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ABSTRACT
EXPLORING THE ROLE OF COLLECTIVE NARCISSISM IN SPORT TEAM
IDENTIFICATION
MAY 2017
BEN LARKIN, B. S., UNIVERSITY OF MAINE ORONO
M. S., SOUTHERN NEW HAMPSHIRE UNIVERSITY
Ph. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Janet Fink
Team identification is among the most widely studied concepts in sport fan behavior.
This is largely due to the fact that highly identified fans exhibit drastically different and more
avid consumption and purchase behavior compared to those low and/or moderate on team
identification. Most notably, this has been manifested in a greater propensity to attend games,
watch the team on television, and purchase team merchandise. While the study of team
identification has focused both on its development and outcomes, one constant is that scholars
have long focused on team identification as a healthy and positive type of team attachment. In
this dissertation, I argue that this is not necessarily always the case. Drawing on literature from
social psychology on a construct known as collective narcissism, I argue that sport fans’
identification with their favorite team(s) may take a collectively narcissistic form that results in
drastically different outcomes and behavioral responses compared to the generally positive team
identification that has been so vigorously studied in the literature.
I investigate this phenomenon through a mixed method approach designed to explore
both the roots and outcomes of collectively narcissistic fandom. In study 1, I explain how
collective narcissism relates to and can extend a number of literature streams in the field of sport
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fan behavior that are most commonly associated with team identification. Furthermore, I
leverage hierarchical regression techniques to show the extent to which collective narcissism can
explain additional variance over and above team identification in these commonly studied
outcome variables. In study 2, I conduct in-depth semi-structured interviews with participants
from the first study, some of whom registered as collective narcissists and others who registered
as merely highly identified but not collectively narcissistic. In comparing the two groups, I
uncover critical differences in the drivers of collective narcissism that are unique from traditional
drivers of team identification. In doing so, I extend the general literature on both collective
narcissism and team identification by exploring the roots of this form of ingroup identification
and elucidating how it develops. Finally, in study 3, I demonstrate the drastically different
behavioral responses exhibited by collective narcissists in comparison to mere highly identified
fans facing team criticism in the context of sport rivalries. Specifically, through a two-way
MANOVA, I show that collective narcissists are significantly more likely than mere highly
identified fans to interpret criticism directed at their favorite team as a threat and respond by
derogating the source and exhibiting aggression intentions.
In sum, these three studies underscore the pivotal role collective narcissism plays in sport
fans’ identification with their favorite team(s). I posit that collective narcissism exists to varying
degrees in virtually every sport fans’ team identification. Moreover, it is this element of
identification that is responsible for many of the behavioral outcomes commonly exhibited by
highly identified sport fans. Collectively, the three studies contribute to a more complete
understanding of team identification and the various forms it may take. A growing body of
literature has sought to extend the concept of team identification by examining the various
elements that contribute to its makeup, but has assumed identification to take a positive and
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healthy form. The current research fills this gap by exploring the development and outcomes of a
collectively narcissistic form of team identification. Moreover, these studies provide insight for
sport managers seeking to better understand many of the idiosyncratic traits and behaviors of
sport fans and leverage this understanding with more effective marketing communications
moving forward.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Team identification is well understood in the sport management literature. For example, a
wealth of research has been put into understanding both the outcomes of team identification
(e.g., Kwon, Trail, & Anderson, 2005; Madrigal, 1995; Trail, Fink, & Anderson, 2003;
Wakefield & Wann, 2006; Wann & Branscombe, 1990; Wu, Tsai, & Hung 2012) as well as how
it develops (Funk & James, 2001; Kolbe & James, 2000; Lock, Darcy, & Taylor, 2009; Lock,
Taylor, Funk, & Darcy, 2012). Researchers have identified a number of outcomes related to fans’
identification with a team (Wu et al., 2012), including basking-in-reflected-glory (BIRG) and
cutting-off-reflected-failure (CORF; Delia, 2015; Kwon, Trail, & Lee, 2008; Madrigal, 1995;
Wann & Branscombe, 1990), loyalty (Kwon et al., 2005; Tsiotsou, 2013; Wu et al., 2012), and
attitude importance (Funk, Haugtvedt, & Howard, 2000; Funk & James, 2004). In addition,
undesirable consequences such as dysfunctional fandom have been identified (Donahue & Wann,
2009; Wakefield & Wann, 2006).
While a considerable amount of research has gone into team identification, one constant
is scholars have always focused their studies on the positive attachments fans form with respect
to their favorite team(s). Certainly, Wann and his colleagues (e.g., Donahue & Wann, 2009;
Wakefield & Wann, 2006) have demonstrated how team identification can manifest in negative
behaviors such as verbal and physical aggression, blasting, etc.; however, this was assumed to
simply represent the behaviors of a select subset of highly identified fans rather than a distinct
form of identification with the sport team in itself. In this series of three essays, I argue that
identification with a sport team can and in some cases does take a different form, a form that has
been referred to as collective narcissism. Collective narcissism has been defined as “an ingroup
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identification tied to an emotional investment in an unrealistic belief about the unparalleled
greatness of an ingroup” (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009, p.
1074). In effect, it is a manifestation of many of the traits and characteristics possessed by those
with a narcissistic personality expressed in relation to an ingroup with which they identify (Golec
de Zavala et al., 2009).
While this construct has been studied extensively in relation to individuals’ national and
ethnic identities (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009;
Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013), to this point it has not been studied in relation
to sport consumers and their identification with a sport team. Given the notion that one can
develop a narcissistic identification in relation to any group with which they identify (Golec de
Zavala & Cichocka, 2012), this is an area that warrants further exploration amongst sport fans.
After all, sport fans have long been criticized for being unrealistic (Poladian, 2015) and
oversensitive (Burke, 2014), and have shown a history of aggressive responses to losses and
criticism (Branscombe & Wann, 1992; Wann, Carlson, & Schrader, 1999), three traits commonly
associated with collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012; Golec de Zavala et al.,
2009).
1.1 Purpose of the Studies, Justification, and Expected Contributions
Accordingly, the overarching purpose of this research is to introduce the collective
narcissism construct to the sport consumer behavior literature and explain how it can be used to
extend a number of literature streams commonly associated with team identification (e.g., BIRG,
CORF, dysfunctional fandom and aggression, attitudes, and loyalty). Specifically, using
hierarchical regression analyses, I examine the additional variance over and above team
identification that can be explained by collective narcissism in these commonly studied outcome
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variables. In doing so, I aim to extend the literature on team identification by showing that it may
sometimes take a different form, which is expected to have wide-ranging implications for our
understanding of sport fan behavior moving forward. Second, I aim to explore the roots of
collective narcissism. Specifically, through semi-structured interviews with self-reported
collectively narcissistic sport fans, I aim to understand how generally positive team identification
may instead take the form of collective narcissism. In doing so, I seek to extend the literature
both on collective narcissism and sport team identification. Finally, in study 3, I look to further
explain how collective narcissism and positive team identification differ. Specifically, I examine
the distinct behavioral responses of both highly identified fans and collective narcissists in the
context of team criticism in sport rivalries. This work aims to show that collective narcissists are
prone to exhibit much more aggressive and intolerant responses to criticism—interpreting even
ambiguous comments as a threat and responding by derogating the outgroup. In doing so, I look
to extend the literature on sport consumer behavior and team identification by showing that
perhaps the collectively narcissistic aspect of one’s identification with their favorite sport team(s)
is responsible for outgroup derogation and intergroup conflict/aggression. It has long been
assumed through the tenets of social identity theory that outgroup derogation is characteristic of
highly identified sport fandom. However, social identity theory research has generally shown
individuals to exhibit more of a proclivity to ingroup favoritism than outgroup derogation
(Brewer, 1979). I aim to isolate the role of collective narcissism in sport team identification and
demonstrate how it may be this distinct construct that is responsible for many of the behaviors
commonly associated with high levels of general sport team identification.
The importance of this research is clear given the aggressive and often excessively
dysfunctional behavior exhibited by sport fans across the globe (e.g., Branscombe & Wann,

3

1992; McClintock, 2011; Wakefield & Wann, 2006). For example, McClintock (2011) detailed a
host of hostile intergroup conflicts between fans of two rival west coast baseball teams that
resulted in serious injury and in some cases death. While extant literature has examined sport fan
aggression (Branscombe & Wann, 1992; Wakefield & Wann, 2006), a strong theoretical
explanation as to the roots of this behavior have not been provided. Wakefield and Wann’s
(2006) work on dysfunctional fans was largely atheoretical. Moreover, although Wann and his
colleagues (e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1992; Wann, 1993; Wann, Carlson, & Schrader, 1999;
Wann, Peterson, Cothran, & Dykes, 1999) have attempted to draw on aggression theory to
explain why highly identified fans may be more prone to aggression, I argue there is an
explanation rooted in certain individuals’ identification with the team that can explain the
excessive and sometimes hostile nature of their fandom. However, it is only through obtaining an
understanding of identification of this nature that we can begin to address problems such as fan
dysfunction and aggression. In addition, I argue there are indeed positive outcomes of collective
narcissism. For example, if these fans are to exhibit higher levels of loyalty and attitude
importance—as is argued here—then this may result in higher degrees of attendance, media, and
merchandise consumption.
1.2 Overview of the Studies
In chapter 2, I begin by first providing a thorough review and background on the
collective narcissism literature. Golec de Zavala and her colleagues have conducted a series of
studies over the last several years that have provided a firm foundation on which to draw in my
efforts to merge this literature with what we know of team identification. From there, I introduce
self-expansion theory, which I argue provides a more appropriate framework than the more
commonly used social identity theory to understand the nature of the relationship developed
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between collective narcissists and their favorite teams. Next, in an effort to demonstrate how
collective narcissism is indeed quite prevalent in the spectator sport industry, I draw on anecdotal
evidence obtained from the National Football League’s New England Patriots fan base. Through
this examination, I aim to point out the characteristics of collective narcissism displayed quite
frequently by these fans. Finally, I explain how collective narcissism is a unique and distinct
form of group esteem, with qualitative differences between this construct and other forms of
inflated group identification. In chapters 3 through 5, I introduce each of the three studies,
including a discussion of their results and contributions. Finally, in chapter 6, I wrap up with a
brief review of the key findings, a discussion of the common thread tying all of the findings
together, and a few concluding remarks on the investigation of this construct moving forward.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Collective Narcissism
Narcissism is a trait characterized by grandiose, but simultaneously unstable self-views
that require incessant validation and admiration from others (Thomaes, Bushman, De Castro, &
Stegge, 2009). Narcissism is thought to stem from a fragile self-esteem, accompanied by an
almost addictive desire to constantly enhance self-esteem (Baumeister & Vohs, 2011; Thomaes
et al., 2009). The concept of collective narcissism extends this theory to groups, suggesting that
if people can be narcissistic with regard to their personal identities, they can certainly be
narcissistic about collective group identities as well (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Collective
narcissism, then, is an exaggerated and insecure collective self-esteem that produces an inflated
and grandiose image of an ingroup. It is seen as an extension of individual narcissism, though the
two variables are distinct, and it has been argued that one can be narcissistic at the individual but
not collective level and vice versa (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). With collective narcissists, the
ingroup is seen as an extension of self (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), though this may only be
specific to certain groups as one can be narcissistic about one (or more) groups, but not others
(Golec de Zavala, 2011). This could stem from the fact that collective narcissism is sometimes
used as a strategy to protect a threatened ego (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). It may be that
groups with which one identifies that provide particularly strong support for an unstable and
fragile ego and self-esteem (e.g., a successful sport team with a rich history) are particularly
susceptible to the emergence of collectively narcissistic identification. Individuals who identify
in this manner are believed to be emotionally invested in an excessive image of an ingroup, an
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image that requires chronic validation and is particularly vulnerable to any and all challenges
from both inside and outside the group (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009).
Because collective narcissists hold on to this grandiose image so tightly, collective
narcissism has been shown to be a strong predictor of intergroup attitudes and relations (Golec
de Zavala et al., 2009). Collective narcissists have been shown to be unwilling to forgive and
forget past slights and unfairness, both real and perceived, and they have been shown to hold
prejudice against certain groups with whom they share a tenuous history (Golec de Zavala et al.,
2009). In fact, specific outgroups are often targeted and perceived as consistently threatening
(Golec de Zavala et al., 2013a). Accordingly, these groups are regularly met with hostile
responses. The magnitude of one’s collective narcissism increases following a negative
evaluation of an ingroup (Golec de Zavala, 2011). Such evaluation is typically interpreted as a
threat and is met with hostility and unwavering defense. These hostile reactions might include
violent and coercive acts even in ambiguous situations (Golec de Zavala, 2011; Golec de Zavala
et al., 2009). However, it is important to note that these individuals are not necessarily generally
hostile, as the aggressive response is limited only to the outgroup perceived to insult or threaten
the collective narcissist’s ingroup in some fashion (Golec de Zavala, 2011).
Collective narcissists’ unparalleled regard for their ingroup leads to the impression that
others simply don’t understand or appreciate the greatness of their ingroup (Golec de Zavala,
2011). This, in turn, creates a feeling amongst collective narcissists that their group is unfairly
treated and constantly threatened. This may include a tendency to believe in conspiracy theories
as a means of protecting the ingroup’s grandiose image (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala,
Marchlewska, & Olechowski, 2015). Even when the group is acknowledged in some fashion by
outsiders, it is rarely seen as good enough. One exception may be those who repeatedly express
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support for the ingroup, as collective narcissists quickly come to tolerate those who regularly
express support and respect for the ingroup. Nevertheless, they remain “constantly vigilant for
new signs of anything undermining the group” (Golec de Zavala, 2011, p. 315), presumably so
they can derogate the source of such perceived slights as a means of temporary self-esteem
restoration.
2.2 Collective Narcissism as Viewed through Self-Expansion Theory
While team identification has traditionally been understood through an application of
social identity theory, Aron et al. (2005) argued that their self-expansion model “provides novel
and potentially useful explanations for ingroup identification processes” (p. 224). Moreover, I
argue that such a model provides a more appropriate framework for an understanding of a
collectively narcissistic identification with a sport team than is provided by social identity theory.
In this section, I discuss the central tenets of self-expansion theory and explain how it fits within
the collective narcissism context.
The origins of self-expansion theory stem from Aron and Aron’s (1986) efforts to
understand attraction and satisfaction in relationships. Their conclusion was that motivation to
enter into such relationships was a result of exploratory motives, such as the desire to enhance
opportunities and increase self-efficacy. The central premise of the model is that when one enters
into a relationship, they gain the other’s resources, perspectives, and identities (Aron et al.,
2005). This process has been shown to take place not just in individual and romantic
relationships, but also in groups (Aron et al., 2005; Tropp & Wright, 2001).
When speaking of resources, the authors referred not just to material or knowledge
resources that may be more characteristic of interpersonal romantic relationships, but also social
assets that can enable individuals’ achievement of goals (Aron et al., 2005). In the context of
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romantic relationships, this may literally provide both partners with resources they did not
previously have; however, in other cases, such as one’s relationship with a sport team, “one may
feel as if what the other has is one’s own even when it is not in actuality” (Aron et al., 2005, p.
210). That is, even when an individual simply perceives another’s resources as their own, the
outcomes (rewards and costs) received by the other are experienced as their own. In the case of a
collective narcissist, I posit that the perception of the team’s resources as their own may be used
as a vehicle to fulfill their excessive and fragile self-esteem addiction, as discussed by Golec de
Zavala and her colleagues (e.g., Cichocka et al., 2015; Golec de Zavala, 2011; Golec de Zavala
et al., 2009; Golec de Zavala et al., 2013a, 2013b) as well as other scholars (e.g., Thomaes,
Bushman, De Castro, & Stegge, 2009).
Since rewards and costs are experienced as their own (Aron et al., 2005), I argue that
criticism of the team is interpreted as a threat—not just to the team, but the individual as well—
and is met with hostility and unwavering defense of the team amongst those fans who are
collective narcissists (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). This exemplifies the reciprocal nature of
resource exchange in relationships (Aron et al., 2005). Recent extensions of self-expansion
theory have argued that those who are attached to brands not only receive the brand’s resources,
but also invest their own resources in the brand as a means of relationship sustenance (Park,
MacInnis, Priester, Eisingerich, & Iacobucci, 2010). While the resources invested may be time or
money resources, the authors argue that this could also be reflected in social resources, such as
“defending the brand or derogating alternatives” (Johnson & Rusbult, 1989; Park et al., 2010, p.
4). Indeed, both the unwavering defense of the ingroup and derogation of the outgroup are
characteristic of collective narcissism, but not necessarily mere ingroup identification (Golec de
Zavala et al., 2013). Moreover, narcissists are typically achievement-oriented (Paulhus &
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Williams, 2002; Thomaes et al., 2009) and leverage social relationships as a means of
establishing social dominance and furthering their own agenda (Thomaes et al., 2009),
tendencies that certainly coalesce with the self-expansion view of ingroup identification.
Therefore, in short, I argue that collective narcissists identify with a team in an effort to
boost an excessive, yet fragile, self-esteem. This effort requires an identification characterized by
a reciprocal exchange of resources, such that—through the view of the collective narcissist—
team outcomes are experienced as their own. Accordingly, they invest their own resources in
defending the team and derogating the opposition.
2.3 A Case of Collective Narcissism: The New England Patriots Fan Base
Collective narcissism has most commonly been studied in the context of individuals’
national identities (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012); however, its effects have been
demonstrated in groups beyond the national context (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013). Although it
has never been examined in sport, anecdotal evidence of typical collectively narcissistic behavior
can be found in the actions of the National Football League’s New England Patriots fan base.
Burke (2014) detailed a widespread oversensitivity of this fan base. Researchers have suggested
that social contexts and situational factors can give rise to collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala
et al., 2009) and the New England Patriots’ involvement in a seemingly endless list of scandals
over the years has perhaps provided a breeding ground for identification of this nature amongst
their fan base. Van Natta and Wickersham (2015) detailed the two most noteworthy accounts,
often referred to as “SpyGate” and “DeflateGate.” In “SpyGate,” the Patriots found themselves
in the National Football League’s (NFL) cross hairs for illegally videotaping opponents’ signals.
The more recent “DeflateGate” refers to the Patriots’ usage of footballs below the air pressure
limit mandated by the NFL. As Van Natta and Wickersham (2015) explained, the league went
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relatively easy on the Patriots when handing down the punishment in “SpyGate,” but perhaps
made up for this lenient sentence by inflicting a considerably harsher punishment for
“DeflateGate.” This added NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell and sport and entertainment
network ESPN—who Patriots fans seem to believe has it out for the team given how they have
covered the scandal (Hill, 2015; Wilbur, 2015)—to the growing list of enemies the team has
acquired over the years (e.g., Shaughnessy, 2015).
Consistent with the behavior of collective narcissists, the New England Patriots fan base
has demonstrated an extreme vulnerability and sensitivity to challenges from outside the group
and an unwillingness to forgive past transgressions with outgroups (e.g., the Colts, the NFL, and
ESPN). In addition, fans have been on high alert for anything and everything that might
undermine the group, no matter how ambiguous. Such perceived attacks have led to beliefs in
conspiracy theories and have been met with aggressive responses, presumably as a means of ego
restoration. Refer to Table 2.1 for examples of how the New England Patriots fan base has
exemplified such traits and behaviors.
Although highly identified sport fans have long shown a tendency to derogate perceived
outgroups (Delia, 2015; Wann & Branscombe, 1990), I posit that this finding may stem from the
fact that collective narcissism has never been measured or parsed out in a team identification
measure. Therefore, it is important I distinguish between collective narcissism and other forms of
identification or group esteem. This will allow me to elucidate how collective narcissism relates
to and can extend a number of literature streams in the sport consumer behavior literature.
2.4 Collective Narcissism as a Distinct Form of Identification and Group Esteem
There is a qualitative difference between collective narcissism and other forms of inflated
group esteem (Golec de Zavala, 2011; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Moreover, citing the weak
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relationship found between ingroup identification and outgroup derogation found in metaanalytic work (e.g., Pehrson, Brown & Zagefka, 2009), Golec de Zavala et al. (2013b)
demonstrated that there is a distinct narcissistic aspect of ingroup identification that, when parsed
out, serves as a robust predictor of outgroup derogation and hostility. Across numerous studies,
the researchers demonstrated a consistent and robust negative relationship between positive
ingroup identification and outgroup negativity, but a significant and robust positive relationship
between collective narcissism and outgroup negativity. It is important to note, however, that
independently the relationship between ingroup identification and outgroup negativity was
negative, but not significant. It was only when collective narcissism was added to the regression
that the relationship became both negative and significant. This led Golec de Zavala and her
team to conclude:
Genuine, non-narcissistic in-group positivity predicts positive attitudes toward outgroups…however, because in-group positivity is positively related to collective
narcissism, a tendency to form hostile attitudes toward out-groups associated with
collective narcissism masks the potential of unpretentious and noncontingent positive ingroup regard to predict positive attitudes toward out-groups (Golec de Zavala et al.,
2013a, p. 25).
Consistent with social identity theory, sport researchers have long demonstrated a
tendency for highly identified sport fans to derogate the outgroup (Branscombe & Wann, 1992;
Delia, 2015), bask-in-reflected-glory (Delia, 2015; Wann & Branscombe, 1990), and in some
cases act aggressively toward such entities as the opposing team and/or referees (Branscombe &
Wann, 1992; Wakefield & Wann, 2006). However, to this point, the narcissistic component of
team identification that may exist to varying degrees in sport fans has not been accounted for in
spectator research. This is important given that extant measures of group identification capture
both narcissistic and non-narcissistic components of in-group positivity, failing to distinguish
between the two (Golec de Zavala et al., 2011). In short, it may be that the narcissistic
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component of sport fans’ team identification is partially responsible for various behaviors;
however, until parsed out and accounted for alongside generally positive team identification, this
cannot be determined.
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Table 2.1
Collective Narcissism in Professional Sport Fandom
Collectively Narcissistic
Traits, Beliefs, and Behaviors
Collective narcissists are
characterized by a feeling that
others simply don’t understand
the greatness of their ingroup
Collective narcissists exhibit an
unwillingness to forgive and
forget past slights, both real and
perceived

Examples demonstrated by the New England Patriots Fan Base
•

Patriots fans have embraced the tagline “You hate us ‘cause you ain’t us,” which essentially boils down to the notion
that any criticism of the franchise is sour grapes (Metcalf, 2015)

•

The Patriots have a long list of enemies stemming from a tenuous history both with the league in general and specific
opponents, including (Shaughnessy, 2015):
-The Baltimore Ravens, who allegedly tipped off the Colts organization to keep an eye out for deflated footballs
during the AFC Championship game
-The Indianapolis Colts for bring the deflated football issue to the attention of the league
-The Houston Texans organization for doing little more than criticizing the Patriots for not cooperating during the
“DeflateGate” investigation
-Any other owner who expressed support for the NFL commissioner during the “DeflateGate” investigation,
including Dallas Cowboys Owner Jerry Jones and New York Giants Owner John Mara
The animosity for the most recent enemy, the Indianapolis Colts, is particularly pronounced
-Patriots defeat of the Colts in the 2015 season was not the “blood bath” fans were hoping for as the main target for
retribution following “DeflateGate” (Dolloff, 2015)
-“New England fans…want the Patriots to continue their scorched-earth campaign and roll up a kazillion points on
the Colts” (Lowe, 2015, para 5)
During the “DeflateGate” investigation, New England Patriots fans have undergone a transformation taking them
from “well-adjusted, rational people into emotional, hypersensitive wrecks” (Malinowski, 2015, para 8)
Members of a New England Patriots blog and fan community interpreted a harmless and ambiguous tweet on the part
of ESPN during a Patriots Monday Night Football telecast as an antagonistic reference to the team’s role in the
“SpyGate” scandal. Specifically, the network tweeted a stream of football and camera emoji icons, to which Hill
(2015) responded, “this could very well be an attempt to highlight all of the camera reviews that broke up the flow of
the game, but everyone knows exactly how this tweet would be received” (para 4)
Even a year after the “DeflateGate” scandal initially occurred, the fan base and media continues to perpetuate it by
holding on to these past perceived slights
Giles (2015) detailed a series of conspiracy theories diehard New England Patriots use as a means of explaining
“DeflateGate” in some fashion other than the Patriots cheating

•

Collective narcissists display an
extreme vulnerability and
sensitivity to challenges and
criticism, no matter how
ambiguous, even going so far
as to chronically scan the
external environment for
anything that might undermine
the group
Collective narcissists display a
tendency to buy in to
conspiracy theories as a means
of protecting ingroup image
against threat

•
•

•
•
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Collective narcissists respond
aggressively to perceived
attacks and slights

•
•
•

•

Malinowski notes, “After ‘DeflateGate,’ Pats fans are mad as hell and they’re looking for revenge against Roger
Goodell and the NFL’s ‘sting’ operation”
Kurkjian (2015) relayed a quote from a Patriots fan at a 2015 home game, who, in reference to NFL Commissioner
Roger Goodell, stated “he’s afraid of this place. I would be, too, if I was him…He would hear some bad things
coming his way. He wouldn’t have a pleasant arrival or exit” (para 16)
Other fans have suggested every week will represent revenge against anybody who said or did something, such as
those enemies identified by Shaughnessy (2015), providing an opportunity for the Patriots to make clear: “You
should have kept your mouth shut, and now we’re going to shove you in a locker and teach you a lesson”
(Malinowski, 2015, para 40)
Fans have even gone to the lengths of hiring private planes to fly over Commissioner Goodell’s vacation home in
Scarborough, ME with banners containing antagonistic messages directed at the commissioner (Associated Press,
2015; Basu, 2015)
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 1: THE OUTCOMES OF COLLECTIVE NARCISSISM
I propose that when added into hierarchical regression models on top of positive team
identification, collective narcissism will serve to explain a substantial amount of additional
variance over and above team identification in a number of commonly studied constructs in sport
consumer research. In the sections that follow, I review literature on such topics as BIRGing and
CORFing, dysfunctional fandom, sport fan aggression, sport fan attitudes, and sport fan loyalty.
In doing so, I aim to elucidate the role collective narcissism may play in these various literature
streams.
3.1 Collective Narcissism and BIRGing and CORFing
In their foundational work, Cialdini et al. (1976) demonstrated the tendency for
individuals to “share in the glory of a successful other with whom they are in some way
associated” (p. 366). This phenomenon, which the researchers termed basking-in-reflected-glory
(BIRGing), was demonstrated by college students’ tendency to wear team apparel and use the
pronoun ‘we’ to a greater extent after a (football) team win than a team loss. In the years since
this study, a great deal of research in the sport consumer behavior literature has been dedicated to
this phenomenon (e.g., Delia, 2015; Hirt, Zillman, Erickson, & Kennedy, 1992; Kwon et al.,
2008; Wann & Branscombe, 1990). This research has included the related phenomenon of
cutting-off-reflected-failure (CORFing), which refers to the propensity for individuals to distance
themselves from unsuccessful others (Wann & Branscombe, 1990).
Research has shown that these phenomena are identity enhancement techniques
motivated by individuals’ desire to maintain a positive self-esteem (Hirt et al., 1992; Wann &
Branscome, 1990). Furthermore, higher levels of fan identification have been shown to result in
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a greater tendency to BIRG and a lower tendency to CORF. Because the team is so central to
these individuals’ self-concept, their identities persist even through hard times and negative
public ridicule (Wann & Branscombe, 1990). Accordingly, CORFing is not viewed as a viable
identity maintenance strategy for those highly identified with a team. However, given their
robust attachment to the team, these individuals will be the first to BIRG following a team win.
The notion that BIRGing and CORFing tendencies are designed to maintain a positive
self-esteem could have implications for collective narcissists’ propensity to do so given that there
are indeed categorical differences in the extent to which narcissistic and non-narcissistic
individuals pursue self-esteem (Thomaes et al., 2009). That is, non-narcissistic individuals are
apt to attempt to enhance self-esteem in situations that organically allow for it (i.e., after a team
win); in contrast, narcissists more frequently seek out and/or even artificially create such
situations in an effort to feed their self-esteem addiction (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Thomaes et
al., 2009). It seems, then, that a narcissistically identified fan’s chronic need for self-esteem
enhancement would lead to a perpetual effort to associate themselves with the team even in
situations when a typical highly identified fan may not. Moreover, Delia (2015) suggested that
BIRGing is not just for the purpose of affiliation, belongingness, and pride, but also to ensure
that others know they are superior to and not associated with the opposition. Given that
collective narcissists perceive their ingroup to be of unparalleled dominance and superiority
(Golec de Zavala, 2011; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), I posit that the narcissistic portion of
one’s identification with a sport team could be partially responsible for the BIRGing
phenomenon.
Similarly, sport consumer behavior scholars have long held that outgroup derogation
represents perhaps the only identity restoration technique available to highly identified fans
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given their unwillingness to CORF (Wann & Branscombe, 1990). This research, however, has
never accounted for collective narcissism within the same study. Viewed through self-expansion
theory (e.g., Aron et al., 2005), collective narcissists can be understood to experience the rewards
and costs associated with the team as their own. It is for this reason that they invest resources in
the relationship with the team (Park et al., 2010), such as a tendency to defend the team no
matter how dire the situation. Even highly identified fans have been shown to reduce their
relationship with the team in the wake of such situations as player scandals (Fink, Parker, Brett,
& Higgins, 2009). Therefore, it would seem collective narcissists would be even less likely to
CORF than merely highly identified fans. Based on the preceding logic, I expect collective
narcissism will explain additional variance over and above team identification in both BIRGing
and CORFing.
3.2 Collective Narcissism and Dysfunctional Fandom
Team identification has long been associated with aggressive behavior on the part of
sport fans. Wann and Branscombe (1990) noted “highly identified fans, when threatened by a
loss, may be more likely to aggress than those low on identification. They cannot cope by
distancing themselves as low identified persons can” (p. 113). Branscombe and Wann (1992)
identified a number of additional causes beyond their inability to CORF. Such rationale included
the presence of situational factors (i.e., heat, crowd noise and density) that produce arousal,
particularly for those highly identified fans who feel intense affect. They argued that arousal
could exacerbate fans’ tendency to categorize, stereotype, and exhibit attributional biases.
According to Wann (2006), identification has been found to be the primary factor
facilitating fan aggression. He discussed a number of ways in which aggression may manifest in
sport spectatorship, but the type of aggression most relevant to this discussion is that of
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instrumental aggression. While this goal-oriented aggression may be geared toward helping the
team, it is often more of an attempt to restore psychological health and self-esteem (Wann,
2006). Given that narcissists differ from non-narcissists in the degree to which they pursue selfesteem (Baumeister & Vohs, 2001; Thomaes et al., 2009), it seems collective narcissists may
possess an even greater need to aggress than those who are merely highly identified with the
team.
More recent research has extended the concept of aggression to represent a mere subset
of the behavior exhibited by what Wakefield and Wann (2006) referred to as dysfunctional fans.
They defined dysfunctional fans as “overly zealous and abusive,” and suggested they have
“taken identification to the extremes” (Wakefield & Wann, 2006, p. 170). Further, they
purported that this group represents but a small segment of highly identified sport fans, those that
are confrontational and complain often. They found this group to be significantly more likely to
engage in behavior such as blasting officials, calling into sports talk radio to criticize the team,
believing in the need to consume alcohol during games, and traveling to away games in an effort
to start trouble with the opposing team’s fans.
In short, Wann and his colleagues have consistently suggested that team identification
can be taken to extremes, wherein certain fans exhibit aggressive and hostile behavior as a means
of identity restoration (Branscombe & Wann, 1992; Wakefield & Wann, 2006). However,
interestingly, in presenting their portrait of the dysfunctional fan, Wakefield and Wann (2006)
linked dysfunctional fan behavior to narcissism and the need to cope with an inflated, yet fragile,
self-esteem. Specifically, they drew on Ruiz, Smith, and Rhodewalt’s (2001) notion that
“narcissism and hostility are both characterized by dysfunctional social interactions, including
tendencies to perceive slights, experience anger, and behave aggressively” (p. 537). Moreover,
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these dysfunctional fans’ aggressive responses to self-concept damage represent an attempt to
cope with “inflated and fragile self-esteems” (Wakefield & Wann, 2006, p. 182). Wakefield and
Wann’s (2006) portrayal of the dysfunctional fan draws several parallels to collective narcissism,
most notably hostile responses stemming from an inflated, yet fragile, self-esteem (e.g., Golec de
Zavala et al., 2009). They parsed out participants into two groups, including highly identified
fans with low dysfunctionality and highly identified fans with high dysfunctionality. Based on
the preceding logic, I posit that this subset of highly identified fans with high dysfunctionality
are more than likely collectively narcissistic fans. Therefore, I expect collective narcissism will
predict additional variance over and above team identification in dysfunctional fandom.
3.3 Collective Narcissism and Attitude Importance
Attitude has been defined as both an enduring feeling about an entity that has the power
to guide behavior (Funk et al., 2000; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981), as well as a learned
predisposition with regard to a particular object (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Funk et al., 2000).
Funk and his colleagues have explained that team identification is a key antecedent to attitude
importance with respect to the team (Funk et al., 2000; Funk & James, 2004). Importance
reflects the “psychological significance and value attached to the team stemming from one’s selfconcept” (Funk et al., 2000, p. 132). Although there are many properties of attitudes, attitude
importance has been shown to be a strong predictor of various dependent variables and thus
represents a useful point of departure in the discussion of attitudes amongst sport fans (Funk &
James, 2004).
Funk et al. (2000) explained that attitude importance “motivates individuals to selectively
process and elaborate on personally relevant information” (p. 132-133). Accordingly, those who
possess stronger attitudes and place a great deal of importance on the team are more apt to notice
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newspaper articles written about the team. Such behavior is characteristic of collective
narcissists, as these individuals regularly survey the external landscape for anything that might
undermine their group (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Moreover, attitude importance has been
shown to be highly predictive of more persistent attitudes that are resistant to change, as well as a
willingness to support the team even in times of controversy (Funk et al., 2000). While those
who are highly identified with the team have been shown to reduce their association with the
team in such circumstances (Fink et al., 2009), collective narcissists are more apt to resist and
respond aggressively (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). This is tied to the grandiose image these
individuals possess with regard to the team. Moreover, scholars have argued that narcissism is a
personality trait that predisposes people to hold strong attitudes rooted in ingroup favoritism
(e.g., Bizumic & Duckitt, 2008). Accordingly, we posit that collective narcissists’ attitudes are
more persistent and resistant to change compared to those who are merely highly identified with
the team. Their attitudes with respect to the team could thus be characterized by a higher degree
of importance. Therefore, I argue that collective narcissism will explain additional variance in
attitude importance over and above that explained by team identification.
3.4 Collective Narcissism and Loyalty
Team loyalty is arguably the most important outcome variable in sport management.
Team identification has long been shown to be an antecedent to loyalty (Kwon et al., 2005;
Tsiotsou, 2013; Wu et al., 2012). Kwon et al. (2005) found team identification to predict
cognitive, affective, conative, and behavioral loyalty, while no other point of attachment (e.g.,
player, coach, etc.) explained a practically meaningful amount of variance in any of the various
types of loyalty. Tsiotsou (2013) explained that the key driver that converts mere cognitive
processes into loyal consumer behavior is one’s attachment to (or identification with) a team. Wu
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et al. (2012) found that both team and player identification were direct predictors of behavioral
loyalty. Vicarious achievement and trust were found to be antecedents to team identification,
suggesting that the extent to which one trusts the team and derives self-esteem by virtue of the
team’s achievement are aspects of individuals’ team identification that indirectly explain
behavioral loyalty.
While highly identified fans have long been shown to be more loyal to the team than
casual fans, there is reason to believe collective narcissism could be partially responsible for this
pattern. Shabad (2010) spoke of a “narcissistic loyalty to one’s own kind” (p. 710). On a similar
note, Bizumic and Duckitt (2008) studied narcissism in a group context, suggesting that due to
their on-going efforts to regulate self-esteem “narcissists tend to see anything that is closely
associated with themselves as grandiose, important, and superior” (p. 442). They further argued
that these individuals are thus likely to see their groups in this fashion and develop ethnocentric
beliefs.
As previously discussed, collective narcissists stand behind their team in virtually any
and all circumstances (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). The same has long been posited to be true
for those merely highly identified with a team (Funk & James, 2000), however, more recent
work has proven otherwise (Bizman & Yinon, 2002). Moreover, seen through the lens of selfexpansion theory (e.g., Park et al., 2010), collective narcissists can be expected to expend
significant financial, time, and social resources as a means of relationship maintenance. For
example, stemming from their tendency to remain perpetually on watch for anything
undermining the team (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), it seems collective narcissists may invest
more time on sport media consumption related to the team to ensure they are being held in a
positive regard by both mainstream and social media. Moreover, if my supposition that
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dysfunctional fans can be characterized as collective narcissists is to be believed, it would seem
these individuals would be more apt to both consume the team via sport talk radio and even
exhibit the uniquely loyal behavior of attending the team’s away games (Wakefield & Wann,
2006), a behavior that would require an extremely significant investment in time, financial, and
social resources. That is, the cost of both travel and game tickets would require significantly
more time and financial resources than even a home game. Furthermore, given that the game is
played in the opposition’s home facility, the individual would then need to invest social
resources in defending their team and derogating the opposition. Based on the preceding logic, I
argue that collective narcissism will explain additional variance in behavioral loyalty beyond that
explained by team identification.
3.5 Methods
A total of 254 sport fans 18 years of age and above were recruited to participate in a
survey built on Qualtrics survey software. Participants were recruited from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service to complete the survey containing measures of the variables
discussed above in the literature review. MTurk has been shown to be a source for reliable data
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), with a more demographically diverse and representative
pool of participants than college students (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).
3.5.1 Measures
The survey contained the following variables (see Table 3.1 for a list of items for each
construct). All items were measured using a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree).
•

Collective Narcissism. Collective narcissism was measured using an adaptation of Golec
de Zavala et al.’s (2009) scale. The 9-item one factor model exhibited excellent model fit
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and an alpha coefficient as high as .84 in their studies. Moreover, the predictive validity
of the scale has been established numerous times across studies (e.g., Golec de Zavala et
al., 2009; Golec de Zavala et al., 2013b).
•

Team Identification. Team Identification was measured using the Attachment to Team
subscale from the Points of Attachment Inventory (e.g., Robinson, Trail, & Kwon, 2004).
This measure has exhibited alpha coefficients of .97 and AVE values around .90 in recent
work (e.g., Larkin, 2015; Larkin, Fink, & Trail, 2015).

•

Basking-in-reflected-glory. BIRG was measured using Kwon, Trail, and Anderson’s
(2005) measure. The construct showed strong psychometric properties, with an alpha
coefficient of .87 and an AVE value of .686.

•

Cutting-off-reflected-failure. CORF was measured using Kwon, Trail, and Lee’s (2008)
measure. This measure exhibited an alpha coefficient of .87 and an AVE value of .689 in
their work.

•

Dysfunctional Fandom. Dysfunctional Fandom was measured using Wakefield and
Wann’s (2006) measure. The alpha coefficient for this measure was just .72 in their work,
but to my knowledge, no other measure exists to capture this construct.

•

Aggression. Aggression was measured using Wann, Schrader, and Carlson’s (2000)
Hostile and Instrumental Aggression of Spectator’s Questionnaire. This measure
displayed alpha coefficients ranging from .83 to .94.

•

Attitude Importance. Attitude Importance was measured using an adaptation of Jacks and
Devine’s (2000) measure. This construct displayed an alpha coefficient of .80 in their
work.
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•

Loyalty. Loyalty was measured using Tsiotsou’s (2013) measure, which contains both a
behavioral loyalty and loyalty intention measure. Only the behavioral loyalty component
was used for this study. Tsiotsou (2013) reviewed a number of sport team loyalty
measures and identified a series of conceptualization and operationalization issues. It was
concluded that this measure, drawn from Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman (1996), was
the most suitable measure of team loyalty. Collectively, this measure exhibited an AVE
value of .93.

3.6 Analysis & Results
Initially, seven of the 254 cases were removed because the subjects failed the
authentication question, which simply asked them to select a certain number for a specific
question to ensure they were completing the survey in earnest. This left a final sample size of
247 participants. The sample consisted of 68.4% males with an average age of 34.1 years old. A
total of 36% of the sample reported a 2015 household income between $20,000 and $49,999,
while 27.5% reported making between $50,000 and $79,999, 13.8% reported making $19,999 or
less, 12.6% reported making between $80,000 and $109,999, and just 10.1% reported making
more than $110,000.
3.6.1 Measurement Model
Descriptive statistics, including the means and standard deviations of the variables of
interest, can be found in Table 3.2. Initially, the measurement model was assessed through a
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using Mplus 5.0 structural equation modeling (SEM)
software. The initial assessment of the measurement model revealed the following fit statistics:
[2/df ratio = (1863.883/743 = 2.51), CFI = .835, RMSEA = .078, and SRMR = .090], indicating
poor model fit per widely accepted SEM guidelines. Hu and Bentler (1999) argued that the 2/df
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ratio should fall below 3.0, the CFI should exceed .90, and both the RMSEA and SRMR should
fall below .08. Therefore, the initial assessment of the measurement model revealed poor fit per
both the CFI and SRMR fit index criteria. In addition, the model failed to demonstrate both
convergent and discriminant validity. With regard to convergent validity, there was one item
from the Collective Narcissism measure as well as one item from the Loyalty measure that
presented an issue. One of the Collective Narcissism items read “I do not get upset when people
do not notice achievements of my group.” This item is worded with a double-negative, which
can be assumed to have created confusion amongst participants responding to the measure. This
may have confounded the results to a degree. Accordingly, this item was dropped from the
Collective Narcissism measure for further analyses. One of the Loyalty items read “I attend all of
the events of my team.” While this would certainly be indicative of loyalty, it is also unrealistic
given the cost of attending sport events in the United States. As has been noted in past research,
cost is one constraint to sport event attendance that could prove insurmountable irrespective of
the individual’s level of identification and/or motivation to attend (Larkin et al., 2015). In short, I
posit that this item is simply not a fair indicator of loyalty to a particular team. Accordingly, this
item was dropped from the Loyalty measure for further analyses. With regard to discriminant
validity, several more issues emerged. First, discriminant validity between Hostile Aggression
and Instrumental Aggression, Hostile Aggression and Dysfunctional Fandom, and Instrumental
Aggression and Dysfunctional Fandom was not established. The correlations between these
variables did not exceed the AVE values of the constructs in question, as prescribed by Fornell
and Larcker (1981). This was not necessarily unexpected given that aggression is considered a
hallmark of dysfunctional fandom (Wakefield & Wann, 2006). Given that dysfunctional fandom
captures a wider domain of dysfunctionality amongst fans—a domain that includes aggression—
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Dysfunctional Fandom was kept for further analyses, while both Hostile Aggression and
Instrumental Aggression were dropped from the analyses. Finally, the correlation between
Attitude Importance and Team Identification was .971, which when squared also exceeded the
AVE values of both subscales. Therefore, Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) discriminant validity
criteria was not met for these constructs. Moreover, with an AVE of 0.48, Attitude Importance
presented convergent validity issues and was thus dropped from the analysis.
Following the aforementioned changes, the measurement model was once again assessed
and it revealed the following fit statistics: [2/df ratio = (687.962/334 = 2.06), CFI = .909,
RMSEA = .065, and SRMR = .064], indicating acceptable model fit per widely accepted SEM
guidelines (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Moreover, convergent validity was demonstrated as all AVE
values exceeded the requisite 0.50 cutoff (see Table 3.3 for an illustration of the psychometric
properties of the subscales). In addition, discriminant validity was established as all AVE values
exceeded the squared correlations between constructs (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; see Table 3.4
for the correlations amongst the latent variables).
3.6.2 Hierarchical Regression Model
Factor scores were created using principal components analysis with direct oblimin
rotation in SPSS 22. Subsequently, a two stage hierarchical regression model was conducted for
each of the four remaining dependent variables (i.e., BIRGing, CORFing, Dysfunctional
Fandom, and Loyalty). In each case, Team Identification was entered first, with Collective
Narcissism entered second to ascertain the amount of additional variance on top of Team
Identification that Collective Narcissism explains in the dependent variables. Given the likely
correlation between the dependent variables, a Bonferroni correction was used, such that
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significance was achieved by p < .0125. The results of the hierarchical regression analyses are
summarized in Table 3.5.
The hierarchical regression revealed that at the first stage, Team Identification was a
significant predictor of BIRGing, F (1, 246) = 150.23, p < .001, explaining 38% of the variance.
When Collective Narcissism was added to the model in step two it made a significant change, F
(2, 244) = 106.78, p < .001, explaining an additional 8.7% of the variance in BIRGing. When
both Team Identification and Collective Narcissism were included in the regression model
together, both predictors were significant (p < .001) and they served to explain 46.7% of the
variance in BIRGing. With respect to CORFing, Team Identification was again a significant
predictor, F (1, 246) = 51.26, p < .001, explaining 17.3% of the variance. When Collective
Narcissism was added to the model in step two it made a significant change to the model, F (2,
244) = 39.54, p < .001, explaining an additional 7.2% of the variance in CORFing. When both
Team Identification and Collective Narcissism were included in the regression model together,
both predictors were significant (p < .001), collectively explaining 24.5% of the variance in
CORFing. However, interestingly, and contrary to expectations, the coefficient for Team
Identification was negative (= -.531, p < .001), as expected, but the coefficient for Collective
Narcissism was positive (= .291, p < .001), indicating Collective Narcissism was actually
positively associated with CORFing. With respect to Dysfunctional Fandom, Team Identification
was once again a significant predictor, F (1, 246) = 82.20, p < .001, explaining 25.1% of the
variance. When Collective Narcissism was added to the model in step two it made a significant
change to the model, F (2, 244) = 100.91, p < .001, explaining an additional 20.2% of the
variance in Dysfunctional Fandom. When both Team Identification and Dysfunctional Fandom
were included in the regression model together, both predictors were significant (p < .001),
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explaining a total of 45.3% of the variance in Dysfunctional Fandom. Finally, with respect to
Loyalty, Team Identification was again a significant predictor, F (1, 246) = 135.34, p < .001,
explaining 35.6% of the variance. When Collective Narcissism was added to the model in step
two the model was once again significant, F (2, 244) = 69.98, p < .001; however, this explained
only 0.8% of additional variance in Loyalty, for a total of 36.4%. Moreover, when both Team
Identification and Collective Narcissism were included in the regression model together, only
Team Identification was a significant predictor.
I also examined some potential behavioral correlates of both Team Identification and
Collective Narcissism, including Attendance Intention, Substitution Intention, number of team’s
games attended in the previous year, number of team’s games intended to attend in the next year,
and number of games intended to watch on television in the next year. Neither Team
Identification nor Collective Narcissism explained a practically meaningful amount of variance
in past or future behavior. This was the case both together and independently. However, an
interesting result emerged with regard to the behavioral intention items (which were measured on
a 7-point likert scale). These items simply asked participants, given the choice between attending
future games or watching them at home, whether they were “likely to attend future games”
(Attendance Intention) or “likely to watch future games at home rather than attend” (Substitution
Intention). The hierarchical regression indicated that at the first stage, Team Identification was a
statistically significant predictor of Attendance Intention, F (1, 246) = 24.612, p < .001,
explaining 9.1% of the variance. When Collective Narcissism was added to the model in step
two it made a significant change to the model, F (2, 244) = 16.454, p < .001, but explained only
2.8% of additional variance. With regard to Substitution Intention, when Team Identification was
entered into the regression model in the first stage, it was not a statistically significant predictor

29

of Substitution Intention, F (1, 246) = 0.186, p = .667, explaining just 0.1% of the variance.
However, when Collective Narcissism was added into the model in the second stage, it made a
significant change to the model, F (2, 244) = 7.856, p < .001, explaining an additional 5.9% of
the variance. However, interestingly, the coefficient for Collective Narcissism was negative (=
-.266, p < .001), while the coefficient for Team Identification was positive, but not significant
(= .132, p = .051).
3.7 Discussion
The results of the research reveal that collective narcissism plays a significant and
meaningful role in explaining a number of outcome variables commonly associated with team
identification, including BIRGing, CORFing, and dysfunctional fandom. Such findings have
significant implications for the development of theory and literature on sport fan behavior. In the
sections that follow, I discuss these findings and their theoretical implications—specifically
identifying how they extend the sport fan behavior literature in a number of capacities.
Subsequently, I discuss the practical implications of the work, as well as limitations and
directions for future research.
3.7.1 Collective Narcissism and BIRGing
Collective narcissism explained an additional 8.7% of variance in BIRGing on top of the
38% explained by team identification independently. This indicates that the collectively
narcissistic portion of fans’ team identification is partially responsible for their BIRGing
tendencies. This finding is consistent with the notion that narcissists have a self-esteem addiction
and thus perpetually seek out ways to boost their self-esteem (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001;
Thomaes et al., 2009). Given the notion that BIRGing is an identity enhancement technique
rooted in a quest to maintain a positive self-esteem (Hirt et al., 1992), it would seem the

30

collectively narcissistic portion of fans’ team identification could be a driving force in their
general BIRGing tendencies. Furthermore, given that BIRGing is also motivated by a desire to
display superiority (Delia, 2015), BIRGing could be driven in part by collective narcissists’
desire to see their team (group) as superior (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Regardless, scholars
have long held that highly identified fans have a heightened tendency to BIRG (Hirt et al., 1992;
Kwon et al., 2008; Wann & Branscombe, 1990); however, this study extends on that notion by
showing that this tendency is partially a result of the collectively narcissistic portion of
individuals’ team identification. This opens up new directions for future research on the subject
of BIRGing.
3.7.2 Collective Narcissism and CORFing
Scholars have also long held that highly identified fans have a reduced tendency to CORF
(Wann & Branscombe, 1990), due largely to the fact that the team is so central to their selfconcept. I expected this to be even more pronounced amongst collective narcissists for a number
of reasons, most notably because of their tendency to stand behind their groups and invest
resources in their defense (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). While collective narcissism did explain
a significant amount of additional variance (7.2%) in CORFing, the relationship was not in the
expected direction. In contrast to team identification, collective narcissism was positively related
to CORFing.
While unexpected, I feel this could be rooted in the type of self-esteem typically
possessed by narcissists. As noted, collective narcissists possess an inflated but unstable and
vulnerable self-esteem. Moreover, narcissists typically possess what has been referred to as
discrepant high self-esteem—meaning they have low implicit self-esteem and high explicit selfesteem (Zeigler-Hill, 2006). This distinction is entrenched in the dual-process perspective. Put
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simply, implicit self-esteem is rooted in the nonconscious, automatic processing system (Pelham
& Hetts, 1999; Zeigler-Hill, 2006), while explicit self-esteem is a product of the cognitive
system (Brown, 1993; Zeigler-Hill, 2006). Thus, explicit self-esteem refers to the “conscious
feelings of self-liking, self-worth, and acceptance,” while implicit self-esteem is exemplified by
“nonconscious, automatic, and overlearned self-evaluations” (Zeigler-Hill, 2006, p. 120).
Because narcissists are low on implicit (nonconscious) self-esteem, but high on explicit
(conscious) self-esteem, they possess underlying negative associations of the self that are
incongruent to their conscious attitudes, in turn leaving them susceptible to temporary
fluctuations in their explicit self-esteem (Kernis, 2003; Zeigler-Hill, 2006). Moreover, these
individuals are more sensitive and reactive to negative events (e.g., failure, losses, etc.), perhaps
due to the triggering of those underlying negative associations of the self (Zeigler-Hill, 2006).
This is why they are more prone to such tendencies as unrealistic optimism (Bosson, Brown,
Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003) and defensive behaviors like ingroup bias and dissonance
reduction (e.g., CORFing; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003).
It is also worth noting that the unwavering ingroup defense exhibited by collective
narcissists in past work occurred in a markedly different context. Past work was largely
conducted in the context of national identities and international relations, contexts generally
characterized by subjective actions and perceptions of various countries. In contrast, the sport
context comes with a clear cut winner and loser when it comes to game outcomes, leaving sport
fans few options for rationalizing such outcomes.
In short, perhaps collectively narcissistic fans project grandiose attitudes with regard to
the team—attitudes that mask underlying vulnerability. This, in turn, leaves them susceptible to
fluctuations in explicit self-esteem, outward expression, and ultimately defensive behaviors
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aimed at dissonance reduction (e.g., CORFing). I posit, however, that these lapses in explicit
self-esteem are only temporary. These are only momentary defensive techniques that represent a
departure from collective narcissists’ general tendency to invest resources in defending the team.
The finding that collective narcissism is positively related to CORFing could also be
useful in explaining contradictory findings from past work on the construct. Although the bulk of
the research has found a negative association between team identification and CORFing, at least
one study has found otherwise, as Ware and Kowalski (2012) found those fans who strongly
associate with a team to be the most likely to both BIRG following a win and CORF after a loss.
Given that collective narcissism is thought to represent a distinct narcissistic aspect of
individuals’ ingroup identification (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013a, 2013b), it could be that Ware
and Kowalski’s (2012) sample was made up of individuals with a particularly pronounced
narcissistic element to their team identification. Researchers must parse out the (collectively)
narcissistic element of ingroup identification to draw such a conclusion, and this is the first study
of sport fan behavior to have done so. Given this result, it seems collective narcissism is
something well worth monitoring in studies of BIRGing and CORFing moving forward.
3.7.3 Collective Narcissism and Dysfunctional Fandom
Among the most robust findings from the research was that collective narcissism
explained 20.2% of additional variance in dysfunctional fandom when added into the model on
top of team identification. Indeed, Wakefield and Wann (2006) characterized dysfunctional fans
as individuals who have the tendency to perceive slights in social interactions and behave
aggressively as a means of coping with an excessive, yet fragile, self-esteem. Clearly, this
portrait has many of the same traits as collective narcissism; however, one of the strongest
contributions of the current research is the development of the theoretical underpinnings for this
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type of behavior. Wakefield and Wann’s (2006) work described dysfunctional fans as a mere
subset of highly identified fans—only those who have taken identification to the extremes. The
results support my argument that perhaps collective narcissism is at the root of the dysfunctional
fan behavior discussed by Wakefield and Wann (2006). In that sense, the current study provides
a strong theoretical foundation for the advancement and development of the line of research on
dysfunctional fandom. While scholars (e.g., Donahue & Wann, 2009; Partridge, Wann, & Elison,
2010) have followed up on Wakefield and Wann’s (2006) work with further studies, these
studies have lacked a strong theoretical explanation for dysfunctional fandom. Partridge et al.’s
(2010) work was rooted in theory, but their theoretical arguments were centered around the
concept of shame and dysfunctional fans’ coping with shame rather than on the general idea of
fan dysfunction. The current study shows that collective narcissism is an even stronger predictor
of dysfunctional fandom than team identification and thus provides a strong theoretical
explanation for the behavior of dysfunctional fandom. Accordingly, collective narcissism should
be an integral part of the development of the dysfunctional fandom literature moving forward.
3.7.4 Collective Narcissism and Loyalty
Contrary to expectations, when added in to the regression model on top of team
identification, collective narcissism did not explain a significant amount of variance in loyalty.
Given their tendency to invest substantial resources in support of the team (Golec de Zavala et
al., 2009; Park et al., 2010), it was expected that collective narcissism would explain part of the
variance in sport fan loyalty beyond team identification; however, this was not shown to be the
case. This could be related to the unstable self-esteem that leaves them susceptible to defensive
behaviors and dissonance reduction techniques, as discussed in the finding related to CORFing.
That is, given that self-esteem has long been believed to be at the center of sport team

34

identification, the uniquely unstable self-esteem of collective narcissists perhaps leaves them
vulnerable to temporary lapses in devotion to their teams. On a self-report measure, this could
lead to unstable responses on such items as attitudes and loyalty. Accordingly, this is something
that is worth investigating further in future research.
3.7.5 Collective Narcissism and Self-Expansion Theory
An interesting finding from the research that has implications for the use of selfexpansion theory as a framework for the examination of collectively narcissistic identification is
the positive association between collective narcissism and CORFing. This result is seemingly at
odds with the notion of inclusion of the team in self and investing resources to defend the team
(e.g., Aron et al., 2005; Park et al., 2010). It is for this reason that I argue for the need to consider
the instability of collectively narcissistic relationships in the broader context of both the selfexpansion model and attachment theory and the overlap between the two. Indeed, there are
considerable similarities and overlap between attachment theory and the self-expansion model
(Aron & Aron, 2006). This has been acknowledged and supported in a marketing context as well,
specifically as a means of exploring consumers’ brand attachments (e.g., Park et al., 2010).
Pistole (1995) discussed narcissistic and non-narcissistic relationships through the lens of
attachment theory, specifically exemplifying many of the central tenets of self-expansion
theory—and thus the overlap between the two theories—including the tendency for individuals
to include the other in the self and experience their partner’s resources as their own. Pistole
argued that securely attached individuals are more proficient in managing their esteem through
an “internal self-confirming process” (1995, p. 119). In contrast, more narcissistically based
relationships are exemplified by the self taking on primary importance, causing interactions with
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their partner to be characterized by the need to substantiate their own self-worth and regulate
esteem.
Initially, esteem may be enhanced through merging with a partner that the narcissist
effectively puts on a pedestal (Pistole, 1995). Pistole (1995) further noted that, “with the partner
serving as a self-object…the power and worth are experienced as belonging to self. The partner
is valued as part of the self” (p. 120). In such times, the narcissistic partner will affirm the
security of the relationship (Pistole, 1995), perhaps through the mutual exchange of resources.
However, if the individual’s narcissistic needs are not met, it is likely to result in defensive
behaviors (e.g., CORFing) which are used as a means of regulating and protecting the self
(Pistole, 1995).
In short, seen through the lens of self-expansion theory and attachment theory—and more
so the overlap between the two—the collectively narcissistic fan’s relationship with their favorite
team(s) can be characterized as a relationship marked by instability. While the relationship is
generally characterized by collective narcissists assuming the team’s value and worth as part of
themselves—and subsequently investing their own resources to maintain the relationship—it is
susceptible to defensive behaviors such as CORFing when individuals’ narcissistic needs are not
being met. This could have theoretical implications for such topics as fair-weather fandom and
dysfunctional fandom moving forward.
3.7.6 Practical Implications
In addition to the aforementioned theoretical implications, the study also comes with
information useful for advancing practice. Given that collective narcissism has been
demonstrated to be an aspect of team identification that plays a role in explaining such outcomes
as BIRGing, CORFing, and dysfunctional fan behavior (e.g., blasting, aggression, etc.), this is
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not something that should be ignored by sport practitioners. Teams should consider designing
specific programs and marketing messages aimed at countering the hostility displayed by this
segment at sporting events. Marketing materials could include embracing the notion of a wider
ingroup. Consistently priming these individuals with ideas of a division-, conference-, or leaguewide ingroup could go a long way toward countering some of the dysfunctionality displayed at
sporting events. Such an approach is consistent with the notion of superordinate identity, which
has been shown to provide a foundation for the development of tolerant intergroup relationships
(Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007; West, Pearson, Dovido, Shelton, & Trail, 2009). This
could be particularly important given that the results demonstrated that collective narcissism was
negatively associated with substitution intention and thus apt to attend live events with relatively
high frequency. A growing body of research has examined the escalating propensity for
individuals to choose to watch sport events from the comforts of home in lieu of attending (e.g.,
Larkin, 2015; Larkin et al., 2015; Pritchard & Funk, 2006). For a growing number of fans, this is
a result of the inappropriate and antisocial behavior characteristic of many live sporting events in
this day and age (Mravic, 2013).
In addition, given the notion that collective narcissists can be collectively narcissistic
about multiple ingroups with which they identify (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), teams should
leverage external identities (e.g., region, city, etc.) in marketing messages with these fans (as
discussed by Heere & James, 2007). This could capitalize on the grandiose images these
individuals may have with regard to other relevant identities, thereby strengthening their
relationship with the team. The perspective has been put forth that external identities could, in
fact, be enmeshed within the superordinate identity that is the sport team identity itself (Lock &
Funk, 2016). Thus, while perhaps practically difficult, it does seem leveraging, for example, the
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city wherein the team resides as a related collectively narcissistic identity could potentially bear
fruit. Such efforts could capitalize on the grandiose images these individuals may have with
regard to other relevant identities, thereby strengthening their relationship with the team.
3.7.7 Limitations and Future Research
As with any research, the current study does come with some limitations. First, although
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is considered a quality source for reliable data collection
(Buhrmester et al., 2011), the pool of participants represented a convenience sample and not a
true random sample. Second, discriminant validity issues prohibited the assessment of both
instrumental and hostile aggression, as well as attitude importance. Third, while hierarchical
regression analyses allowed for the examination of collective narcissism’s impact on top of
generally positive team identification, it did not allow for further insight that could provide
additional information about the underlying mechanisms (e.g., mediators and moderators) of the
relationship between Collective Narcissism and these outcome variables. Finally, while team
identification has long been measured with a parsimonious unidimensional self-report measure, a
growing body of research has called for a more complex multidimensional measure of team
identification (e.g., Heere & James, 2007; Heere, James, Yoshida, & Scremin, 2011). The
approach taken here with regard to the measurement of ingroup identification was akin to that
used by Golec de Zavala et al. (2013) in their study designed to parse out collective narcissism
from generally positive ingroup attachment. Furthermore, sport spectator behavior scholars—
including authors of the studies referenced in this study’s literature review—have continued to
utilize the unidimensional measures successfully (e.g., Kwon et al., 2005; Larkin et al., 2015;
Madrigal, 1995; Wakefield & Wann, 2006). That being said, there exists a school of thought that
team identification is inherently multidimensional and should only be measured that way.
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As for future research, given the discriminant validity issues in the study, future research
could replicate the study with different measures of aggression and attitude importance. This
could allow for further insights on the role of collective narcissism in sport team identification.
Second, given that the current study provided only theoretical propositions about the underlying
mechanisms of the relationships between collective narcissism and such outcomes as BIRGing,
CORFing, and Dysfunctional Fandom, future studies should look for and test potential mediators
and moderators that could provide further insights on the cognitions and behaviors of
collectively narcissistic sport fans. Following the surprising positive relationship between
collective narcissism and CORFing, future work should explore more deeply the notion of
collectively narcissistic instability. In addition, given the apparent differences in fandom between
collective narcissists and mere highly identified fans (e.g., positive relationship with CORFing,
stronger correlation with dysfunctional fandom), future studies should explore additional
differences in cognitions and behavior between collective narcissists and highly identified fans.
For example, although discriminant validity issues prevented the assessment of aggression in the
current study, this avenue would be one well worth seeking in future work. Finally, while a
growing body of research has begun to explore how team identification develops, it is unclear
how such identification may instead take the form of collective narcissism. Future work should
explore the roots of this type of identification to shed light on how fans come to identify in this
fashion.
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Table 3.1
Study 1 Factors and Items
Factor and Items
Collective Narcissism
I wish other groups would more quickly recognize the authority of my team
My team deserves special treatment
I will never be satisfied until my team gets all it deserves
I insist upon my team getting the respect that is due to it
It really makes me angry when others criticize my team
If my team had a major say in the league the league would be a better place
I do not get upset when people do not notice the achievements of my team
Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of my team
The true worth of my team is often misunderstood
Team Identification
Being a fan of the team is important to me
I am a committed fan of the team
I consider myself a “real” fan of the team
BIRG
I like to let others know about my association with the team
I like to publicize my connection with the team
I like to tell others about my association with the team
CORF
I do not want to be associated with the team
I do not wish to be a fan of the team
I would like to disconnect myself from the team
Dysfunctional Fandom
I can’t help but complain when there is something wrong related to the team
When a coach or player makes mistakes, I let others know about it
I speak my mind when I see players or coaches screwing up
I have had confrontations with others at the team’s games when I voiced my opinion
I am one of those that stand up and yell even when others don’t like it
Instrumental Aggression
I have yelled at an official because I thought it would help my team
I have yelled at an official because I thought it would improve my team’s performance
I have yelled at an opposing player or coach because I thought it would help my team
I have yelled at an opposing player or coach because I thought it would improve my team’s performance
Hostile Aggression
I have yelled at an official because I was mad at him/her and wanted to express my anger
I have yelled at an official because I was mad at him/her and wanted to hurt him/her in some way
I have yelled at an opposing player or coach because I was mad at him/her and wanted to express my anger
I have yelled at an opposing player or coach because I was mad at him/her and wanted to hurt him/her in some way
Attitude Importance
My attitude toward the team is very important to me personally
I do not care personally about the team
I am personally very concerned about the team
Loyalty
I follow my team in all of the games
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I attend all of the events of my team that I can
I am devoted to my team
I am a loyal fan of my team
I support my team even when it loses
I am trying to convince others to be fans of my team
I do not allow others to say bad things about my team
I intend to pay anything in needed (money, time, and effort) in order to be close to my team
I intend to be a fan of my team forever
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Table 3.2
Study 1 Descriptive Statistics
Factor
Team Identification
Collective Narcissism
BIRGing
CORFing
Dysfunctional Fandom
Loyalty

Mean
5.67
3.91
5.07
1.77
4.08
5.06
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Standard Deviation
1.33
1.74
1.45
1.26
1.62
1.35

Table 3.3
Psychometric Properties of the Study 1 Variables
Factor Loadings ( Alpha Coefficients (and Average Variance Extracted (AVE)



Items
Team Identification
Being a fan of the team is important to me
I am a committed fan of the team
I consider myself a “real” fan of the team
Collective Narcissism
I wish other teams would more quickly recognize the authority of
my team
My team deserves special treatment
I will never be satisfied until my team gets all it deserves
I insist upon my team getting the respect that is due to it
It really makes me angry when other criticize my team
If my team had a major say in the league, the league would be a
better place
Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of my
team
The true worth of my team is often misunderstood
BIRGing
I like to let others know about my association with the team
I like to publicize my connection with the team
I like to tell others about my association with the team
CORFing
I do not want to be associated with the team
I do not wish to be a fan of the team
I would like to disconnect myself from the team
Dysfunctional Fandom
I can’t help but complain when there is something wrong related
to the team
When a coach or player makes mistakes, I let others know about
it
I speak my mind when I see players or coaches screwing up
I am one of those that stands up and yells even when others don’t
like it
I have had confrontations with others at the team’s games when I
voiced my opinion
Loyalty
I follow my team in all of the games
I am devoted to my team
I am a loyal fan of my team
I support my team even when it loses
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.860

AVE
0.68

.888

0.50

.906

0.77

.808

0.59

.839

0.52

.853

0.50

.747
.895
.828
.687
.674
.751
.755
.684
.678
.687
.736
.844
.916
.863
.741
.778
.786
.652
.809
.775
.652
.694

.780
.854
.822
.597

I am trying to convince others to be fans of my team
I do not allow others to say bad things about my team
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.572
.568

Table 3.4
Correlations amongst Study 1 Latent Variables
1
1. Team
1
Identification
2. Collective
.439**
Narcissism
3. BIRGing
.680**
4. CORFing
-.505**
5. Dysfunctional
.578**
Fandom
6. Loyalty
.700**
Note: **p < .001; *p < .01

2

3

4

5

.580**
.091
.695**

1
-.229*
.671**

1
.041

1

.369**

.476**

-.295**

.368**

6

1
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1

Table 3.5
Summary of Study 1 Hierarchical Regression Results


Variable
BIRGing
Step 1
Team Identification
Step 2
Team Identification
Collective Narcissism
CORFing
Step 1
Team Identification
Step 2
Team Identification
Collective Narcissism
Dysfunctional Fandom
Step 1
Team Identification
Step 2
Team Identification
Collective Narcissism
Loyalty
Step 1
Team Identification
Step 2
Team Identification
Collective Narcissism
Note: N = 247; *p < .001
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t

.617

12.26*

.490
.320

9.64*
6.30*

-.416

-7.16*

-.531
.291

-8.77*
4.82*

.501

9.07*

.309
.488

5.99*
9.48*

.597

11.63*

.557
.101

10.03*
1.82 (NS)

R

R2

Δ R2

.617

.380

.380

.683

.467

.087

.416

.173

.173

.495

.245

.072

.501

.251

.251

.673

.453

.202

.597

.356

.356

.604

.364

.008

CHAPTER 4
STUDY 2: EXPLORING THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE NARCISSISM
In the first study, we explained how collective narcissism could potentially extend a
number of literature streams on sport fan behavior commonly associated with sport team
identification. While this served to elucidate some of the potential outcomes of collective
narcissism (e.g., heightened degrees of dysfunctional fandom, BIRGing, and CORFing), it
remains unclear how identification of this kind develops. Even within the general literature on
collective narcissism, this is not something that has been explored.
Nevertheless, due to the significance of the construct, a growing body of research has
been dedicated to the examination of how team identification develops (e.g., Funk & James,
2001; James, 2001; Kolbe & James, 2000; Lock, Darcy, & Taylor, 2009; Lock, Taylor, Funk, &
Darcy, 2012). While this work has served to elucidate the age at which children are capable of
forming a psychological commitment to a team (James, 2001), instrumental socializing agents in
the development of fandom (Kolbe & James, 2000), and behavioral manifestations of developing
team identification (Lock et al., 2012), the work has generally assumed that identification
develops in a positive and healthy manner. As evidenced by the dysfunctional fan behavior
discussed by Wakefield and Wann (2006)—behavior I argue is rooted in collective narcissism—
it is clear that positive and healthy attachment is not always the case. Nevertheless, it is unclear if
the development of collective narcissism is rooted in the narcissistic personality trait at the
individual level, if it is influenced by the team with which the individual identifies, or if the
development of initially positive team identification at some point veers off course and becomes
identification more characteristic of collective narcissism. In this study, I explore the
development of collective narcissism. I do so by drawing on theory and literature related to the

47

development of team identification, organization narcissism, and the development of narcissism
as a personality trait at the individual level. Using these theories and models to inform the
research, I will conduct semi-structured interviews with both collectively narcissistic and mere
highly identified fans from the first study. In doing so, I aim to extend the literature on collective
narcissism—both in general and as it relates to sport fandom—by illuminating the roots of
collective narcissism and how identification of this nature may form and develop.
I begin by reviewing the literature on the development of general team identification. I
use this as a point of departure to discuss how one may instead develop a narcissistic degree of
identification with a team. In doing so, I propose three plausible ways in which generally
positive team identification may instead develop into a form more characteristic of collective
narcissism.
4.1 The Development of Team Identification
Early work on the development of team identification identified environmental causes,
such as socializing agents (e.g., fathers and coaches), that are instrumental in the initial formation
of sport fandom (James, 2001; Kolbe & James, 2000). Kolbe and James (2000) suggested this
typically occurs between the ages of six and 15, while James (2001) found children as young as
five years old are capable of forming a psychological commitment to a team. It should be noted,
however, that the behavioral consistency characteristic of those with developed team
identification does not seem to surface until children are at least nine years old (James, 2001).
Kolbe and James (2000) found that when socialized into sport fandom as preteens, fathers and
coaches were most influential. These agents were also prominent for adolescents, albeit not to
the same degree as preteens. For adults, on the other hand, players, coaches, and other fans were
the primary socializing agents. In addition, they found that fans did not exhibit the tendency to
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practice exclusivity in group membership. Rather, they displayed accepting tendencies toward
any and all individuals with a desire for membership in the group.
Interestingly, Lock et al. (2012), too, found identified fans of a sport team to exhibit
tendencies to not only accept new fans, but actively recruit them, a practice they termed
“spruiking” (p. 289). In this work, the researchers conducted qualitative interviews with fans of a
new sport team after their first year of competition. Consistent with Lock et al. (2009), they
found that team identification develops rather quickly as fans get to know the players and
coaches over the course of the year. Furthermore, as the season progresses and associations with
players percolate, consumption of the team becomes central to individuals’ lifestyles. This
typically entails the active search for information through various forms of media both as a result
of internalized team identification and to demonstrate fandom. Indeed, organizational
characteristics, team success, and player attributes (e.g., attractiveness and similarity) have been
identified as team-related causes of team identification (Wann, 2006).
While these environmental factors may indeed foster movement along a psychological
commitment continuum, much of the initial attraction to a sport team may be rooted in
psychological factors (Park, Mahony, & Kim, 2011; Wann, 2006). Park et al. (2011)
conceptualized the notion of curiosity as an initial attraction mechanism for sport. They noted
that while understudied in spectator sport, the uncertainty and variety inherent in this sector
make the context a natural fit for the study of curiosity. Reviewing the literature on curiosity
from the fields of both social psychology and business, the researchers elucidated how curiosity,
because of its nature as a driver of exploratory behavior, may indeed represent a critical factor in
explaining how consumers initially become interested in sport. Team identification has also been
shown to stem from the psychological need for belonging and affiliation, as well as the desire to

49

be part of a distinctive group (Wann, 2006), the latter of which may have implications for one’s
propensity to develop a collectively narcissistic form of identification. This will be discussed in
greater detail in the following section.
4.2 Collective Narcissism and the Need for Group Distinctiveness
In discussing the motivational roots of team identification, Wann (2006) stated that fans
are sometimes motivated to view their ingroup as distinct from outgroups and that in some cases
this desire can even supersede the desire for a positive group image. Indeed, Delia (2015) found
BIRGing to reflect a desire to show that one’s team is better than and distinct from rival teams.
This is tied to a belief that one’s team is special or unique (Wann, 2006).
Collective narcissism is a term used to describe an “individual’s emotional investment in
an unrealistic belief in the exaggerated greatness of an in-group” (Golec de Zavala, 2011, p.
310). In other words, collective narcissists possess a highly persistent belief that their in-group is
special and thus deserves preferential treatment. Cichocka et al. (2015) explained that collective
narcissism is likely to foster heightened degrees of collective paranoia. Kramer (2004) described
collective paranoia as exaggerated beliefs that one’s group is incessantly being threatened,
mistreated, or vilified by certain vindictive out-group(s). Kramer and colleagues (e.g., Kramer,
1998; Kramer & Jost, 2003; Kramer & Messick, 1998) argued that collective paranoia is
associated with the categorization of oneself as a member of a distinct social group that is
constantly scrutinized (Cichocka et al., 2015). Therefore, it seems plausible that collective
narcissism may be particularly likely to develop in those fans that identify with the team due to
the desire to be part of a distinct group.
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4.3 Collective Narcissism by way of a Narcissistic Organization
According to Heere and James (2007), fans often consider themselves to be
organizational members of the sport team(s) they support. This is potentially significant for the
development of collective narcissism given that organizations can adopt collectively narcissistic
identities that yield unethical behavior (Duchon & Drake, 2009). Like individuals, organizations,
too, have a need for self-esteem (Brown, 1997; Duchon & Drake, 2009). Furthermore, they are
motivated to preserve their collective identity and sense of legitimacy (Duchon & Drake, 2009).
This can sometimes lead to the institutionalization of an extreme narcissistic identity with norms
of dominance, control, and entitlement. While often rooted in the higher levels of an
organization’s hierarchy, such a narcissistic identity can be passed down to organizational
members at all levels through an organization’s culture (Duchon & Drake, 2009; Schein, 1992).
According to Schein (1992), “culture is the social mechanism that will transfer the organization’s
identity to new members as the ‘correct’ way to perceive, think, and feel” (p. 4). Thus, collective
narcissism in a fan base could stem from institutionalized norms of dominance, control, and
entitlement projected from team leadership. Indeed, narcissism is a trait characteristic of many
great leaders, as narcissists generally possess the charisma and grand vision that are paramount
for successful leadership (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). Furthermore, given the role of mass
media as a social institution (Silverblatt, 2004) with the power to shape public opinion and
influence followers (Brown & Deegan, 1998), this collectively narcissistic identity in a team’s
fan base may even stem from the team’s media.
According to Stein (2003), narcissistic organizations possess many of the same traits as
collective narcissists, including the feeling that the organization is incredibly special and unique,
a pervasive sense of self-aggrandizement and entitlement, and a delusional sense that nothing of
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value can possibly exist outside the organization, so much so that they are consistently flippant
with regard to other organizations. These attributes are so universal and omnipresent in the
organization that they become perpetually embedded in organizational functioning. Therefore,
whether stemming from team leadership (e.g., ownership, coach, management) or the team’s
local media, a fan’s collective narcissism could perhaps develop via a trickle-down effect
stemming from the team itself.
4.4 Collective Narcissism as a Byproduct of a Narcissistic Personality
Narcissistic personality disorder is “characterized by a pervasive sense of grandiosity and
self-importance and by a strong need to be validated and obtain attention or admiration from
others” (Thomaes et al., 2009, p. 1233). One may exhibit these qualities to a degree and thus be
considered narcissistic based on a self-report measure without having been clinically diagnosed
as a narcissist. Such traits would include an exaggeration of one’s talents and accomplishments, a
feeling of superiority, a sense of entitlement, and an obsessive concern for how they are viewed
by others (Thomaes et al., 2009). Thomaes et al. (2009) presented a framework for the
development of narcissism as a personality trait, which—given the notion that personality
characteristics may impact the internalization of one’s team identity (Funk & James, 2004)—
may indeed have significant implications for the development of collective narcissism.
Accordingly, I briefly discuss how narcissism develops as a personality trait as a means of
understanding how this may translate into a collectively narcissistic identification with a sport
team.
According to Morf and Rhodewalt’s (2001) self-regulatory model, narcissists possess
grandiose, but unstable self-views. In an effort to validate these self-views, narcissists often take
undue credit for positive outcomes, view themselves as superior to others and exaggerate their
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accomplishments. This is often met with criticism or rejection from others, which causes the
narcissistic individual to continuously seek renewed validation. In effect, this is a vicious cycle
which is a result of an underlying effort to regulate self-esteem. In fact, Baumeister and Vohs
(2001) portrayed narcissism as an addiction to self-esteem. Narcissists want to feel good and thus
pursue their self-esteem “fix” by any means possible. Therefore, given that self-esteem
enhancement has long been shown to underlie identification with sport teams (Wann, 2006),
collective narcissism could stem from the self-esteem addiction characteristic of the narcissistic
personality trait. Baumeister and Vohs (2001) argued that narcissists differ in the degree to
which they pursue self-esteem. As opposed to seeking self-esteem boosts in naturally occurring
situations (e.g., a team win), narcissists will artificially create such situations. This explains why
a collectively narcissistic fan may actively seek out content that undermines the team and
subsequently respond aggressively as a means of self-esteem restoration (Golec de Zavala et al.,
2009). As Thomaes et al. (2009) explained, these attempts to exhibit superiority often come at
the expense of others.
Narcissism as a personality trait typically emerges well before adulthood (Thomaes et al.,
2009). While children can evaluate their own self attributes as early as age two or three, they
lack the ability to reflect on themselves or form conscious self-esteem until at least age eight
(Harter, 2006; Thomaes et al., 2009). Between the ages of eight and adolescence are when
children become motivated to form favorable (and avoid negative) self-views. Indeed, it is at this
point that children become increasingly self-conscious and use impression management
strategies to influence the opinions of others (Harter, 2006; Thomaes et al., 2009). Thus,
consistent with Bleiberg’s (1994) notion of adolescence as a period of “narcissistic
vulnerability,” it appears likely narcissism emerges between the ages of eight and adolescence.
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This coincides with Kolbe and James’ (2001) proclamation of a six to 15 year old age range for
the emergence of a psychological connection with a sport team. Therefore, it seems plausible that
collective narcissism could develop in concert with narcissism as a personality trait. According
to Thomaes et al. (2009), narcissism is likely to emerge following a “derailment of normative
self-development at some point in or just after late childhood” (p. 1236). This might include a
loss of self-esteem from negative peer evaluation or some other blow to one’s ego that causes
excessive shame and anger (Thomaes et al., 2009).
There are two major schools of thought with regard to why narcissism emerges. Some
scholars have argued that narcissism stems from biological temperamental traits, while others
have held firm that it is rooted in socializing experiences in childhood (Thomaes et al., 2009).
With regard to the former, approach and avoidance temperament are most relevant to the
formation of narcissism (Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Rothbart & Bates, 2006; Thomaes et al., 2009).
Approach temperament refers to “a general neurobiological sensitivity to positive or desirable
stimuli” (Thomaes et al., p. 1237). It has been reported that approach temperament in
adolescence is tied to risk taking behavior and a predisposition to substance abuse (Quevedo,
Benning, Gunnar, & Dahl, 2009; Thomaes et al., 2009). In contrast to approach temperament,
avoidance temperament refers to “a general neurobiological sensitivity to negative or undesirable
stimuli” (Thomaes et al., 2009, p. 1238). Avoidance temperament is often evidenced by a
tendency to experience negative emotions such as anger, fear, and sadness (Rothbart et al., 2000;
Thomaes et al., 2009). Narcissists are believed to be high in approach temperament because they
display many of the behavioral (e.g., risk taking, impulsivity, etc.) and personality (e.g.,
extraversion, competitiveness, achievement orientation, etc.) characteristics traditionally
exemplified by those with an approach temperament (Thomaes et al., 2009). Such characteristics
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are also frequently exemplified by collective narcissists with regard to their ingroup (Golec de
Zavala et al., 2009). Also consistent with those high in approach temperament, narcissists are
highly goal-oriented and are sensitive to rewards (Thomaes et al., 2009). Thus, it is not
surprising that narcissism has been shown to be associated with high self-reported approach
temperament measures (Foster & Trimm, 2008). Narcissists do sometimes still display the
negative emotions characteristic of avoidance temperament, leading Thomaes et al. (2009) to
claim that those high in both approach and avoidance temperament display what is known as
covert narcissism, which is evidenced by high degrees of self-absorption, introversion, and an
inclination to experience negative emotions (e.g., shame), leading such individuals to withdraw
from others. Those high in approach temperament, but low in avoidance temperament, are
known as overt narcissists (Thomaes et al., 2009). Such individuals are “self-absorbed extraverts
prone to deny or block negative experience from conscious awareness by becoming angry, and to
express anger in the form of aggression against others” (Bushman et al., 2009; Thomaes et al.,
2009, p. 1234).
It is thought that such biological temperamental traits interact with one’s environmentally
based experiences during development to jointly affect the development of narcissism (or lack
thereof) over time (Thomaes et al., 2009). Two theories have been put forward dealing with the
socializing experiences linked to narcissism, both dealing with parent-child relationships. Some
theorists argue that overvaluation and overindulgence on the part of parents may serve to
engender narcissistic traits in their children (Thomaes et al., 2009; Twenge, 2006). This is akin to
putting one’s child on a pedestal, wherein a child is made to feel they are special and unique
from other children, and showered with praise for any and all efforts. This, in turn, leads to
children developing grandiose self-views, a sense of entitlement, and a dependence on external
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validation. In contrast, other theorists suggest that “parental coldness, extremely high
expectations, and lack of support may lead to narcissism” (Kohut, 1977; Thomaes et al., 2009, p.
1239). Proponents of this view hold that children create inflated self-views in an effort to shield
themselves from feelings of rejection and low self-worth. This may also be tied to a desire for
positive attention from others to make up for their lackluster parental relationship.
Thomaes et al. (2009) explained that empirical support has been found for both theories.
Given that “collective narcissism is seen as an extension of individual narcissism to the social
aspects of self” (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, p. 1075), and fandom develops around the same
time period in a child’s life as does narcissism (Kolbe & James, 2001), I posit that collective
narcissism may simply represent a group-related manifestation of a fan’s individual narcissism.
Nevertheless, individual and collective narcissism are related but distinct variables (Golec de
Zavala et al., 2009). Since one can be narcissistic at the individual, but not collective level, and
vice versa (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), I propose that the development of collective narcissism
on the part of sport fans could also be tied to fandom rooted in an excessive need for group
distinctiveness, and/or a trickle-down effect, whereby fans become collectively narcissistic
indirectly by embracing the culture imparted by the team for whom they root and/or their local
media. These various theories serve as a guide as I explore the development of collective
narcissism in sport fans.
4.5 Methods
To explore the development of collective narcissism, semi-structured interviews were
conducted with self-reported collective narcissists and mere highly identified fans obtained from
the first study as measured by Golec de Zavala et al.’s (2009) scale. Qualitative research methods
were chosen due to their suitability for answering ‘why’ questions (Fylan, 2005). For example,
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rather than trying to quantify the broad impact of collective narcissism—as was the case in the
first study—I was interested in exploring the roots of this phenomenon and discovering why
identification of this nature may emerge rather than generally positive team identification.
Furthermore, interviews afforded me the opportunity to engage in a discussion that ultimately
provided a rich understanding of participants’ experiences (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Scholars
have argued that the primary purpose of qualitative research is to “describe human experience as
it is lived” (Thompson, Locander, & Pollio, 1989, p. 136). Through probing research subjects to
reflect on previously repressed or unreflected experiences, researchers have the ability to
discover previously veiled patterns (Thompson et al., 1989). I feel the use of semi-structured
interviews allowed for the provision of novel insight on this phenomenon, which is important
given the lack of research or understanding on how collective narcissism develops,
4.5.1 Participants and Procedure
Interviews were conducted by phone with self-reported collective narcissists from the
first study, as measured by Golec de Zavala et al.’s (2009) and Robinson et al.’s (2004) scales.
This approach to participant selection ensured the provision of participants best able to help
understand the questions of interest (Creswell, 2009). These individuals were initially recruited
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to take part in a survey that contained the collective narcissism
and team identification measures, as well as measures of other variables of interest in the study.
A question was included on this survey requesting an email address at which participants could
be contacted to participate in a follow up study (i.e., the current study). An email was sent to
those scoring particularly high on the collective narcissism measure requesting participation in a
30-45 minute interview. I emailed those scoring highest on the Collective Narcissism measure
(and thus Team Identification) first for the collective narcissists group, and those scoring high on
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Team Identification, but below the midpoint (on a 7-point scale) on Collective Narcissism for the
highly identified group. In an effort to increase participation, a $25 Amazon gift card was offered
to each participant. In the email, I explained a bit more about the purpose of the study.
Specifically, I explained that I am interested in the individual’s relationship with their favorite
sport team. In addition, I reminded each participant that participation was voluntary, but that
doing so would result in the provision of a $25 Amazon gift card. A copy of the informed
consent was also included.
At the start of each interview, I ensured each participant that they had the opportunity to
review the consent form and ask any questions that may remain. In addition, each participant was
reminded that an audio recording of the interview would be kept. Lastly, they were informed that
they had the ability to withdraw from the study at any time, but that doing so would result in the
forfeiture of eligibility for the $25 Amazon gift card. Upon the conclusion of each interview, I
summarized the content of the interview to the participant (i.e., performed a member check;
Rossman & Rallis, 2012). As Fylan (2005) explained, doing so affords the researcher the
opportunity to seek confirmation from the interviewee with regard to whether or not their
statements were interpreted correctly. In essence, this served the purpose of an immediate
validity check. The initial target sample size for each group was 15 and the intent was to only
continue interviews past that point if it was evident that saturation had not yet been reached.
Given that common themes emerged but additional data was not producing any additional
themes (McCracken, 1988) after reaching 15 interviews in each group, no additional interviews
were conducted.
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4.5.2 Materials and Analysis
Prior to beginning the interviews, a two-step process was used to develop the interview
guide. In the first step, the aforementioned theory and literature was used as a means of
generating questions to be included in the guide (e.g., McCracken, 1988). Subsequently, a
colleague with expertise in sport consumer behavior reviewed the guide, making suggestions for
additional questions that may be of use to elicit insights central to the phenomenon. The
interview guide was included in the submission to the university’s Institutional Review Board
and was ultimately granted full approval. A copy of the interview guide can be found in
Appendix A. The interview guide served as the core foundation of the interviews; however, as
prescribed by Fylan (2005), the conversation remained free to vary, and open to the pursuit of
topics and thoughts raised by the participants (Rossman & Rallis, 2012). Moreover, an on-going
coding process was used, wherein novel ideas raised by participants were pursued in subsequent
interviews with other participants, so as to explore the extent to which these ideas may or may
not emerge as prevailing themes across interviews.
The interviews typically lasted between 30 and 50 minutes. I occasionally engaged in
peer debriefing. This process consisted of a critical review of the project and its findings with
individuals detached from the study (Creswell, 2009). According to Rossman and Rallis (2012) a
peer debriefer “serves as an intellectual watchdog for you as you modify design decisions,
develop possible analytic categories, and build an explanation for the phenomenon of interest”
(p. 65). Furthermore, the process can serve the purpose of enhancing trustworthiness,
authenticity and credibility (Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Miller, 2000). Prior to the analysis, the
audio recordings of the interviews were transcribed verbatim to produce a comprehensive and
accurate written record of each session. Per the recommendation of Gibbs (2007), after each
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interview was transcribed, the written record was checked for accuracy to ensure it did not
contain any mistakes.
A coding process akin to those discussed by Creswell (2009), Tesch (1990), and Gioia,
Corley and Hamilton (2012) was used. Specifically, I engaged in an inductive data analysis,
wherein patterns, categories, and themes were built “from the bottom up, by organizing the data
into increasingly more abstract units of information (Creswell, 2009, p. 175). Participants were
viewed as knowledgeable agents (Gioia et al., 2012), and thus, at the initial stage, the underlying
meaning from the perspective of each participant was sought (Tesch, 1990). As the research
proceeded, I searched for similarities and differences, parsing the information into more abstract
categories (e.g., Creswell, 2009; Gioia et al., 2012). In doing so, I remained mindful of the theory
and literature informing the study, so as to maintain some level of theoretical sensitivity (Glaser,
1978). Data was regularly compared with the codes to ensure there were no inconsistencies in the
definition or meaning of codes throughout the process (Gibbs, 2007). Finally, the codes were
compared and discussed with another member of the team to determine intercoder agreement
(Creswell & Miller, 2000).
4.5.3 Participant Characteristics
I recruited 15 participants for each group. For the Collective Narcissist group, scores on
the measure of Collective Narcissism ranged from an average of 5.125 to an average of 7, with a
total group average of 6.0 (on a 7-point scale). The Team Identification score ranged from an
average of 5 to an average of 7, with a total group average of 6.5 on this measure. This provided
me with a group I could be reasonably certain was at least relatively collectively narcissistic,
given that not one person in the group fell below 5 (out of 7) on the Collective Narcissism scale
and on average these individuals scored approximately 6 (out of 7). For the highly identified (but
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not collectively narcissistic) group, scores on the Collective Narcissism measure ranged from an
average of 1.375 (on a 7-point scale) to 3.75, with a total group average of 3.0 on this measure.
The Team Identification scores ranged from an average of 5 to an average of 7, with a total
group average of 6.1. This provided me with a group that I could be reasonably certain was not
particularly collectively narcissistic, but yet was still very much invested in the team, as
evidenced by their 6.1 average (out of 7) on Team Identification.
There was a pretty good mix of ages in both groups. In the Collective Narcissists group,
there were seven participants 30 years old or younger, while the remaining eight were over 30
years old. The average age in this group was 31 years old. In the Highly Identified group, the
average age was slightly older—35 years old—but there remained a strong mix of experience
and youth, with six participants checking in at 30 years or younger and the remaining nine over
30 years of age. On the whole, females were underrepresented, with just three participants (or
20% of the sample) in each group identifying in this fashion. It is also worth noting that there
was a good mix of people in each group who lived their whole life in the hometown of their
favorite team and others who lived in the town and then ultimately moved.
4.6 Results
Insights gleaned from the analysis provide evidence of a number of distinct drivers of
collectively narcissistic team attachment generally not shared by mere highly identified fans.
While there were some consistencies between the two groups, collective narcissists differed from
their non-narcissistic counterparts on a number of key factors. Results indicate that collective
narcissists’ identification with their favorite teams is driven by an incessant desire to view the
team as unique, a sense of ingroup exclusivity, a pervasive feeling of being under scrutiny from
external parties, and a chronic underdog mentality marked by a need to prove the doubters
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wrong. In the sections that follow, I first discuss the similarities—drivers of team attachment
shared by both groups—many of which are consistent with results from past literature on the
development of team identification (e.g., Kolbe & James, 2000; Lock et al., 2009, 2012).
Subsequently, I discuss each of the themes unique to collective narcissists noted above, as well
as how mere highly identified fans compare.
4.6.1 Similarities
As the interviews unfolded, it became clear that both the collective narcissists and mere
highly identified fans shared a number of qualities related to their sport fandom. For the most
part, participants in both groups had been fans since childhood and follow the team regularly
through watching on television, attending games, and consuming content on the internet.
Participants on both sides reported enjoyment when their favorite team is praised and also
indicated they experience some level of vicarious achievement. Furthermore, both sides
expressed enjoyment with regard to being around other fans of their favorite team, with one
collectively narcissistic Oakland Raiders fan remarking, “Raiders fans are some of the best
people in the world.” Despite the wide array of characteristics these two groups shared, there
were four in particular that stood out as drivers of fandom for both collective narcissists and
mere highly identified fans alike. These include socialization agents, player attachment, player
personas, and rivalries.
4.6.1.1 Socialization Agents
In discussing the roots of their attachment to their favorite team(s), both collective
narcissists and mere highly identified fans alike, recounted early memories of following the team
with family members. For example, a collectively narcissistic fan of the Green Bay Packers
explained that his attachment to the team is rooted in watching games with his parents early on in
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his life. He explained that, “my mom and dad were big Packer fans. So, they had it on. And I was
just sort of born into it. So just watching games with them. As early as I can remember, that’s
what we did on Sunday.” Similarly, a non-narcissistic Bears fan explained that he initially
became a fan of the team via his family. He notes, “it’s kind of just been engrained in my family
that in this area we’re Bears fans. You know, nothing out of the ordinary…Just in this family,
we’re Bears fans.” These findings are consistent with previous literature which has found father
figures in particular to be the most impactful force in fostering initial fandom in children (James,
2001; Kolbe & James, 2000).
4.6.1.2 Player Personas
Another prominent driver that influenced the development of team identification in both
groups was the construction of player personas. Consistent with the findings of Lock et al.
(2012), these highly identified fans grew increasingly more attached to the team as they got to
know the players on a seemingly personal level. Interestingly, collective narcissists identified
this as a critical factor in the advancement of their attachment as well. A collectively narcissistic
Philadelphia Phillies fan discusses this notion in the comment below.
I would say it was kind of the off the field personalities (that made me connect more
deeply with the team). Like, Shane Victorino established himself as kind of the team
jokester, and you would see that sort of thing after the game. He would be the one pieing
the person who hit a walk-off home run. Stuff like that. And when they would do press
conferences, you would see who had the charisma to be funny…So you really do
establish it and Chase Utley, not one for many words, but I think that was one of the
things that appealed to me. He didn’t have much to say, and everything he showed was
on-field performance.
Similarly, a highly identified but non-narcissistic Cleveland Browns fan indicated that his
attachment to the Browns grew by virtue of the strong personalities that were on the team when
he initially became a fan, something that paled in comparison to other Cleveland teams.
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You know, between (Bernie) Kosar, Dixon, all those guys…it was just…because they
were really strong personalities. That’s what made the team. There weren’t—I mean
there’s certain teams throughout, liking teams in Cleveland—but there weren’t a lot of
strong personalities, people you enjoy watching play and things. But during those years
they really were and that kind of cemented feelings for the team.
Lock et al.’s (2012) notion of player personas was tied to the development of identification with
a brand new team. Results of the current study indicate that, for both collective narcissists and
mere highly identified fans alike, the opportunity to observe players’ genuine personalities,
whatever they may be, is instrumental in the development of team attachment even for
established teams. Extending on the work of Lock et al. (2012), this was the case even for
established star players (e.g., Bernie Kozar, Chase Utley, etc.).
4.6.1.3 Player Attachment
Independent of player personas, the results indicate that the formation of attachment to
certain players can in turn increase attachment to the team as a whole. This was consistent across
both collective narcissists and mere highly identified fans. A collectively narcissistic Oakland
Raiders fan suggested he may not have identified as strongly as he did if it were not for certain
players to whom he was attached:
I think it’s pretty important. I mean I’m not entirely sure that I would have identified as
much as I did when I was a kid if my dad had never gotten me Jack Tatum’s book. And
you know I never would have learned about guys like Dave Otto, Jack Casper, um, Ken
Stabler, you know, the historical greats. You know, when I was a kid, like, Tim Brown,
Jerry Rice…I remember when I was a kid Jerry Rice came over from the Niners and that
was huge.
A highly identified but non-narcissistic Philadelphia 76ers fan indicated that in spite of the
team’s lack of success recently, he remains prideful and attached to the team and this largely
stems from his attachment and appreciation for individual players.
A lot of my passion for the team comes from the players. I like certain players. I follow
the players and gradually I just started following the team. I remember a couple years
ago, we still had Andre Iguodala. I think he was a pretty decent player. Uh…like back
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then…looking back through history, we had Allen Iverson, we also had Julius Erving,
who was probably in the top 3 players of all time. So, just looking back through history,
that really attracts me…because I never realized we have that many great players
considering how trashy we are today.
In short, learning about players’ personalities and becoming attached surfaced as a
primary driver of team identification for both collective narcissists and mere highly identified
fans. While it has to this point not been made explicitly clear in the literature whether team
attachment stems from initial attachment to players or vice versa, it seems that in at least a
number of participants in this study, player attachment was a primary source of team
identification.
4.6.1.4 Rivalries
In addition to socialization agents and player-derived attachment—factors uncovered in
previous research on the development of team identification—participants in the current study
also indicated that rivalries influenced their attachment to the team. While not necessarily the
determining factor impacting attachment, they indicated that it can help foster more deep-rooted
connections. For example, a collectively narcissistic Los Angeles Lakers fan alludes to such a
notion below:
Definitely the rivalry with the Celtics. That was…when they beat us in 2008 it was one of
the hardest losses of my life. Probably the hardest I’ve ever experienced. So it made it so
sweet when we beat them in 2010. Boston/LA is the classic rivalry in the NBA. It used to
be in like in the 80s. And it was cool to experience that. I think other than that…I mean
we have—I know the Clippers want to think they’re a rival now (laughs). It’s…they’re a
nice side story, but…they’ll never be us. You know we’ve kind of had some other rivals
through the years…the Spurs, the Mavericks…but the Boston rivalry has always been the
big one. I will say that probably that rivalry between 2008 and 10…that brought my
fandom to an even higher level.
While not the source of initial fandom, this participant indicated that the rivalry was a driver in
the advancement of her attachment to the team. Interestingly, a mere highly identified Boston
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Red Sox fan indicated that not only did the rivalry with the New York Yankees increase fandom,
but it was, in fact, the source of his initial identification with the team.
I think the rivalry (with the Yankees) very much was…like it had to do with why I
became a Red Sox fan in the first place. So, I guess the origin-point of my fandom was
very much influenced by the rivalry. And it also I think during those early years—it was
like the main narrative that kept things interesting, kept things…made it feel as if
something was at stake…Um because Red Sox fans have always been sort of upset about
the Yankees’ success, while the Red Sox went so long without any success. But 2004 was
a rather pivotal moment because the Red Sox finally won a World Series and they won it
in a rather story book fashion…that team…like it was perfect. Like I saw an HBO
advertisement with Bill Simmons, the famous sports journalist, and he’s just saying all
these things and one of them was “I believe the 2004 playoffs were an act of God.” And
just like…and that does I think resonate with a lot of Red Sox fans. But from that
moment…the rivalry was just never really the same. So, I think maybe, if I’m less of an
intense Red Sox fan, it probably has to do with the fact that the rivalry is no longer as
intense as it used to be.
In sum, common across both collective narcissists and mere highly identified fans, rivalries
between their favorite team and a specific adversary fueled their attachment to the team. In a
similar vein to the mere highly identified Red Sox fan quoted above, a collectively narcissistic
Oakland Raiders fan spoke about Northern California’s bay area rivalry with the San Francisco
49ers and identifying not just as an Oakland Raiders fan but also as “not a 49ers fan,” and how
this has, in large part, fueled his fan identity through the years. It is worth noting that while
rivalries were important in the development of identification for both groups, collective
narcissists were a bit more aggressive to this end. For example, a collectively narcissistic
participant indicated “it is tough to have a reasonable conversation with (fans of a rival team).”
In contrast, mere highly identified fans, for the most part, were more grounded about it and had
the tendency to appreciate rivalries for what they are. Nevertheless, while it would seem
interactions with a rival outgroup could indeed bring out the worst in collective narcissists—
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something that will be explored later—even non-narcissists in this study indicated rivalries were
an instrumental factor influencing their attachment.
4.6.2 Unique Drivers of Collectively Narcissistic Identification
Despite the emergence of these factors common to both collective narcissists and highly
identified fans, the perspectives expressed by collective narcissists revealed a number of critical
differences regarding what drives their fandom. These drivers were marked by instability and
could also be construed as manufactured by the individual, perhaps to support a fragile ego. In
the following section, I discuss these four themes, while also explaining how mere highly
identified fans differed. In addition, I draw parallels between these insights and our existing
knowledge of collective narcissism, so as to highlight where the current findings build on the
extant collective narcissism literature.
4.6.2.1 Pervasive Need to View the Team as Unique
Without exception, the collectively narcissistic participants exhibited a prevailing need to
view the team as unique. This went well beyond the long-standing notion—derivative of social
identity theory—wherein highly identified individuals strive to identify as part of a distinct
group. This segment went to great lengths to construe their team as a highly unique entity,
standing in stark contrast to others in the league, and identified these factors perceived as unique
and distinct from outgroups as influential in the development of their attachment to the team.
Generally speaking, participants perceived their favorite team as unique and distinct from rivals
in three typical ways: history, culture, and fan bases.
In speaking with participants, it was evident that history was a large source of perceived
group distinctiveness. Moreover, it was immediately clear that this was a source of pride that
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really drove their attachment with the team. As Brad describes below, the Detroit Red Wings’
history is incredibly unique within the context of the NHL:
I would say that the history of the team being one of the most winningest franchises in
the league. They are one of the original 6 teams. You know, when the league started there
were just six teams and they were one of them. Um, the logo is widely regarded as one of
the most iconic or branded logos in all of sports, not just hockey. So, I would say that
they’re unique. I mean, obviously, there’s 30 teams now. So, being a pro hockey team I
guess isn’t unique. But, how they’ve branded themselves, the deep level of history, and
then the iconic players they’ve had makes them a unique franchise for sure.
Sandy echoed this sentiment in talking about her attachment to the Lakers:
They’re incredibly unique. They’re probably, like I said, one of, if not the most iconic
team in sports. The logo, the colors, the…just the team in general…the name, the history,
the players…they are the NBA’s marquee franchise. The league is at its best when the
Lakers are winning championships. Like right now—and they will only be down for so
long—right now, everyone I talk to thinks the NBA is boring. There can be teams like the
Warriors and Thunder and Cleveland and whoever else…and it’s nice for them to win a
championship or compete for a championship or whatever, but they’ll never be the
Lakers.
She continues: “I would say that, definitely, the Lakers’ image has been a huge part of my
obsession with this team through the years.” In addition to history, many collectively narcissistic
fans also discussed how their favorite team’s culture was incredibly unique and also contributed
to a feeling of group distinctiveness and team attachment through the years. A comment by
Brian, a New England Patriots fan, demonstrates this phenomenon quite aptly:
I think teams are catching on, when they see the Patriots are interested, then it’s like “oh
crap…I’m also interested. Why are they interested? I should be interested too.” So I think
in that way, these teams try to copy cat the philosophy. So I think that’s why for a long
time we saw a lot of front office guys from the Patriots…you know, Scott Pioli, you
know the guy the Lions hired, their GM…Bob Quinn or something? Does that sound
familiar? I don’t know. But, you see these teams take from our tree to try to copy that
success, and it’s not like that. Um, so yeah, they’re unique in a lot of ways. Like I said,
they establish value for a guy, and if he doesn’t fit with that value then he’s gone. It’s that
simple. And they have a certain type of player they want, and if you’re not that type of
player, you’re gone. Or we’re not drafting you. Um, you know, and I think the Patriots
love to find value in guys. Corey Dillon….no one wanted Corey Dillon. Corey Dillon
comes here…he’s the leading rusher and they win the Super Bowl. Um, you know,
nobody wanted Randy Moss. He was sitting around in Oakland, pouting, had the worst
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season of his career. Raiders trade him for a 4th round pick. Then he comes here, we go to
the Super Bowl, and he has the record for most touchdowns and receiving yards in a
season in NFL history.
Brian continues:
It’s definitely helped (form my attachment to the team). I think that had led to the “In Bill
we trust” mentality. Or “Trust the hoodie” or whatever shirt from Barstool Sports you
want to see. Um, I think that’s very much a real thing. I think kind of like what the
Yankees did for a while when they won 4 out of 5. It’s like, okay, whatever you guys are
doing, it turns out to be gold. So, yeah…I’m all for it. Trust, trust, trust, trust. Um, so it’s
the same thing with the Patriots.
Mike, a Green Bay Packers fan, expressed a similar point of view to Brian. However, despite
acknowledging that there were indeed other impressive franchises in the National Football
League, Mike explained that, as he sees it, even the other elite franchises in the league pale in
comparison and cannot match the successful, winning culture exhibited by the Green Bay
Packers:
Like I said before, they’re the best run organization in the NFL. Maybe in
sports…although it’s tough to compare across sports. Um, but yeah…they’re….they have
an eye for talent and picking the right players at the right time. They’re patient, well run,
smart, hard working…and no nonsense. They pick the right players, but not just the right
ones on the field. They pick the right guys to represent the team off the field as well.
That’s a big part of it. That’s something that like…you know successful organizations
like I’ve mentioned before—the Patriots, the Ravens, the Steelers. Well…the Patriots are
constantly involved in cheating scandals. The Steelers have a quarterback accused of
rape, a wide receiver suspended for drugs. The Ravens have a running back proven to be
a wife beater, a player who was accused of murder. I mean…the Packers have none of
that. They have all of the same success in selecting players and acquiring talent without
any of the nonsense. It’s the perfect NFL culture.
In addition to the team’s culture, Mike also argued that the Green Bay Packers’ fans have
developed a culture unique from other teams in the NFL, and this, too, has contributed to the
feeling of group uniqueness and attachment felt with regard to the team:
I think there are other loyal fan bases too. No doubt. Um, you know, I know Bears fans
are incredibly loyal, for example. I think Cowboys’ fans are fair-weather…to be honest
with you. And I’ve lived here now (in Dallas)…I’ve been here. I’ve seen it. They go 11-5
a few years ago, make the playoffs, have some success, people are all about them. Last

69

year, Romo goes down, Dez goes down, the team goes into the toilet, you don’t hear a
peep. Which is how it should be (laughs). Um, no, but…there are other loyal fan bases,
but not to the level of the Packers. And again, show me another group of fans that
actually has an investment…partial ownership stake…in the team. You can’t.
Sandy echoed this sentiment, suggesting Saints’ fans are unique from others in the league and the
players feel this too. Collectively, this has been a powerful source of attachment to the team:
That’s actually one thing we pride ourselves on. We feel like we have a really, really,
really strong fan base. We aren’t the type of fans to try and start arguments to try and
start fights. Um, when we do smack talk, it’s in good fun and we don’t say anything
hurtful toward the other teams. And the one thing about Saints fans that sets us apart from
other fans is when we tailgate, we don’t just tailgate, we have second lines. That’s a
really big part of New Orleans culture. I remember when we went to Miami, we second
lined. Everyone thought it was so weird. They were in shock by what was going on
because they had never seen anything like this. So, we second lined down the street, um,
in Miami, with New Orleans bands playing, live music. You know, we had umbrellas that
we use to second line, black and gold umbrellas, and we actually give them to people on
the street so they can join in. So, we’re just a really unique fan base.
She continues:
I believe the Saints are unique in terms of the fan following. That sets them apart from
every other team. We’re such weird people here. I remember players would say this is a
different experience…this is a different animal. So, yeah, I believe the fans set them
apart.
One interesting thing to note about the collective narcissists’ perception of team uniqueness and
distinctiveness is that their assertions in this regard were very quick and definitive. When asked
about the notion, they answered immediately with decisive examples of group distinctiveness
that clearly served as a source of great pride. One such example is Mike’s summary of Green
Bay Packers’ uniqueness, which encompasses history, culture, and fan base, all together making
them the “gold standard in the NFL,” from his point of view:
Oh definitely. They’re incredibly unique. You know, like I’ve said, they’re the gold
standard in the NFL. They’re probably the best run organization in the NFL. They have a
long history of great coaches and players. You know, Vince Lombardi, Mike Holmgren,
Mike McCarthy now. You know, all Super Bowl winning coaches. The
quarterbacks…Bart Starr, Favre, Rodgers. Name another team with that kind of rich
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quarterback history. Um…they’re the only team to sell an ownership stake in the
organization to the fans. That’s just so cool. It really is a team owned and operated by the
fans. We are the most important stakeholder and the team knows it. They’re unique in so
many different ways. Um, you know, both the current team and throughout history. Show
me another team that is on that level. I don’t think you can.
While there were critical exceptions, by and large, the mere highly identified fans did not view
their favorite teams as particularly unique from others in the respective leagues. Even when they
did, it was typically something they needed to ponder for a few moments before identifying
factors that could be construed as unique. In many of these cases, the individuals would identify
a potential unique quality, but quickly qualify it by suggesting that this may also be something
that other teams could boast. When asked about the notion of team uniqueness with respect to the
Green Bay Packers, Lindsey stated, “I think there’s talent on every team. I think there’s people
on every team. I just happen to prefer them, but I don’t think they’re anything like over the top
unique.” Similarly, Ron, a Minnesota Twins fan, and Bart, a Baltimore Orioles fan, suggested
that every team could boast some unique quality, but that there’s nothing really that sets their
team apart:
Ron: Not really. I mean unique in the sense that every team is unique. Every team has a
different character. Certainly, obviously, they have a different history, but…Certainly, I
would say the Yankees are unique. The Twins are not unique, I don’t think. Um, yeah, I
don’t think there’s anything really meaningful that distinguishes them from other teams
in their sport or in any sport. Yeah, I’d be hard pressed to really say they’re unique.
Bart: Hmm…like an Orioles exceptionalism? Let’s see…I guess there’s things that make
every team unique. I guess with the Orioles I feel like they have a history of good players
starting in the 1950s, but they’re a newer team than a lot of the other teams, especially in
the division. And since it’s kind of….I’m not sure what sets them apart.
Both Bart and Lindsey expressed similar sentiments with regard to their teams’ fan bases:
Lindsey: I don’t know how much different they are, but they’re very passionate. If you’ve
seen some of the comments on their news articles and stuff…generally they’re pretty
nice, but you do see some people who are cranky and angry, and I mean I think generally
they appreciate the team.
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When asked to describe Baltimore Orioles’ fans, Bart described them, but quickly indicated
these qualities are not unlike fans of other teams (i.e., the Boston Red Sox):
I feel like they’re kind of hard-nosed and realistic. Especially after so many years of not
doing well. It always felt like Orioles fans kind of had a lot in common with Red Sox
fans, in how they viewed themselves as the underdogs most of the time.
Bart expressed a similar sentiment in discussing the Orioles’ culture. He suggested that they
make the most of limited resources, but other teams do the same:
Well, I would say unusual because I feel like in recent years, I feel like Tampa has really
gotten to be known as the ultimate example of a team with very little money who
managed to play above their means, and also the Oakland A’s as well. So, I feel like the
Orioles don’t really have a corner on that reputation, but I still like to think they make a
lot out of the limited resources that they have.
A critical exception to mere highly identified fans’ perceptions of group distinctiveness and
uniqueness was found in the comments of Jamie, a Philadelphia 76ers fan:
Unique??? I’d have to think about that. I mean I don’t think we’re that unique. Well…we
are one of only a few teams that have won a championship. Like I think there are only 8
teams in the league that have won at least one championship, and we have 2 or 3, so that
makes us unique. We also have a lot of great historical players that played on our team,
and not a lot of teams have that. We also have a very passionate fan base. Our fans are
very passionate. And we’re located in Philadelphia, which is a very historical city.
In sum, the preceding quotes, provided by both collective narcissists and mere highly
identified fans alike, exhibit the tendency for collective narcissists to identify with their team in
part to be a member of a distinct group, unique from others in the respective league. While mere
highly identified fans did in some cases express the view that their team is unique and this serves
as a source of attachment, this was not nearly as widespread, nor were they as decisive and
definitive. Examples of this include Ron's assertion that the Twins were unique only “in the
sense that every team is unique,” as well as Jamie’s hesitation to suggest the Philadelphia 76ers
were unique before concluding that they were unique in their history and passionate fan base. As
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a whole, the collective narcissists exhibited a far greater need to perceive the team as unique and
distinct from others, and this tendency is in line with scholars’ notions of identification for the
sake of being a part of a distinct group (e.g., Wann, 2006), particularly for collective narcissists
(e.g., Cichocka et al., 2015). Given the current findings, I would argue that, while highly
identified fans, via the tenets of social identity theory, do indeed identify as part of a distinct
group, collective narcissists appear to take this to a different level, identifying with a perceived
unique entity in and of itself.
4.6.2.2 Chronic Sense of Scrutiny
A common theme that popped up in the interviews is that collective narcissists were
considerably more sensitive to criticism than mere highly identified fans. This was not
surprising, as it is something consistent across the extant literature on collective narcissism (e.g.,
Golec de Zavala, 2011; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Golec de Zavala et al., 2013a, 2013b).
However, in more than half of the interviews with collective narcissists, the perception of the
team being under constant scrutiny emerged. Moreover, it was identified as a driver of fandom
and team attachment in these individuals. Brian discusses this concept in relation to his Patriots’
fandom in the following statement:
So, I guess what I can say is this must have been what it felt like to be a Yankees fan in
the 90s. You know? You’re the villain, everyone hates you, you know it, this isn’t like
it’s a façade that’s being created in a fan’s head. This is well documented. Um, you
know, from Trent Dilfer saying Brady’s toast, uh, to whoever. Like go Google “Patriots
trash talking” and you’ll see all these ESPN analysts come up. Um, you know, it’s
just…it’s part of the territory of winning. And unfortunately I think it’s one of those
things that people will appreciate when it’s gone. You know? People outside of Patriot
Nation, I mean. Because I don’t think we’ll see anything like this ever again.
Brian continues below, explaining how the constant scrutiny the team is under actually serves, at
least on some level, as a source of attachment:
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I think it’s actually increased my attachment. Um, you know, my attachment was strong
to begin with, but I think it’s higher, because, you know, it’s not fun being poked at all
the time. Like, you poke the bear, eventually he’s going to eat you. And that’s kind of
how I feel about being a Patriots fan. But at the same time, it makes me laugh, and I
actually kind of get joy out of it, with how many people dislike the Patriots. It just shows
other peoples’ jealousy, at times misunderstanding of what’s going on, you know?
This phenomenon was not unique to Brian’s Patriots fandom. Rather, fans of a variety of teams
in the NFL expressed a similar sentiment in discussing their own perceptions of their favorite
teams. Interestingly, much of this notion of scrutiny stemmed from me asking them about how
the team is covered in the media. Initially, I was trying to find out if there was any sort of
‘trickle-down effect,’ wherein collective narcissism stems from a collectively narcissistic
organization and/or team media (as noted in the literature review). However, consistently, across
participants, this pervasive feeling of the team being scrutinized emerged. A quartet of NFL fans
discuss this notion below:
Bonnie: When “BountyGate” happened, they were all about “punish the Saints! Horrible
people in that organization! Scammers! They’re this and they’re that…what they did to
Brett Favre.” I sit there thinking about how they’re not commenting on the fact that other
teams do the same exact thing. You know, other teams have bounties. It’s been a part of
the NFL culture forever. It just so happened that the Saints got caught. So, I feel if you’re
going to punish the Saints, punish every single team that has participated in it. Investigate
every team and see if they’ve done something like that. But, no, they needed a fall guy,
and that was the Saints. And the national media kept wanting to pump it into people’s
heads that, you know, the Saints they are thugs and they’re horrible people and they try to
hurt people. And in my opinion it’s all based off the fact that the Saints destroyed Brett
Favre’s chance to go to the Super Bowl that year because everybody thought that was the
year that Favre would go to the Super Bowl. When the Saints destroyed that…oh
no…just a lot of push back.
Chris: They (the Cowboys) know they’re under the microscope, but they aren’t going to
change who they are, or the way they operate, or how they act, for anybody. And I love
that about them.
Mike: (The media coverage is) generally positive. I mean, I think most of what I read for
blogs is…it’s written by other fans. And of course we get mad and upset when the team is
playing poorly. But, you know, that’s…you know that’s few and far between. Um, we’re
just passionate fans that loves to see our Packers play well. And they usually do. Um, you
know, sometimes the national guys can get a little salty. And I think it’s…you know a lot
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of these national guys are former players, and it’s really just jealousy. Jealous they
weren’t a part of an organization like the Packers. And some of the other guys…even
guys that weren’t players…they just—whatever team they’re going for—probably just
jealous of Packers fans and what we’ve been able to experience over the years. So it’s
just sour grapes I think….I’d say it (has influenced my fandom). I don’t mind being
hated. It’s…it’s kind of almost like a sign of respect. They hate us because they want
what we have. Um, and so it’s sort of a source of pride. It’s something I can hang my hat
on as a fan. It’s like…almost validation in a way. You know what I mean?
Steve: You realize the national view of your team is a lot more…depressing. So, you, for
a long time it would be like “there’s the Raiders…making a stupid call again.” And it’s
just like, dude, you’ve been trashing my team for 12 years. And I respect your view as a
sports journalist, but the Raiders haven’t done anything right since 2002 according to this
guy. So, I always keep that in mind when I’m reading football articles. It’s like, who is
the author? Does this guy have a bit of a bias?
The preceding comments all highlight the idea of being “under the microscope” for one reason or
another. It may be due to success, culture, style of play, perpetual ineptitude, etc. Regardless,
these fans perceive it as a consistent and unjustified view of their team. Accordingly, this fosters
an increased bond with the team and something of an “us against them” mentality. While these
fans did not state explicitly that they felt this scrutiny was unique to their team, I got the sense
that in most cases they did. However, Dean, a Montreal Canadiens fan, stated unequivocally that,
at least in the context of the National Hockey League, his team is scrutinized unlike any other:
Well, it depends who you’re talking about. You know, I live here in New England and so
a lot of the coverage I have access to is Boston Bruins fans…Boston Bruins media. So, I
mean, and I’ll watch ESPN, but they barely even talk about hockey until the playoffs.
Either way, whether it be the Boston media, ESPN, it doesn’t matter…we’re held to a
higher standard.
When pressed to clarify what he meant by being held to a higher standard, Dean continued:
Just…like everything. You turn on ESPN and they never have anything positive to say
about us. Obviously, you know, the Boston media hates us, and I get it…it’s…you know
it’s a rivalry. But, no other team gets this kind of treatment. Maybe it’s the success we’ve
had throughout history. You know, the Phoenix Coyotes, the Tampa Bay
Lightning…nobody cares what’s going on with them.
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When asked about the media coverage of their favorite teams and/or how they feel when
the team is criticized, mere highly identified fans generally responded much differently. They
were generally able to brush it off and in some cases even see the merit in the criticism. This
mentality characterizes Lindsey’s feelings as she stated, “and I also think the critiques that are
out there…like if a player has a bad game, I think it’s fine to say so. I don’t think they’ve ever
been picked on or held to the fire either way.” Ron expressed a similar view, noting that it would
bother him, not because it was unjustified, but because it was true:
I think if it bothers me, it bothers me because I think it’s true. Like if someone says the
Twins are never going to win again, it would bother me not because somebody said it or
because somebody had a negative opinion of the Twins, but because I think it’s true and
because I don’t want it to be true. So, the idea that somebody doesn’t like the Twins or
thinks poorly of the Twins, in itself, isn’t a problem to me, or doesn’t bother me. Half the
time I don’t think the Twins are good. You know, I don’t think the Twins are good right
now. You know, I have no problem admitting that. Um, so I don’t….you know, I don’t
have a problem with people not liking the Twins or criticizing the Twins if…especially if
it’s justified, but it bothers me because if it’s true then it suggests bad things about what
their prospects are moving forward.
While criticism—be it in the media or from other fans—did in some cases bother mere
highly identified fans, not a single one of these participants expressed the perspective that their
team is under some kind of scrutiny. The perspective expressed here by the collective narcissists,
however, is in line with Cichocka et al.’s (2015) argument that collective narcissists seek to
identify with a distinctive group that is constantly under scrutiny. This feeling of scrutiny—
whether manufactured or otherwise—seems to serve as a source of pride that fuels their bond
and attachment with the sport team.
4.6.2.3 Underdog Mentality
A common characteristic shared by the majority of collective narcissists, but only a few
select non-narcissists, was an underdog mentality. In effect, these individuals internalized the
doubt expressed toward their team from external parties (e.g., the media, fans of other teams, and
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‘fair weather’ fans of their own team) and used this as a driving force in their fandom, taking
particular pride in their success after having stuck it out through the lean years. Peter, a
Philadelphia Phillies fan, spoke of this concept, recounting the Phillies’ journey from perennial
basement dweller (last place team) to 2008 World Series champion and perennial World Series
contender in the following sequence of quotes:
I think the fact that going into anything as an underdog, it’s very much more exciting to
see them succeed. It gives you more of a sense of pride and accomplishment than
watching a team who does really well, but was expected to do really well.
It (their underdog identity) definitely (influenced my attachment). I remember in high
school the Phillies weren’t doing very well, but I’d still always have my Phillies shirt or
my Phillies hat with me at all times, and I would always get “Oh hey…why you reppin’
that when the Eagles are going to do better?” And it’s like, alright, but then just watching
them slowly succeed and do better and have that relationship with the players. It was
much more satisfying and rewarding for myself to actually see it. And I think because I
had established that, I think everyone knew for me it was a much bigger deal than for
other people who just jumped onto it much later when they were doing well.
Well, everyone is always entitled to their own opinion. I don’t really let it get at me. But
it does make me focus or kind of root for them a little more, just so they can prove that
person wrong.
While much of Peter’s notion of identifying with an underdog mentality and proving the
doubters wrong, so to speak, stems from personal encounters with “fair weather” Phillies fans,
other collectively narcissistic participants’ underdog mentality was more a product of comments
and opinions from the media. For example, Chad, a collectively narcissistic Chicago Bears fan,
explained that the team consistently outperforms projections after being slighted in the media:
Some Bears fans (doubt the Bears). A lot of fans of other teams (doubt the Bears). A lot
of analysts (doubt the Bears). Even though most of the analysts said the Bears had a great
draft, I doubt many of them will pick the Bears to make the playoffs, and I just love to
prove them wrong. And like year in and year out, they’re always projected to be one of
the worst teams in the league, and they don’t make the playoffs, but they’re never that
bad. So, it’s always nice just proving the people wrong who think they’re going to be that
bad.
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Interestingly, Chad identified multiple external parties (e.g., other Bears fans, fans of other
teams, and the media) as parties casting doubt on the Bears. His comments on the media
specifically are consistent with the notion that collective narcissists are constantly on watch for
anything that could be perceived as a slight on the group (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Other
participants took exception to the lack of coverage—noting that whatever coverage the team did
get was not exactly positive—and used this as a source of pride as the team started to succeed
and media coverage, in turn, escalated. Molly, a Florida Panthers fan, covers this idea in the
following comment:
Sometimes it was almost no coverage. It was just kind of like an afterthought. And then
sometimes it’s like not exactly positive. Just kind of reinforcing that who are these guys
sort of feeling. It’s just because we’ve started to succeed a little bit in the last couple of
years that they’ve started to get some more positive coverage. It hasn’t been as much
taking pot shots at what we haven’t accomplished. It’s now instead more what we are
doing. So, that’s…I appreciate that. Locally, it’s still garbage coverage and next to none.
But nationally we’re starting to get more positive coverage.
While the collective narcissists, by and large, embraced this notion of being an
underdog—effectively perceiving it as a slight that they could then use as fuel as the team started
performing better—mere highly identified fans, for the most part, could see merit in the doubt
cast on their team and did not use this to fuel an underdog image. This perspective is captured in
the following quotes from Ron and Bart:
Ron: I guess I don’t see my fandom of the Twins as being a competition with other fans
that much. Um, I don’t interact with other fans that much, and if…and I’ve never felt
some sort of strong sense of…if you’re a fan of the Yankees, or the Red Sox, or the
Patriots, or the Lakers, or one of these big teams, you probably feel like people are
throwing stones at you a lot. And then maybe you have a sense of I’m going to show you
guys. Um…but I don’t think anybody…the Twins are not a big enough franchise that
anyone is going to be throwing stones at them. They’re usually being ignored. So, I don’t
think that there’s ever been too much of that feeling of need to show them wrong.
Bart: I can’t say it was anything like proving the doubters wrong because the doubters
were right for so many years. I guess it probably just fits with my idea that all things must
pass. Everything will come around eventually. Things will even out. There’s definitely
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like…it’s emotionally satisfying, especially toward the beginning when they first started
doing well, when it wasn’t expected yet that the Orioles would win a lot at home. And so,
um, I guess sort of that emotional part of the rivalry.
Bart’s comment, in particular, is emblematic of the more even-keeled perspective expressed by
much of the non-collectively narcissistic group throughout the interviews. The notion that “all
things must pass” and “it’s not about proving the doubters wrong” suggests that he is not using
his attachment to the Orioles as a means of boosting his ego, which stands in contrast to the
views expressed by many of the collective narcissists. That being said, there were a few critical
exceptions to this trend amongst the mere highly identified fans:
Lindsey: It is nice when (the Packers) are doing bad and it’s like the next season
everyone expects they will continue to be bad. Or, if they have a bad game or a streak of
bad games they’re going to continue to do bad. But, at the same time, when they do well,
it’s kind of like… “Haha, you were wrong!” So it does feel good.
Brent: Oh definitely…Just because there was a lot of mockery about the direction (the
Browns) were taking, and just basically there were a lot of writers, so called experts, and
fans of different fan bases, saying it was idiotic to hire a front office where the VP was
from baseball. But after they did their draft and they got pretty high marks for how smart
they were and acquiring with draft picks, it was kind of a feel good feeling to say like
“Yeah, finally they’re doing something right.” You know, usually we’re the butt of jokes,
but people were kind of taking notice about it. So, it was kind of cool.
Andy: Well I think you always want to kind of shove it in their face a little bit (laughs).
Um, I think saying like “Well looks like you were wrong” is always fun, and we’ve done
that. Like I mean…in 2007, 2011, we (the Giants) weren’t favorites. We were always
underdogs. Um, but we won anyway. I love that aspect of it. I think…I would in those
two seasons, the fact we were underdogs made it even sweeter. Especially in 2007.
But…yeah I don’t know if that’s influenced my fandom. I think I’d still be just as big of a
Giants fan anyway. But uh…it definitely it makes it fun to kind of stick it to the
frontrunners, you know?
While these comments do touch on the notion of an underdog mentality, they were also a bit
more tempered than those expressed by the collectively narcissistic participants. The mentality
was also not nearly as widespread amongst the mere highly identified participants. The roots of
the collectively narcissistic underdog mentality could be tied to the extent to which it lends itself
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to boosting a fragile ego. Bristow and Sebastian (2001) explained that the “the more competitive
a fan is, the more likely she/he is to cheer for an underdog. Such a fan might readily view the
competition as being tougher, the victories sweeter, and the positive affect experienced greater”
(p. 270). Indeed, scholars have long found evidence of a (dis)confirmation continuum, wherein
an unexpected win provides for the most positive affect, even more than one that was expected
(e.g., Madrigal, 1995). For collective narcissists, identifying with an underdog mentality and
using newfangled success as a means of proving the doubters—those who have slighted the
team, whether real or perceived—wrong can produce maximum positive affect that helps to, at
least temporarily, prop up an unstable self-esteem.
4.6.2.4 Ingroup Exclusivity
Tied to the idea of an underdog mentality is an ingroup exclusivity expressed by many of
the collective narcissists, but only a single non-narcissistic participant. Many of the collective
narcissists noted that sticking with the team through the lean years—those that gave life to the
underdog mentality discussed previously—made them “true” fans. In contrast, those that did not
stick with the team through “thick and thin” were mere “bandwagoners” who could not be
considered part of the inner circle. Molly touches on this notion of ingroup exclusivity in the
following statement:
So, it’s fun to be part of the ra-ra crowd, especially the part of the crowd that never gave
up. Some people just come on when they’re doing well and disappear when they’re not.
Not true fans, really. But you know I hang in there.
The notion that those who did not stick with the team through unsuccessful seasons are not true
fans was highly pervasive through many of the interviews with collective narcissists. This was
also something that did not sit well with several of the collectively narcissistic participants, as
bandwagon fandom comes with significant downsides. For example, Steve, explained that a
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growing Oakland Raiders’ fan base in recent years is bittersweet because he knows these new
fans are not “true” fans:
I mean (the increase in Raiders fans is) almost bittersweet though. Like, four years ago if
I walked down the street and saw another Raiders fan, you know that guy has been
through the same amount of shit as you. So, there’s almost like the camaraderie….’cause
it’s always like “Man, the Raiders suck.” And you know he’s heard it for the last decade
too. So, you know, you have all these people who like…last week, I was in the
supermarket and I’m like “Oh cool! Raiders fans!” But they’re like “yeah, I just started
following the team this year.” And I’m like that’s kind of weird.
From this perspective, it seems true fandom of a sport team is something that must be earned. It
is an exclusive club and loyalty/unwavering support is the currency. Sandy noted another
downside to bandwagon fans, explaining that they give the entire fan base a bad reputation:
I know LA is known for being sort of, I guess, fair-weather fans…bandwagon
fans…whatever. I hate that stereotype because I’m not like that at all! I…I mean yes I
don’t watch as many games as I used to and I might turn it off if they’re down 20. But I
still love the team. I still really want them to do well. So…I think the
bandwagoners…they can just suck it. I hate that they give us that reputation. Um…and as
a true fan, I think, I think that’s how my fandom has changed the most.
In contrast to collective narcissists, of which more than half touched on this notion of
ingroup exclusivity, only a single mere highly identified fan raised this issue. Mark, a highly
identified San Francisco 49ers fan, noted the fluctuation in support for the team he has seen
throughout his lifetime:
You do see that (people jumping on and off the bandwagon). I mean, you look at the 80s
and 90s and everyone and their brother is a 49ers fan. You know, the team was doing
really well…winning Super Bowls…life is good, right? Um, fast forward to like the last
10 years and it’s just been almost disheartening to watch. The team is really bad for a
while under, like, Mike Singletary, and everyone starts to jump ship. Then Jim Harbaugh
returns the team to glory and everyone’s back on. Now…it’s like…history repeating
itself, you know? Um, I think people are optimistic about Chip Kelly, so we’ll see how
that goes, but…so I think the fan base shows its true colors in situations like this. You
know, it’s not going to be playoffs and Super Bowls all the time. I know that and I think
most other real 49ers fans know that. But we do have our fair share of bandwagoners and
god knows they’ll be back if Chip Kelly is able to work his magic.
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Other than Mark, no other non-narcissists brought up the notion of ingroup exclusivity. In fact,
Brent noted how incredibly loyal the Cleveland Browns’ fan base has been despite years as
perennial losers:
The fact that we have such a large fan base…we have been perennial losers for the last 20
years, so that speaks volumes about the loyalty. It’s kind of a really unique historical
team and it’s definitely…I think it’s definitely amongst a few teams that you have that
die-hard fans no matter what the record is. We’re one of those few teams.
Interestingly, this notion of ingroup exclusivity on the part of collective narcissists stands
in contrast to Lock et al.’s (2012) findings of ‘spruiking,’ wherein fans of a new soccer team
actively attempted to recruit new fans as their identification with the team was developing. In
effect, the view practiced by participants in Lock et al.’s (2012) study is “fandom without
borders,” so to speak, whereas the perspective expressed here, by the collective narcissists, is
“fandom with closed borders.” This is interesting given that collective narcissism has long been
associated with intergroup hostility and mistrust of outsiders in the context of international
relations (Golec de Zavala, 2011; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, 2013). It seems a similar concept
could be playing out here, on a smaller scale, where collectively narcissistic sport fans seek to
guard membership in the fan community tightly, reserving it only for those truly loyal
individuals.
4.7 Discussion
The preceding discussion provides evidence of both similarities and differences vis-à-vis
the development of team identification for both collectively narcissistic as well as highly
identified fans. Indeed, while there is considerable overlap, the collectively narcissistic segment
displayed a unique perspective that distinguishes them from their mere highly identified
counterparts. In this section, I attempt to tie together the similarities and differences gleaned
from the interviews with the two distinct fan groups, in an effort to provide an informed
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conclusion on the pertinent research question: Just what drives collectively narcissistic sport
team identification? And how and when does this develop?
4.7.1 The Development of Collective Narcissism
One interesting aspect of the results is that many of the drivers of initial sport team
fandom are largely the same (e.g., socialization agents, player personas, etc.). Indeed, many
participants in both groups recounted early attendance experiences and/or watching games on
television with family and friends, and getting to know the players and their personalities as
instrumental in the formation of their early fandom. In most cases, these individuals were fans
since childhood. These findings are neither unexpected, nor are they novel, as they are certainly
in line with past research (e.g., James, 2001, Kolbe & James, 2000; Lock et al., 2012).
The fascinating part of these findings is where these two groups of fans differ. That is,
when examining the unique drivers of collectively narcissistic identification, it seems as though
this type of attachment stems from the differing needs of these individuals compared to their
mere highly identified counterparts. For a mere highly identified fan with stable and secure selfesteem, the factors referenced previously (e.g., socialization agents, player personas, etc.) are
sufficient to foster a positive and healthy relationship with the team. Collective narcissists, on the
other hand, appear to manufacture a perspective in their mind that the team is of unparalleled
importance and greatness (i.e., unique and distinct from other teams in the league) and that
outside parties simply “do not get it” (i.e., the chronic sense of scrutiny and inclinations toward
ingroup exclusivity).
Indeed, Baumeister and Vohs (2001) argued that narcissists differ in the degree to which
they pursue self-esteem. That is, rather than seeking it out in naturally occurring situations (e.g.,
after a team win), they go to such lengths as artificially constructing such situations—for
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example, holding on to the idea that the team is unique and distinct from others in the league and
is constantly under scrutiny from outsiders—as a means of inflating a fragile ego and selfesteem. Accordingly, there does not seem to be a point at which positive and healthy team
attachment instead takes the form of collective narcissism. Rather, responses indicate that these
individuals simply have a more exaggerated need for self-esteem, by virtue of their collective
narcissism, and thus—through using their relationship with the team to bolster that self-esteem—
possess a natural proclivity to conceptualize the team in such a way as to artificially enhance
their self-esteem. Based on past findings from narcissism scholars (e.g., Thomaes et al., 2009), I
would surmise that this likely occurred somewhere between the ages of 8 and adolescence, as it
is at this point children become motivated to form favorable self-views.
Nevertheless, given the proclivity for both segments to recount the development of player
personas and player attachment as drivers of initial fandom, it would seem teams should go to
great lengths to foster these connections between fans and players. Teams could use social media
to give fans inside access to players’ lives off the field/court. It would also be smart to leverage
these platforms to allow fans to “get to know” prospects in sports like baseball or hockey, where
players usually spend several years in a team’s minor league system before reaching the big
leagues. Through these efforts, fans will have already formed something of a relationship with
the player before he is even a member of the team.
4.7.2 Collective Narcissism and Self-Expansion Theory
With regard to self-expansion theory, the findings illustrate the extent to which collective
narcissists are motivated to invest their own resources in relationship sustenance (as discussed in
Park et al., 2010). However, based on the findings, it does not appear these resources are
reflected solely in these individuals’ tendencies to express unwavering defense of the team in the
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face of criticism. Rather, they invest significant cognitive resources in forming a perspective of
the team that allows for maximum self-esteem enhancement. Moreover, it seems these processes
operate as something of a feedback loop. That is, the collectively narcissistic fan is attached
and/or devoted to the team, and thus invests resources in defending the team. As noted, part of
these resources are comprised of the perceptions of uniqueness, scrutiny, etc. manufactured by
the individual to boost a fragile self-esteem. In turn, they become more attached to the team by
virtue of these perceptions.
From a practical standpoint, it would seem, then, that marketers would be well served to
invest in marketing campaigns that accentuate the fans’ role as part of the team. Given that they
endow such significant resources in defending the team and maintaining the relationship, one
could argue they invest more heavily in the team from a cognitive and emotional standpoint than
even a mere highly identified fan. Accordingly, initiatives such as the Seattle Seahawks’ “12th
Man” campaign, wherein the home crowd is given the honorary title as another “player” in
addition to the 11 already on the field at any given time, would seemingly be increasingly
effective for a collectively narcissistic fan.
4.7.3 Ingroup Identification and the Need for Group Distinctiveness
In past work, scholars have referenced the need for group distinctiveness when discussing
both collective narcissism as well as mere ingroup identification. In the current study, the
findings were quite clear on this subject, as all 15 collectively narcissistic participants touched on
the idea of their favorite team being unique and distinct from others in the league and identified
this as a significant driver of their fandom. Moreover, they were very quick, decisive, and
emphatic in their responses on this topic, leaving little doubt as to what their true feelings are visà-vis the team’s place in the league and sport in general. In contrast, just five of their mere highly
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identified counterparts expressed the perspective that the team is unique, and even in such cases,
the responses were less ardent. Instead, these participants hesitated, taking time to ponder, before
ultimately concluding that there were indeed some unique qualities of their team. Indeed, while
clearly identifying with a distinct group, this segment was largely hard pressed to conceive of
their team as truly unique. It appears collective narcissists simply take this conception of a
distinct group to another level, construing the team as a truly unique entity of an unreachable
standard to all others.
In either case, this finding speaks to the importance of leveraging the unique qualities of
the team in marketing communications with fans. This could be reflected in the team’s unique
history, culture, or even fan base, as all three aspects were identified by participants as
characteristics that made their team unique from others in the league. A good example of a
campaign that touched upon the uniqueness of the fan base is the Boston Celtics’ souvenir cups
created for the 2012 National Basketball Association playoffs. The cup featured text reading: “I
AM NOT SOUTH BEACH,” “I AM NOT HOLLYWOOD,” “I AM CAUSEWAY STREET.”
This was intended to capture the blue-collar image assumed by the Boston Celtics fan base that
stands in opposition to the more glamorous identity of Miami Heat and Los Angeles Lakers’
fans, two of Boston’s biggest rivals at that time. In other words, it was designed to capture the
unique qualities of the Boston Celtics’ fan base by pitting them in opposition to rival fan bases.
This particular campaign could have been particularly effective given that it combined both
rivalries and team uniqueness—two prevailing themes in the current study—into a single
campaign. Teams would be well served to pursue a similar approach in marketing efforts.
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4.7.4 Collective Narcissists’ Underdog Mentality and Ingroup Exclusivity
The underdog mentality embraced by many of the collective narcissists, but relatively
few of the mere highly identified fans, also yielded some interesting insights. It is worth noting
that, in most cases, these collectively narcissistic participants were reflecting back on teams that
had been unsuccessful, but then went on to have success. So, it could be interpreted as a means
through which they could embellish the sweetness of the success they had already experienced.
By doing so post-hoc, they could self-aggrandize the long road they had travelled to reach that
point, in turn providing a grounds to cast off those who did not stick by the team and thus could
not experience the true satisfaction of winning after a period of struggle.
This notion of ingroup exclusivity was among the more interesting findings yielded by
the research, particularly given that exclusion inherently serves as a basis for all groups
(Mulcahy, Parry, & Glover, 2010). Indeed, as Mulcahy et al. (2010) argued, “there are times
when the nature of the group insists upon exclusivity” and such situations are “not necessarily
malicious” (p. 12). Within sport, most investigations of group exclusion have been focused on
individuals being excluded from sport fan communities based on such factors as race, class,
gender, and sexuality (see Esmonde, Cooky, & Andrews, 2015 for a review). However,
Crawford (2004) discussed the distinction typically drawn between “consumer” fans and
“traditional” fans in the United Kingdom, wherein “consumer” fans are those who buy large
amounts of merchandise and consume sport extensively through mass media, and “traditional”
fans are those who attend often but do not necessarily consume excessively otherwise. He noted
that “consumer” fans are often cast as not being real fans. This account is similar in nature to the
collective narcissists from the current study, who displayed a tendency to exclude those they did
not perceive as sticking with the team through thick and thin from the group of “true” fans.
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A number of explanations have been proposed for exclusion efforts on the part of ingroup
members. For example, Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon, and Seron (2002) explained that
individuals may display more or less ingroup exclusion as a function of their ingroup
identification levels. The researchers also suggested their status within the group—such as being
a core member as opposed to a newcomer—could play a role. It would seem both would be
plausible explanations for collective narcissists’ perceptions of ingroup exclusivity, as they
possess both extreme levels of ingroup identification (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009) and also, per
the results of the current study, view themselves as core members of the fan base. Furthermore,
given the tendency of narcissists to leverage impression management tactics as a means of
managing others’ impressions of them (Thomaes et al., 2009), it would seem Noel, Wann, and
Branscombe’s (1995) argument that overexclusion could be a self-presentational strategy for
displaying to other ingroup members that they are indeed truly devoted and loyal ingroup
members could also be a worthy explanation for the current finding.
Collective narcissists’ tendency to view others as “fair weather” or “bandwagon” fans
and subsequently exclude them from the group, at least in their own conception, was particularly
interesting in light of the finding from the first study that collective narcissism was both
positively related to and explained a substantial amount of variance in CORFing. CORFing
refers to the tendency to disassociate from an unsuccessful other (Wann & Branscombe, 1990)
and in that sense is characteristic of “bandwagon” or “fair-weather” fans. As discussed in the
conclusion of that study, however, theory would suggest that this is merely a temporary selfesteem restoration tactic leveraged before reverting back to the more typical baseline collectively
narcissistic relationship. As such, collective narcissists likely do not view this as “jumping ship,”
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as evidenced by Sandy commenting that she “might turn (the game) off if they’re down 20…”
but yet “still loves the team,” before preceding to criticize bandwagon fans.
With respect to practice, findings on the notion of the underdog mentality and ingroup
exclusivity serve as an indication marketers should leverage such ideas in marketing
communications directed toward the collectively narcissistic segment. Tailoring marketing
initiatives to this segment that play on the idea of being a “true” fan and sticking with the team
“through thick and thin” may resonate with these individuals to a greater extent than others in the
fan base due to their more inflated need for self-esteem. This would be consistent with the
collectively narcissistic perspective of ingroup exclusivity.
4.7.5 Limitations and Future Research
Despite the theoretical and practical contributions of the work, this study does come with
some limitations. For one, both collectively narcissistic and mere highly identified participants
were fans of different teams in different sports and at different levels. It is certainly possible that
contextual differences (e.g., market size, team success or lack thereof, etc.) may have played a
role in responses. It is worth noting, however, that there was a good mix of small and large
market teams, some with rich and successful histories and others without, on both sides. As such,
given that I was able to isolate the collective narcissists from mere highly identified fans, there is
still plenty to be taken from the findings. Second, given that a measure of narcissism at the
individual level was not included on the original survey instrument (from the first study) it
proved difficult to ascertain the extent to which collective narcissism may simply stem from
narcissism at the individual level, as was proposed as a possibility in the literature review. Third,
comprising just six of the 30 person total sample (across the two groups), females were
underrepresented in the current study. It is worth pointing out that the gender distribution was
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equal in each group, with three of 15 collective narcissists and three of 15 mere highly identified
fans being female. As such, I do not feel this served to compromise the results in any way. That
being said, given that scholars have found significant differences between genders in past work
(e.g., Fink & Parker, 2009), it is possible different or additional themes could have been found
with a more extensive concentration of women.
As for future research, it would seem that further investigation into team identification
due to the need for group distinctiveness would be worthwhile. Scholars have identified this as a
driver of team identification in the past (Wann, 2006), but findings from the current study
suggest collective narcissists take this to a completely different level. Cross-sectional survey
work containing both a measure of team identification and collective narcissism would allow for
the isolation of the collectively narcissistic component of team identification that could yield
insights on whether this need for group distinctiveness truly is unique to the collectively
narcissistic segment of sport fans. In addition, given the findings related to ingroup exclusivity,
experimental work examining the exclusion tendencies of collective narcissists in a lab or field
setting could yield fascinating insights on the psychology and behavior of collective narcissists.
Are these feelings related to ingroup exclusivity mere perceptions used by collective narcissists
to enhance self-esteem? Or are these views so deep-rooted that they may, in fact, act on these
feelings in an effort to weed out those they do not consider to be “true” fans? Answers to these
questions would advance the literature on collective narcissism significantly. Finally, qualitative
work—specifically interviews and/or observation—on sport fans in childhood and/or
adolescence could produce worthwhile findings on the stage at which children begin to identify
in a collectively narcissistic fashion. Although theory would indicate that this happens between
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late childhood and adolescence (James, 2001; Thomaes et al., 2009), this cannot be said with
certainty until investigation has actually been conducted specific to this population.
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4.8 Appendix A. Study 2 Interview Guide
Pre-interview Script:
“You have had an opportunity to read the consent form sent to you via email. Do you have any
questions about that document or what is being asked of you?”
“And you still wish to participate in the study?”
“I just want to remind you that I will be keeping an audio recording of our interview today. Is
this okay with you?”
“I also just want to remind you that it is possible I may be contacting you in the future if there is
anything from our interview today that requires clarification. Are you okay with this?”
“Finally, I just want to remind you that you may withdraw from the study at any time and skip
any question you feel uncomfortable answering. However, if you withdraw from the study, we
will be unable to provide the $25 Amazon gift card.”
Interview Questions
1.) Tell me about yourself.
2.) Tell me about your relationship with this team.
a. Do you attend many games?
b. Ever been to an away game featuring the team?
c. Do you watch a lot on TV?
d. Do you read a lot about this team?
e. Do you participate on message boards, blogs, or anything of that nature?
f. Do you like to be around other fans of the team?
g. Do you like to be around members of opposing teams?
3.) How does being a fan of this team make you feel?
4.) How long have you been a fan of this team?
a. What happened at the beginning that made you become a fan?
b. How did that start?
5.) How has your connection with the team developed over time?
a. From then to now—how has it changed?
b. Would you say you’re less or more of a fan now?
c. What has happened during that time that has caused changes?
d. Has your fandom ever decreased at any point?
e. Can you remember things from the past that have made you connect more deeply
with the team?
f. What role/how important are the players in the development of your fandom?
i. Do you believe the team has a specific “type” of player that they target?
Like, oh, he’s a “Patriot”?
ii. Has this influenced your attachment to the players/team?
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6.) Have rivalries impacted the development of your fandom at all?
7.) Do you feel league has it out for the team?
8.) Do you have this same type of connection with all your teams?
a. If so, has it always been this way?
b. If not, how does the connection differ? And why do you think this connection is
different?
9.) Do you view the team(s) as unique from other teams and/or rivals? If so, how are they
different from others in the league? Has this influenced attachment?
a. How do you feel about the fans of your team?
b. How do you feel about fans of opposing teams?
c. Do you feel (team’s) fans are different than fans of other teams?
d. Do you identify as a NOT A FAN of (rival)?
10.)
How would you describe the team’s culture/way of doing things (e.g., with
respect to the front office, coaching staff, league relations)?
11.)
Has this influenced your fandom or the way you feel about the team in any way?
If so, how?
a. Different from other teams in the league?
12.)
How about the team’s personality?? How would you describe that??
a. Do you view this as unique from other teams/rivals?
13.)
Do you follow the team’s media? If so, how would you describe the way they
cover the team?
14.)
Has this influenced your fandom or the way you feel about the team?
15.)
Would you characterize yourself as goal-oriented /achievement-oriented?
a. ) As a fan, do you have goals for your team?
b. Does the team’s success provide you with a sense of achievement? If so,
how/explain.
16.)
Describe an achievement in your childhood. How did your parents react?
17.)
Was this typical whenever you did anything good?
18.)
When someone criticizes your team, how does it make you feel?
a. Would you say that proving them wrong (proving the doubters wrong) has been a
significant factor in driving your fandom?
b. Does this provide you with a sense of validation?
19.)
How do you respond when your team is criticized?
20.)
What about when your team is praised? How does that make you feel?
Closing: Thank you very much for participating in my study. Your Amazon gift card should
arrive electronically within a few minutes.
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Table 4.1
Profile of Study 2 Participants

Name

Team

Age

Sex

CN/
ID

Similarities

Unique Drivers of
Collective Narcissism

(7-pt.
Scale)
Socialization

Collective Narcissists
Peter
Bonnie
Eddie
Brad

26
31
31
27

M
F
M
M

6.5/7
6.9/7
5.25/5
5.5/6

46

F

Steve

Phillies
Saints
Mets
Red
Wings
Florida
Panthers
Raiders

33

M

Chad
Brian
Sandy
Tom
Mike
Chris
Stewart

Bears
Patriots
Lakers
Dolphins
Packers
Cowboys
Tar Heels

26
28
30
38
27
33
30

M
M
F
M
M
M
M

Dean
Dave

Canadiens
Blue Jays

28
34

M
M

5.1/
6.7
5.4/
6.3
5.25/7
6.5/7
7/7
6.6/6
6.25/6
6/7
5.25/
6.3
5.5/6
6.5/7

Molly

Highly Identified
Doris
Lindsey

Red
Wings
Packers

✓
✓
✓

✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
Socialization

42

F

1.4/6

✓

26

F

3/6

✓

Player
Attachment
✓
✓
✓
✓

Player
Personas
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓

✓
✓
Player
Attachment

✓
Player
Personas

✓

✓
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Rivalries

✓
✓

Team
Unique
✓
✓
✓
✓

Scrutiny

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
Rivalries

✓
✓
Team
Unique

✓

Underdog
Mentality
✓
✓
✓
✓

Ingroup
Exclusivity
✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
Scrutiny

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓
Underdog
Mentality

✓
✓
Ingroup
Exclusivity

✓

Name

Team

Age

Sex

CN/
ID

Similarities

Unique Drivers of
Collective Narcissism

(7-pt.
Scale)

Highly Identified
Paul
Jamie

Red Sox
76ers

29
20

M
M

Mark

Bears

34

M

Brent
Bart

Browns
Orioles

40
50

M
M

Ron
Andy

Twins
Giants

38
38

M
M

Scott

49ers

45

M

Fred
Rita
Alex

Colts
Royals
Angels

47
43
20

M
F
M

Matthew
Walter

Knicks
Bulls

27
30

M
M

2.75/5
3.25/
5.33
3.75/
6.33
3.25/6
2.5/
6.7
2.9/7
3.3/
6.3
3.5/
6.7
3.4/7
2/5.3
3.6/
6.3
3.9/6
3.6/
5.3

Socialization

Player
Attachment

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓

Player
Personas
✓

Rivalries
✓
✓

Team
Unique

Scrutiny

Underdog
Mentality

✓

✓

✓

✓

Ingroup
Exclusivity

✓
✓
✓

✓

✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓

✓

✓
✓
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✓

✓

✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

CHAPTER 5
STUDY 3: BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES OF COLLECTIVE NARCISSISTS AND
HIGHLY IDENTIFIED FANS
The importance of determining how generally positive team identification may instead
take the form of collective narcissism is buttressed by the drastically different behavioral
responses exhibited by this segment (Golec de Zavala, 2011; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, 2013a,
2013b). According to Golec de Zavala and her colleagues, collective narcissists are particularly
prone to exhibit intergroup hostility and aggression as a means of protecting the group’s image.
Within sport, that image is perhaps never more vulnerable than in the context of relations with a
rival outgroup. As McClintock (2011) explained, there is usually more emotion and more at
stake, and while this can make contests between rival teams more fun, there is often a dark side.
“Every season, in every sport, a story will inevitably emerge of fan-on-fan violence in the stands
or parking lots. Maybe he/she was wearing the rival team’s colors, maybe there was some trash
talking that got out of hand” (McClintock, 2011, para 5). Indeed, intergroup relations between
rival fans can sometimes grow cantankerous.
Wakefield and Wann (2006) argued that, in contrast to hooliganism and large crowds in
international soccer, the source of such hostile, aggressive, and sometimes violent interactions in
America is typically an individual fan they characterized as dysfunctional. While these
dysfunctional fans have generally been characterized as a subset of highly identified fans—those
that have taken identification to an extreme—the results from Study 1 indicate that it may be
collective narcissism that is at the heart of hostile intergroup relations between fans of rival
teams. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to examine both collective narcissists’ and mere
highly identified fans’ behavioral responses to team criticism. Given the pervasiveness and
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importance of rivalries in spectator sport, I explore these responses both in the context of
intergroup relations with neutral and rival parties. I begin by reviewing the literature on sport
rivalries and team identification, before briefly explaining how collective narcissists could be
expected to respond differently than highly identified fans. Subsequently, hypotheses are
presented.
5.1 Team Identification and Sport Rivalries
Team identification refers to a fan’s psychological connection to a team (Wann, Melnick,
Russell, & Pease, 2001). The notion that highly identified sport fans possess psychological
connections so robust that they are resistant to underperformance and counter-persuasion is well
documented in the literature (e.g., Wann & Branscombe, 1990; Funk & James, 2001). For
example, highly identified fans have been shown to be more apt to associate with successful
others, but less apt to distance themselves from unsuccessful others (Hirt, Zillmann, Erickson, &
Kennedy, 1992; Kwon, Trail, & Lee, 2008; Wann & Branscombe, 1990). These results suggest
that highly identified fans will stand by their team even when performance falls below
expectations. Research has also suggested that highly identified fans will maintain their
association with their favorite team in the face of counter-persuasive information (Funk & James,
2001). Consistent with balance theory (e.g., Heider, 1958), Funk and James (2001) explained
that “if information related to a favorite team conflicts with current beliefs, the attached fan will
invoke cognitive effort to process and re-evaluate the information in order to restore internal
consistency” (p. 141). Moreover, such information is typically rejected outright, or is interpreted
in a biased manner that is in line with their own beliefs.
This ingroup bias is well documented and extends all the way back to Hastorf and
Cantril’s (1954) classic study wherein supporters of two respective college football teams in a
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head-to-head matchup had vastly different perspectives on the same game, with each blaming the
other for physical and sometimes dirty play. Seen through the lens of balance theory and social
identity theory, it can help explain highly identified sports fans’ behavior with regard to rival
teams. Scholars have generally found that highly identified fans exhibit bias toward individuals
supporting their favorite team (Harvard, 2014; Wann & Dolan, 1994). This is sometimes
accompanied by a peaked interest in rival teams (Fortunato, 2004; Harvard, 2014; Sierra, Taute,
& Heiser, 2010), and more specifically pleasure derived from the failure of others, commonly
referred to as schadenfreude (e.g., Heider, 1958).
At the root of this opposition are innate needs for belonging (Maslow, 1943) and social
comparison (Turner, 1975). This drives people to make distinctions of social categorization and
ultimately form groups with similar others (Tajfel, 1969; Turner, 1975), which serves as a basis
for intergroup behavior (Turner, 1975). Thus, when fans of rival teams interact, they selfcategorize, identifying as a member of a specific ingroup and classifying the opposition as a
distinct outgroup. This gives rise to “intergroup competitive and discriminatory responses” on
the part of the in-group (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, p. 38). As a measure of self-enhancement,
these stereotypes and comparisons to relevant out-groups are construed in such a way that favor
the in-group (Hogg et al., 1995). Tajfel and Turner (1979) explained that interpersonal history
between group members need not exist; rather, the mere categorization is sufficient to engender
ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation.
As Harvard (2014) explained, rivalries exist on a dyadic level—that is, two entities must
be present for the instigation of a rivalry—and in order for balance to be maintained in such a
relationship, both sides must either like or dislike one another. Interestingly, evidence of both
was found in his study of rivalries at the intercollegiate level, as individuals demonstrated a clear
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in-group bias in favor of their favorite team—a bias that featured intensified satisfaction both
when their favorite team defeats the rival, as well as when the rival is defeated by a neutral party.
However, in some cases, the notion of ingroup was extended to the conference in which their
team is a member at large. That is, in some cases, the rival was seen as a representative of the
conference, and in such cases, there existed a mutual respect and/or liking on the part of the
two—normally opposed—sides.
This blurring of the lines between rivals coalesces with research on social identity and
rivalries, research that has consistently found evidence of ingroup favoritism, but not necessarily
outgroup negativity. For example, social identity theory research has found ingroup favoritism to
be more likely than outgroup derogation (Brewer, 1979). Moreover, in Wann and Dolan’s (1994)
study of sport fans—wherein either an ingroup or outgroup fan was described as having acted
out at a sport event between the two rivals (e.g., yelling obscenities at the referees, throwing soda
on the court, etc.)—highly identified fans did not perceive outgroup fans more negatively than
did those low on identification. In other words, although they found evidence of an ingroup bias,
a negative bias against the outgroup was absent. This is consistent with more recent work, which
found fans to be more apt to accentuate their own team’s unique (presumably positive)
characteristics than to look for unique (presumably negative) features on the part of the rival or
opposition (Smith & Schwarz, 2003).
In brief, evidence from theory and literature on highly identified fans’ perceptions and
interactions with rival outgroups (teams) suggests a clear and overt ingroup bias or favoritism.
This has been evident time and again across contexts (e.g., Harvard, 2014; Smith & Schwarz,
2003; Wann & Dolan, 1994). Nevertheless, despite possessing a clear bias in favor of the
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ingroup, highly identified fans haven’t necessarily exhibited outgroup negativity or derogation of
rivals.
5.2 Collective Narcissism and Sport Rivalries
Harvard (2014) characterized a rivalry as a continuous, on-going phenomenon that can be
intensified by particular events. Moreover, a rivalry can be experienced with multiple teams and
need not be reciprocated—that is, it can be perceived by one side and not the other (Harvard,
2014). For example, the New York Jets’ role in implicating the New England Patriots in the
“SpyGate” scandal and, more recently, the Indianapolis Colts’ role in bringing the Patriots’ role
in “DeflateGate” to the league’s attention are specific events sufficient to heighten burgeoning
rivalries. Shaughnessy (2015) explained that the Patriots now have a long list of enemies
stemming from their involvement in these scandals and public criticism on the part of other
organizations in the wake of such scandals.
While highly identified fans may not be particularly prone to exhibiting much outgroup
negativity and derogation in the midst of rivalries of this nature (Smith & Schwarz, 2003; Wann
& Dolan, 1994), collective narcissists are a different animal. As noted, these individuals are
particularly prone to interpreting others’ actions as an indication of criticism or disrespect (Golec
de Zavala et al., 2009). However, it is only specific outgroups—those with whom they share a
tenuous history—that are perceived as consistently threatening (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013b).
While they may still exhibit hostile responses to threats and/or criticism coming from outgroups
with whom they do not share a volatile past (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013b), collective narcissists
are more apt to interpret known outgroups as threatening (Golec de Zavala, 2011). As Golec de
Zavala (2011) explained, collective narcissism is not a predictor of negative attitudes toward
parties that are not perceived as true out-groups.
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Therefore, I expect that collective narcissists will exhibit significantly different responses
to criticism of their favorite team than those who are merely highly identified with the team. Due
to their proclivity to interpret others’ actions as signs of criticism, collective narcissists may
interpret even ambiguous comments as a threat and both derogate and express an intention to
aggress against the source when it comes from an outgroup with whom the team shares a history
of hostile relations. When such comments come from a neutral party, one not viewed as an
outgroup, these negative responses should not persist. However, when these comments are
legitimately critical in nature, the source of the criticism should not matter. The collective
narcissist can be expected to interpret these comments as a threat and respond with derogation
and aggression. Due to their tendency not to exhibit outgroup negativity (Golec de Zavala et al.,
2013; Smith & Schwarz, 2003; Wann & Dolan, 1994), I argue that highly identified fans will
exhibit no such tendencies, particularly when comments can be considered ambiguous.
Accordingly, the following hypotheses are proposed.
H1: Collective narcissists will be significantly more likely than mere highly identified
fans to interpret ambiguous comments made about the team as (a) threatening, and
respond by (b) derogating the source, and (c) expressing aggression intentions, but only
when the source of such comments is a rival as opposed to a neutral party
H2: Collective narcissists will be significantly more likely than mere highly identified
fans to interpret critical comments made about the team as (a) threatening, and respond
by (b) derogating the source, and (c) expressing aggression intentions regardless of
whether the source of such comments is a rival or a neutral party
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5.3 Methods
To investigate the stated hypotheses, the research was conducted in the context of the
National Football League’s New England Patriots. As noted, this team has no shortage of rivals
and enemies stemming from their unprecedented success and involvement in numerous scandals
through the years (Shaughnessy, 2015). This list is not limited just to teams with whom they
share a tenuous history on the field, but also those who have been publicly outspoken with regard
to the team’s involvement in questionable off-field transgressions, such as sport broadcast
network ESPN. Since collective narcissists are hostile only to outgroups perceived to insult or
threaten their ingroup (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), I posit that this represents an ideal context
in which to investigate the hypotheses.
5.3.1 Study 3a
5.3.1.1 Participants, Procedure and Manipulation
A 2 (Source of Comments: Rival vs. Neutral) x 2 (Fan Type: Collective Narcissists vs.
Highly Identified) design with a two-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was
used for the analysis. Participants’ assessment of their perception of the comments as a threat and
their intention to both derogate the outgroup and respond aggressively served as the dependent
variables in the study.
A sample of 214 New England Patriots fans were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk panel service to participate in the study. The sample was initially 225, but 8 participants
were dropped because they measured as low identifiers (i.e., their team identification score fell
below the midpoint). These individuals were not of interest in the current study because, given
their lack of strong feelings about the team, it would not be expected they would have much of a
reaction to comments made about the team one way or the other. Another 3 participants were
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dropped from the analysis because they did not provide the correct response on the
authentication question, which simply asked participants to select a specific response on a
particular question to ensure they were completing the survey in earnest. The sample was
restricted to United States only and participants were offered $0.30 in exchange for taking the
survey. The link to the survey was posted with a heading reading: “NEW ENGLAND
PATRIOTS FANS WANTED to complete a short survey about their perceptions of the media’s
portrayal/coverage of their favorite team,” followed by further information about the survey. The
sample was 66.4% male and had an average age of 34.9 years old.
The survey was posted in two batches. In the first batch (N = 118), participants were
shown a news article, which was just a general report from the Associated Press on the judge
presiding over New England Patriots Quarterback Tom Brady’s court hearing and his disbelief of
Brady’s defense. Being that the comments in the article represent a mere report on what
transpired in the court hearing, I posit that these comments can be considered ambiguous. That
is, the qualitative nature of such comments is not particularly critical and likely wasn’t intended
as such; rather, it was intended only to inform the public on what transpired in the court hearing.
A sample of 30 undergraduate students at a large Northeastern university were recruited to
participate in a pretest to ascertain the article was not perceived as critical, but rather more
neutral in nature. In comparing the article to another, which was intended to be more critical in
nature, respondents indicated this article was more neutral (M = 3.97) than the other article (M =
2.27), which was a significant difference (t = 11.42, p < .001). However, given that the mean
score was just 3.97, and participants also indicated the article was at least moderately critical (M
= 3.97), it would seem there was some level of ambiguity as to whether the article was critical or
neutral, which is what was sought in this study.
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Individuals in the first batch (neutral condition) were told the article was written by a
neutral party, Tom Pelissero, Staff Writer for USA Today. USA Today was chosen over Sports
Illustrated for the neutral condition due to the results on a pretest. USA Today received a
favorability mean score closer to the midpoint (M = 4.53 on a 7-point scale) compared to Sports
Illustrated (M = 5.20). This difference was significant (t = 21.28, p < .001). In the second batch
(rival condition; N = 96), participants were shown an identical article, but in this case they were
told that the article was written by Mike Wells, Indianapolis Colts Beat Writer for ESPN. The
Indianapolis Colts were chosen as the rival condition due to their role in “DeflateGate.”
Specifically, they represent a team with which the Patriots share a tenuous history and are most
relevant to the “DeflateGate” context given that they are the organization that initially brought
the issue to the attention of the league. After removing those pretest participants who did not
identify as fans of the New England Patriots, the Colts were identified as a rival (M = 4.7).
After reading the news article, participants responded to a self-report survey instrument
containing measures of team identification, collective narcissism, perception of threat, outgroup
negativity (outgroup derogation), aggression intention and demographic information.
5.3.1.2 Measures
The following variables and items were measured using a 7-point Likert-type scale
anchored by 1 = This is not at all descriptive of me, and 7 = This is very descriptive of me.
•

Team Identification. Team Identification was measured using the three items making up
the Attachment to Team subscale on the Points of Attachment Inventory (PAI; Robinson,
Trail, & Kwon, 2004). A sample item from this scale is “I consider myself a ‘real fan’ of
the team”. This factor has been shown to possess strong internal consistency, having
exhibited an alpha coefficient of .96 in recent research (e.g., Kim, Trail, & Magnusen,
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2013), as well as an alpha coefficient of .86, and an AVE value of .68 in phase 1 of this
dissertation.
•

Collective Narcissism. Collective Narcissism was measured using an adaptation of Golec
de Zavala et al.’s (2009) scale. A sample item from this scale is “not many people seem
to fully understand the importance of my group”. This was modified to read “not many
people seem to understand the importance of the New England Patriots football team”.
This scale exhibited an alpha coefficient of .86 in Golec de Zavala et al.’s (2009) work. It
also displayed an alpha coefficient of .888 and an AVE value of 0.50 in phase 1 of this
dissertation.

•

Perception of Threat. Perception of threat was measured using three items developed for
use in this study. Items include, “the news report is a critical threat to the New England
Patriots football team,” “the report’s portrayal of the New England Patriots football team
is quite threatening,” and “I feel threatened by the report’s portrayal of the New England
Patriots football team”.

•

Aggression Intention. Aggression Intention was measured using four items created for
use in this study. The first two items were adapted from Wann et al.’s (2000) Hostile
Aggression scale, while the latter two are emblematic of the views expressed by
collectively narcissistic New England Patriots fans as discussed in Table 2.1. Items
include: “I would like to yell at him to express my anger,” “I would like to hurt him in
some way,” “I would like to make him pay for his remarks,” and “I would like to teach
him a lesson.”

•

Outgroup Negativity/Derogation. Outgroup Negativity (Derogation) was measured using
Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, and Ropp’s (1997) semantic differential scale, which
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is designed to capture derogatory feelings toward outgroups. This factor exhibited alpha
coefficients ranging from .93 to .94 in their work, and was also successfully used by
Golec de Zavala et al. (2013). The six semantic differentials are: (warm-cold; positivenegative; friendly-hostile; trusting-suspicious; respect-contempt; admiration-disgust).
These were measured with the more negative adjective receiving the higher score, so that
outgroup negativity (derogation) was indicated by a higher score.
5.3.1.3 Measurement Model
For a list of descriptive statistics (e.g., means, standard deviations, etc.) refer to Table 5.2.
The measurement model was assessed via a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using MPlus 5.0
structural equation modeling (SEM) software. The measurement model was assessed initially
and displayed the following fit statistics: [2/df ratio = (530.633/265 = 2.00), CFI = .926,
RMSEA = .067, and SRMR = .067]. While this represented good model fit per widely accepted
SEM guidelines (e.g., Hu & Bentler, 1999), there was a convergent validity issue with the
Collective Narcissism measure. One item reading, “I do not get upset when people do not notice
the achievements of the team” had a poor factor loading. I posit that this stems from the fact that
it is a double negative and thus could easily confuse participants. Accordingly, this item was
dropped from the analysis and the model was once again analyzed, displaying the following fit
statistics: [2/df ratio = (500.566/242 = 2.07), CFI = .927, RMSEA = .069, and SRMR = .068].
This represented good model fit per Hu and Bentler’s (1999) criteria. Furthermore, convergent
validity was displayed with all Average Variance Extracted (AVE) scores exceeding the 0.50
threshold (see Table 5.3 for a list of the psychometric properties of the measures). Finally,
discriminant validity was demonstrated as all AVE scores exceeded the squared correlations
between variables (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; see Table 5.4 for a matrix of correlations between
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variables). Given the goodness of fit of the measurement model, it was determined that it was
appropriate to proceed to the two-way MANOVA to evaluate hypotheses.
5.3.1.4 Hypothesis Testing
The results of the two-way MANOVA are summarized in Table 5.5. To test H1,
participants were categorized into one of two possible fan types based on their responses. First,
as mentioned, 8 participants who scored as low identifiers were dropped from the analysis.
Subsequently, those scoring at the midpoint or below on Collective Narcissism were categorized
as Highly Identified (N = 62), while those scoring above the midpoint on Collective Narcissism
were categorized as Collective Narcissists (N = 152). An independent samples t test revealed that
the means on collective narcissism for collective narcissists and highly identified fans were
significantly different (t = -15.89, p < .001). The mean for the highly identified group was 3.27,
while the mean for the collective narcissist group was 5.23. Subsequently, a 2 (Source of
Comments: Rival vs. Neutral) x 2 (Fan Type: Collective Narcissists vs. Highly Identified)
MANOVA was conducted with Perception of Threat, Outgroup Derogation, and Aggression
Intention as the dependent variables. In H1, I hypothesized an interaction effect, wherein
collective narcissists would exhibit significantly greater perceptions of the comments as a threat,
source derogation, and intention to aggress against the source, compared to highly identified
fans, but only when the source of such comments was a rival. The Wilks’ Lambda revealed that
there was not a significant interaction (F(3, 208) = .586, p = .625). Follow-up analyses revealed that
the interaction was not significant for Perception of Threat (F(1, 210) = .00518, p = .943),
Derogation (F(1, 210) = .51769, p = .473), or Aggression Intention (F(1, 210) = 1.45, p = .230).
Therefore, H1 (a, b, and c) was not supported. However, the MANOVA results did reveal a
significant main effect of Fan Type. The Wilks’ Lambda for Fan Type was significant (F(3, 208) =
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20.551, p < .001). Moreover, follow-up analyses were indicative of a significant main effect of
Fan Type on Perception of Threat (F(1, 210) = 53.49, p < .001), Derogation (F(1, 210) = 16.80, p <
.001), and Aggression Intention (F(1, 210) = 33.08, p < .001). As such, it seems the source of the
comments were irrelevant—collective narcissists displayed a significantly greater tendency to
perceive the comments as a threat, derogate the source, and exhibit aggression intentions toward
the source than highly identified fans regardless of source condition.
Per Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), when cell sizes are unequal—as was the case in this
study with a much larger number of collective narcissists compared to non-narcissists—a Box’s
M Test must be conducted to ascertain the equality of covariance matrices, an assumption made
in MANOVA analyses. The Box’s M (30.011) was significant (p < .001), indicating this
assumption was violated. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) recommend randomly deleting cases
from one group, so as to make the groups equal, before re-analyzing the data. Accordingly, 90
cases from the collective narcissists group were randomly deleted from the sample, leaving a
sample of 124 participants, with an equal number of narcissists and non-narcissists. The results
of the MANOVA with equal groups revealed the same pattern of results. The Wilks’ Lambda for
the interaction effect was not significant (F(3, 118) = .892, p = .448). Follow-up analyses revealed
that the Fan Type x Source interaction was not significant for Perception of Threat (F(1, 120) =
.597, p = .441), Source Derogation (F(1, 120) = .971, p = .326), or Aggression Intention (F(1, 120) =
.137, p = .712). There was, however, a main effect of Fan Type, as the Wilks’ Lambda for Fan
Type was significant (F(3, 118) = 14.653, p < .001). Follow-up analyses revealed a significant main
effect of Fan Type on Perception of Threat (F(1, 120) = 38.462, p < .001), Source Derogation (F(1,
120)

= 14.151, p < .001), and Aggression Intention (F(1, 120) = 28.990, p < .001). Given that the
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same pattern of results was repeated with equal groups, the initial test can be considered robust.
The results of the analyses with equal group sizes are summarized in Table 5.6.
5.3.2 Study 3b
To test H2—that collective narcissists would be more likely than highly identified fans to
interpret critical comments made about the team as a threat, and derogate and express aggression
intentions toward the source regardless of whether the source is a neutral party or rival—a
second study was conducted. To test this hypothesis, a sample of 230 participants were recruited
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. However, 12 participants were dropped because they
measured as low identifiers and another 2 failed the authentication question. This left a
remaining sample of 216. The sample was 63.4% males with an average age of 36.1 years old.
The same procedure as was used in the first study was used in this study. Individuals in each of
the conditions were shown an identical article—one which features criticism of the team framed
within the general premise that no person could reasonably defend the team given the evidence
against them. A pre-test of 30 undergraduate students at a large northeastern university assessed
the critical nature of the article. In comparing the article to another, which was posited to be
more neutral in nature, respondents indicated this article was more critical (M = 5.90) than the
other article (M = 3.97), which was a significant difference (t = 13.17, p < .001). Identical source
conditions to the first study were repeated in this study.
5.3.2.1 Measurement Model
For a list of descriptive statistics (e.g., means, standard deviations, etc.) refer to Table 5.2.
The measurement model was again assessed through a CFA on MPlus 5.0 SEM software. The
measurement model was assessed initially and displayed the following fit statistics: [2/df ratio =
(617.173/265 = 2.33), CFI = .909, RMSEA = .076, and SRMR = .080]. While this fit was
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adequate, per Hu and Bentler’s (1999) criteria, there was once again a convergent validity issue
with the Collective Narcissism measure, with the same item from Study 1 and Study 3a reading,
“I do not get upset when people do not notice the achievements of the team” receiving a poor
factor loading. As such, this item was dropped from the analysis and the model was assessed
again. The model displayed the following fit statistics: [2/df ratio = (577/242 = 2.38), CFI =
.912, RMSEA = .078, and SRMR = .080]. This represented acceptable model fit per Hu and
Bentler’s (1999) guidelines. In addition, convergent validity was displayed given that all AVE
scores exceeded the 0.50 threshold (see Table 5.3 for a list of the psychometric properties of the
measures). Finally, discriminant validity was demonstrated with all AVE scores exceeding the
squared correlations between variables (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; see Table 5.4 for a matrix of
correlations between variables). Given that the measurement model was deemed sound, I decided
it was suitable to proceed to the MANOVA for hypothesis testing.
5.3.2.2 Hypothesis Testing
To test H2, participants were categorized into one of two possible fan types using the
same method as was used in Study 3a. This resulted in 137 collective narcissists and 79 highly
identified fans. An independent samples t test revealed that the means on collective narcissism
for collective narcissists and highly identified were significantly different (t = -17.26, p < .001).
The mean for the highly identified group was 3.38, while the mean for the collective narcissist
group was 5.04. Subsequently, a 2 (Source of Comments: Rival vs. Neutral) x 2 (Fan Type:
Collective Narcissists vs. Highly Identified) two-way MANOVA with the same dependent
variables from the first study was conducted. In H2, I hypothesized a main effect of Fan Type,
such that collective narcissists would be more likely than mere highly identified fans to perceive
critical comments about their favorite team as a threat and respond by derogating the source and
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exhibiting aggression intentions, regardless of whether the source was a rival or neutral party.
The Wilks’ Lambda revealed that there was indeed a significant main effect for Fan Type (F(3,
210)

= 19.166, p < .001). Further investigation revealed that there was a significant main effect of

Fan Type on Perception of Threat (F(1, 212) = 35.181, p < .001), Derogation (F(1, 212) = 19.56, p <
.001), and Aggression Intention (F(1, 212) = 33.390, p <.001). Therefore, H2 (a, b, and c) was
supported—the collectively narcissistic group displayed a significantly greater tendency to
perceive the critical comments as a threat and respond by derogating the source and exhibiting
aggression intentions, regardless of whether this came from a rival or a neutral party. No other
effects were significant in this study. See Table 5.5 for a summary of results in this study.
Since Fan Type group sizes were unequal, a Box’s M Test was conducted to ascertain the
equality of covariance matrices. The Box’s M (29.130) was significant (p < .001), indicating this
assumption was violated. Following the procedure recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell
(2001), 58 collective narcissists were randomly removed from the sample, and the data was
analyzed with a sample of 158, containing an equal number of narcissists and non-narcissists.
The results of the MANOVA with equal groups revealed the same pattern of results. The Wilks’
Lambda for the interaction effect was not significant (F(3, 152) = 1.590, p = .194). Follow-up
analyses revealed that the Fan Type x Source interaction was not significant for Perception of
Threat (F(1, 154) = .047, p = .829) and Source Derogation (F(1, 154) = .033, p = .855) and was only
marginally significant for Aggression Intention (F(1, 154) = 4.312, p = .04). Though it is worth
noting that the multivariate test of significance revealed a confidence interval that overlapped
zero for Aggression intention (Coefficient = .827, 95% CI, LL = -.306, UL = 1.96), indicating
this result was not significant. There was, however, a main effect of Fan Type, as the Wilks’
Lambda for Fan Type was significant (F(3, 152) = 20.638, p < .001). Follow-up analyses revealed a
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significant main effect of Fan Type on Perception of Threat (F(1, 154) = 32.303, p < .001), Source
Derogation (F(1, 154) = 16.459, p < .001), and Aggression Intention (F(1, 154) = 40.499, p < .001).
Since the same pattern of results was repeated with equal groups, the initial test can be
considered robust. The results of the analyses with equal group sizes are summarized in Table
5.6.
5.4 Discussion
The results of the current study advance past literature on outgroup negativity and
derogation in sport (e.g., Smith & Schwarz, 2003; Wann & Dolan, 1994), in showing that
collective narcissists exhibit significantly different responses to criticism of their favorite team
than mere highly identified fans. Regardless of whether the comments were ambiguous in nature
or legitimately critical, this group exhibited a greater propensity to perceive the comments as a
threat and exhibit derogation and aggression intentions toward the source of such comments.
Golec de Zavala (2011) stated that collective narcissists are unlikely to exhibit negative attitudes
toward neutral parties not typically perceived as outgroups (Golec de Zavala, 2011). In contrast,
the current study shows that, even when the “attack” was ambiguous, it did not matter whether
the source of such commentary was neutral or a true outgroup with whom the team shared a
tenuous history. In both cases, collective narcissists exhibited the same hostile responses.
It is not difficult to understand why a sport fan, particularly a collectively narcissistic one,
would take criticism personally, and thus respond aggressively. After all, when one identifies
with a sport team, rage may serve as an effort to restore their identity when their self-concept is
threatened (Grove, Pickett, Jones, & Dorsch, 2012). Given that collective narcissism is
associated with an excessive need for self-esteem and validation (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009),
one would expect that a collective narcissists’ rage would be even more acute following a threat
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to their self-concept. But I posit that it is the very nature of spectator sport and the social context
of sport fandom that sets collective narcissism in sport apart from other contexts under which
this construct may be studied. Specifically, as Grove et al. (2012) argued, “the social context of
spectator sport may make it easy for some fans to replace the prescriptions of normally
acceptable behavior in favor of a different set of norms they believe define a ‘true fan’” (p. 8).
Indeed, given the results of the second study, it would seem collective narcissists hold on tightly
to the notion of ‘true fan’ and guard jealously the boundaries of their perceived ingroup. As such,
what is governed as acceptable outside the realm of spectator sport, and in other contexts where
collective narcissism could conceivably be rampant, may not necessarily apply in this unique
arena.
Sport, by its very nature, pits team versus all other opponents. It would cease to exist if
not for the inherent competition between parties. Perhaps more than any other entity, sport is
characterized by the mentality of “if you’re not for me, you’re against me.” Thus, anyone
expressing criticism—whether fans of opposing teams, media of opposing teams, or even a
mainstream journalist from a national publication not typically viewed as an outgroup—could
quickly be cast as an antagonist if the collective narcissist does not like the tone of the
comments.
It is worth noting that, while significantly higher than highly identified fans, with the
exception of source derogation, the mean scores for the other dependent variables were not
particularly high (See Tables 5.2 and 5.5). In Study 3a, wherein the comments were ambiguous
in nature, only source derogation registered above the mid-point. In Study 3b, wherein the
comments were legitimately critical, only source derogation and perception of threat for
collective narcissists registered above the mid-point, though it is certainly possible that these
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numbers were suppressed to a degree by response bias (i.e., respondents did not want to admit
they would act aggressively, even in a confidential survey). Nevertheless, while clearly
significantly more sensitive to criticism than mere highly identified fans, it does not appear as if
collective narcissists are a group of “ticking time bombs” set to explode at any given moment.
What the results do suggest is that, given their inflated and grandiose image of the team and
excessive emotional investment in this image, they are more vulnerable than a mere highly
identified fan to anything that might undermine that image and thus more prone to lash out at the
slightest hint of a negative comment. Moreover, it is likely that certain individuals, perhaps more
plentiful in the collective narcissist group, are particularly prone to hostility and aggression.
These findings advance Branscombe and Wann’s (1992) conceptual work on spectator
aggression as well as many follow-ups (e.g., Wakefield & Wann, 2006; Wann et al., 1999, 2000,
etc.). In their model, team identification served as an initial antecedent for arousal,
categorization, and ultimately aggression as a means of self-esteem restoration. They argued that,
since highly identified fans regard the team as part of their own social identity, they show the
most marked responses to successes and failures, in some cases exhibiting the highest degrees of
outgroup derogation (Branscombe & Wann, 1992). However, importantly, the authors explained
that “unmeasured variations in team identification among spectators in prior studies that
examined the consequences of game outcome for fan aggression may be an important factor
underlying the conflicting results that have been observed” (Branscombe & Wann, 1992, p.
1017). Indeed, by parsing out the narcissistic aspect of team identification and measuring it in
juxtaposition to positive ingroup attachment, I answer the authors’ call for research, by providing
evidence that collective narcissism may be responsible for much of the fan aggression observed
at stadia and sporting arenas worldwide.
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Branscombe and Wann (1992) noted the varied instances of fan aggression and tragic
outcomes stemming from high identification, explaining that, while fatal outcomes are rare, they
still happen far too often. One such instance occurred in 2013, when a Los Angeles Dodgers fan
was fatally stabbed to death by a (rival) San Francisco Giants fan following a game at AT&T
Ballpark in San Francisco (Bender, Gomez, & Melvin, 2013). While it is impossible to say
whether the individuals involved in this altercation were collectively narcissistic fans, the results
of the current study provide a layer of support for the notion that this and many other similar
instances may stem from identification of this nature. This illustrates the benefit for practitioners
to understand what underlies identification of this nature, so as to leverage this knowledge with
an increased awareness and ability to deal with potentially abusive and unruly fans at sporting
events.
It is also interesting that the mean scores for collective narcissism across these two
studies were considerably higher than the mean score in phase 1 of this dissertation. The mean
scores in these two studies were 4.66 and 4.43, respectively, while participants averaged only
3.91 in the first phase. A number of reasons are plausible for this increase. For one, it could be
that certain teams are more vulnerable to collectively narcissistic ingroup identification. Given
that the study in the first phase of this work asked participants to complete the scale in reference
to their favorite team—thus providing responses relevant to a mix of different teams—and the
current studies asked participants to fill out the instrument with respect to the New England
Patriots, it is plausible to suggest that the New England Patriots may simply be more prone to
collectively narcissistic identification than other teams, perhaps due to their unprecedented
success. This is also something that could be driven by the team’s in-market media coverage.
That is, the New England media has perpetuated the notion that the team is under intense
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scrutiny and subject to unfair treatment with respect to the “DeflateGate” drama. For example,
more than two years after the inception of the scandal, in the week leading up to the team’s
Super Bowl LI matchup with the Atlanta Falcons, Howe (2017) discussed the five biggest
storylines of Super Bowl week, the top two of which were centered around the idea of
“DeflateGate” and the commissioner who handed down the penalty, rather than the game itself.
The inability or unwillingness on the part of the media to let go of past slights could certainly
play a role in perpetuating such feelings amongst the fan base. An alternative, but related,
explanation is that collective narcissism has been shown to increase after a negative evaluation of
an ingroup or in cases where individuals feel temporarily insecure or vulnerable as group
members (Golec de Zavala, 2011). Given that these New England Patriots fans first read an
article containing either ambiguous or critical comments about the team, perhaps this served as a
stimulant for their levels of collective narcissism. Further research is needed to substantiate these
propositions.
Certainly, this would seem to serve as an indicator that the media could play a powerful
role in the development of collectively narcissistic sport fans. For journalists and publications
that frequently heap criticism on the team, the results of the current study suggest this may serve
to elevate collectively narcissistic feelings on the part of fans. Moreover, it would seem outlets
who play the role of “watch dog,” highlighting places in the media wherein the team has
received criticism or perceived disrespect at various times could play a similar role in priming
collective narcissism in their fan base. Given the propensity for hostile responses to criticism on
the part of collectively narcissistic fans in the current studies, this is something of which sport
teams and media outlets alike should be cognizant, so as to avoid such outcomes moving
forward.
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5.4.1 Limitations and Future Research
Despite the theoretical and practical contributions, the study does have some limitations.
First, the Indianapolis Colts were used as the “rival” outgroup in question because they represent
the group with whom the New England Patriots share the most tenuous history relevant to the
“DeflateGate” context used in this study. However, it is possible other teams or entities may
engender even more vitriol from the New England Patriots’ fan base. I did not pretest other
potential rival sources. Second, and somewhat surprisingly, non-narcissistic fans were
underrepresented in these two studies. In the first study, just 29% of the sample was nonnarcissistic, while in the second study only 36.5% identified in this fashion. This means that,
across the two studies, roughly 2/3 of the sample was collectively narcissistic. While this was
beyond my control, a more equal proportion of both collectively narcissistic and mere highly
identified fans would have been desirable. Finally, comprising just 33.6% of the sample in the
first study and 36.6% of the sample in the second study, females were underrepresented across
these two studies. This is worth noting given that significant differences have been observed
between genders in past work (e.g., Fink & Parker, 2009).
With regard to future research, a follow-up study investigating changes in collective
narcissism levels amongst sport fans following a negative evaluation of their team would be
worthwhile. Given the higher collective narcissism scores amongst New England Patriots fans
compared to the sample in the first phase of this dissertation, it would seem entirely possibly that
this was due to the priming of collective narcissism via the ambiguous or critical article.
However, given the design of this study, this is impossible to conclude. Future work could isolate
pre- and post-test collective narcissism levels to gain a clearer picture of this phenomenon. In
addition, it is possible that team-related factors could play a role in fans’ levels of collective
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narcissism. Factors such as history, tradition, success and/or failure, market size, or even the
team’s media could play a role in the extent of collective narcissism in the fan base. Future
studies would be well served to investigate this further. Third, the current study could be
repeated using other outgroups to determine if a group other than the Indianapolis Colts could
serve to produce the hypothesized interaction effect in the ambiguous comments condition.
Fourth, given that team criticism could come from a variety of sources, including the media,
opposing fans, the team’s own fans, or opposing players and/or coaches, it would be worthwhile
to investigate whether collective narcissists respond differently depending on the type of source.
Finally, future studies should measure other differences in behaviors between collective
narcissists and mere highly identified fans. For example, given that collective narcissists are
prone to remain on watch for anything undermining the group (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), and
the proliferation of sport content distributed through social media (e.g., Larkin & Fink, 2016), it
would be worth examining the media consumption habits of collective narcissists and mere
highly identified fans to observe potentially critical differences in behavior.
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5.5 Appendix B. Study 3 Team Criticism Article Manipulations
Ambiguous Comments Conditions

Brady’s side faces tough questions at Deflategate appeal
By (Peter King/Mike Chappell, Beat Writer, Indianapolis Colts/Jeremy Fowler, ESPN Staff
Writer)
March 3, 2016, 4:48 PM EDT
The latest chapter in the Deflategate saga unfolded in a Manhattan courtroom on Thursday as the
three judges from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit questioned lawyers for both
the NFL and NFLPA in a hearing to determine if they will uphold Judge Richard Berman’s
ruling that set aside Patriots quarterback Tom Brady’s four-game suspension.
Observers in the courtroom noted that NFLPA lawyer Jeffrey Kessler faced stiff inquiries during
his turn in front of the panel, including queries from Judge Barrington Parker about Brady’s
destruction of his cell phone.
“Why couldn’t the commissioner suspend Brady for that conduct alone?” Judge Barrington
Parker said, via the Providence Journal. “You have one of the most celebrated players
performing in that fashion? Anybody within 100 yards of this proceeding knew that would raise
the stakes.”
Parker went on to say that Brady’s explanation that he routinely destroys his phone “made no
sense whatsoever.” Federal court reporter Max Stendahl of Law360 tweeted throughout the
hearing and noted that Judge Denny Chin called evidence “compelling, if not overwhelming.”
Their appeals court’s decision will not be known for several months and could affirm Berman’s
decision, send it back to Berman’s court, back to an arbitrator or find for the league. The losing
side would be able to request a hearing from the entire Second Circuit or the Supreme Court, so,
in other words, we may not be close to the end of the road yet.
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Critical Comments Conditions

Cheating Scandals Will Forever Tarnish the Brady-Belichick
Legacy
By (Peter King/Mike Chappell, Beat Writer, Indianapolis Colts/Jeremy Fowler, ESPN Staff
Writer)
It's time to stop with the excuses. Stop with looking the other way. Just stop. Stop defending
Tom Brady and Bill Belichick.
No human being with a functioning cerebrum can defend them now.
Sure, New England Patriots fans will. This is what fans do. Everyone cheats. All teams try to get
an edge. You think the Patriots are the only team to underinflate footballs? It wouldn't have
mattered in the game anyway. You're just a hater. All Brady and Belichick want to do is win.
They are winners. Because winning. Patriot winning is greater than your winning. Mom, apple
pie and winning. Please hold it down over there. We're winning.
The excuses from Patriots fans are flowing like a fine vintage of clam chowder. This is the
second time the Patriots have shown they don't care about rules. To the Patriots, rules are for
suckers. Rules are for losers. Rules are for you and me, not for Brady and B.
One underinflated football is interesting. Three are curious. Eight are a pattern. But 11 of 12?
That's serial.
Don't blame the weather. Don't look for false equivalence. Don't say the Packers overinflated, the
Vikings warmed their footballs, the Earth's gravitational pull caused the air to leak or
microscopic black holes sucked out the pressure.
Belichick and Brady cheated. No, they are not the only ones. But this is the second blatant
example of rules skirting. This is no longer coincidence. This is a culture that I didn't think
existed there but does.
There is no explanation for 11 of 12 footballs being doctored other than purposeful manipulation.
This is why the NFL should, and I think will, come down hard on the Patriots. If the NFL
doesn't, it will look like it is enabling cheating. Roger Goodell is on record as saying he would
punish teams harsher that try to cheat the competitive balance rules.
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Table 5.1
Study 3 Factors and Items
Factor and Items
Collective Narcissism
I wish other groups would more quickly recognize the authority of my team
My team deserves special treatment
I will never be satisfied until my team gets all it deserves
I insist upon my team getting the respect that is due to it
It really makes me angry when others criticize my team
If my team had a major say in the league the league would be a better place
I do not get upset when people do not notice the achievements of my team
Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of my team
The true worth of my team is often misunderstood
Team Identification
Being a fan of the team is important to me
I am a committed fan of the team
I consider myself a “real” fan of the team
Perception of Threat
The news report is a critical threat to the New England Patriots football team
The report’s portrayal of the New England Patriots football team is quite threatening
I feel threatened by the report’s portrayal of the New England Patriots football team
Outgroup Derogation
Warm-Cold
Positive-Negative
Friendly-Hostile
Trusting-Suspicious
Respect-Contempt
Admiration-Disgust
Aggression Intention
I would like to yell at him to express my anger
I would like to hurt him in some way
I would like to make him pay for his remarks
I would like to teach him a lesson
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Table 5.2
Study 3 Descriptive Statistics
Factor
Team Identification
Collective Narcissism
Perception of Threat
Source Derogation
Aggression Intention

Study 3a
Mean Standard Deviation
5.93
1.04
4.66
1.54
3.53
1.48
4.83
1.26
2.60
1.37
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Mean
5.72
4.43
3.68
5.29
2.87

Study 3b
Standard Deviation
1.04
1.46
1.51
1.21
1.39

Table 5.3
Psychometric Properties of the Study 3 Variables
Factor Loadings ( Alpha Coefficients (and Average Variance Extracted (AVE)

Items
Team Identification
Being a fan of the team is important to me
I am a committed fan of the team
I consider myself a “real” fan of the team
Collective Narcissism
I wish other teams would more quickly recognize the
authority of my team
My team deserves special treatment
I will never be satisfied until my team gets all it deserves
I insist upon my team getting the respect that is due to it
It really makes me angry when other criticize my team
If my team had a major say in the league, the league
would be a better place
Not many people seem to fully understand the importance
of my team
The true worth of my team is often misunderstood
Perception of Threat
The news report is a critical threat to the New England
Patriots football team
The report’s portrayal of the New England Patriots
football team is quite threatening
I feel threatened by the report’s portrayal of the New
England Patriots football team
Aggression Intention
I would like to yell at the author to express my anger
I would like to harm the author in some way
I would like to make the author pay for his/her remarks
I would like to teach the author a lesson
Source Derogation
Warm-Cold
Positive-Negative
Friendly-Hostile
Trusting-Suspicious
Respect-Contempt
Admiration-Disgust
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Study 3a



.856

AVE
0.76

.801
.905
.897





.843

AVE
0.77

.876

0.52

.828

0.62

.860

0.64

.936

0.72

.872
.886
.871
.895

0.52

.802

.740

.667
.740
.692
.778
.722

.647
.647
.779
.735
.773

.655

.725

.715

.726
.835

0.63

.772

.732

.853

.808

.759

.811
.885

0.67

.721
.761
.914
.853

.695
.789
.882
.827
.924

.853
.870
.744
.736
.878
.849

Study 3b

0.68
.878
.901
.804
.785
.848
.854

Table 5.4
Correlations amongst Study 3 Latent Variables
Study 3a
1
1) Collective
1
Narcissism
2) Team
.601***
Identification
3) Aggression
.403***
Intention
4) Perception of
.587***
Threat
5) Source Derogation
.443***
Study 3b
1
1) Collective
1
Narcissism
2) Team
.710***
Identification
3) Aggression
.504***
Intention
4) Perception of
.652***
Threat
5) Source Derogation
.477***
Note: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

2

3

4

5

1
-.002

1

.183*

.699***

1

.329***
2

.242***
3

.404***
4

1
5

1
.209**

1

.373***

.617***

1

.499***

.099

.439***
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Table 5.5
Summary of Study 3 Results
Univariate Tests
Dependent Independent
Variable
Variable
Study 3a
Perception
of Threat

Source
Derogation

Multivariate Tests
F

Coefficient Confidence Confidence
(Mean
Interval
Interval
Difference)
(LL)
(UL)

Sig

p<
.001
p=
.473
p<
.001
p=
.230
p<
.001
p=
.943

Fan Type

53.494

-1.475

-2.047

-.9040

Fan Type x
Source
Fan Type

.518

-.2903

-1.433

.8522

16.799

-.6586

-1.114

-.2035

1.452

-.3872

-1.297

.5229

33.076

-1.123

-1.677

-.5703

.005

-.0281

-1.135

1,078

35.181

-1.183

-1.748

-.6813

.271

.2078

-.9220

1.338

19.560

-.7268

-1.192

-.2615

.078

.0918

-.8389

1.023

33.390

-1.057

-1.574

-.5388

2.244

.5478

-.4877

1.583

Fan Type x
Source
Aggression Fan Type
Intention
Fan Type x
Source
Study 3b
Perception Fan Type
of Threat
Fan Type x
Source
Source
Fan Type
Derogation
Fan Type x
Source
Aggression Fan Type
Intention
Fan Type x
Source

Note: N = 214 (Study 3a), N = 216 (Study 3b)
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p<
.001
p=
.603
p<
.001
p=
.780
p<
.001
p=
.136

Table 5.6
Summary of Study 3 Results (with equal groups)
Univariate Tests
Dependent Independent
Variable
Variable

Study 3a
Perception
of Threat

Multivariate Tests
F

Coefficient
95%
95%
(Mean
Confidence Confidence
Difference)
Interval
Interval
(LL)
(UL)

Sig

p<
.001
p=
.441
p<
.001
p=
.326
p<
.001
p=
.712

Fan Type

38.462

-1.532

-2.238

-.8255

Fan Type x
Source
Fan Type

.597

-.382

-1.795

1.031

14.151

-.7080

-1.246

-.1697

Fan Type x
Source
Aggression Fan Type
Intention
Fan Type x
Source
Study 3b
Perception Fan Type
of Threat
Fan Type x
Source
Source
Fan Type
Derogation
Fan Type x
Source
Aggression Fan Type
Intention
Fan Type x
Source

.971

-.3708

-1.447

.7057

28.990

-1.217

-1.864

-.5707

.137

.1671

-1.126

1.461

32.303

-1.213

-1.820

-.6056

.047

.0925

-1.122

1.307

16.459

-.7323

-1.246

-.2187

.033

-.0659

-1.093

.9614

40.499

-1.267

-1.833

-.7004

4.312

.8268

-.3062

1.960

Source
Derogation

Note: N = 124 (Study 3a), N = 158 (Study 3b)
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p<
.001
p=
.829
p<
.001
p=
.855
p<
.001
p=
.040

CHAPTER 6
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Anecdotal (Burke, 2014; Poladian, 2015) and empirical (Branscombe & Wann, 1992;
Wakefield & Wann, 2006; Wann et al., 1999) evidence indicated sport fandom may be a
worthwhile context in which to examine collective narcissism. The results of three studies
discussed here bear that out, as an initial portrait of the collectively narcissistic sport fan has
emerged that greatly extends the literature both on collective narcissism in general, as well as
team identification within sport. In this closing chapter, I provide a brief review of the results
from the three studies, as well as a discussion of the common thread tying everything together,
before wrapping up with a discussion of the future outlook on collective narcissism.
6.1 Key Findings
The results from Phase 1 provide an initial profile of the collectively narcissistic sport
fan—one who is, quite interestingly, prone to both BIRGing and CORFing, as well as
dysfunctional fandom. Perhaps the most fascinating aspect to emerge from this study was the
temporary lapses in loyalty (i.e., CORFing) displayed by collectively narcissistic fans.
Theoretically, I proposed this stemmed from their insecure self-esteem, which resulted in
heightened sensitivity to negative events, and thus a susceptibility to dissonance reduction
techniques such as CORFing. Ultimately, this finding was emblematic of the nature of the
narcissistic relationship. In good times, the narcissistic partner is apt to affirm the security of the
relationship, but in bad times—when the narcissistic needs are not being met—this is likely to
result in defensive behaviors to protect the fragile self-esteem (Pistole, 1995).
While Phase 1 featured an examination of the outcomes of collective narcissism in sport,
Phase 2 featured an exploration of the drivers of this type of attachment. What was provided in
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this study was evidence of the ways collective narcissists perceive the team that are distinct from
those exhibited by mere highly identified fans. Collective narcissists displayed a tendency to
attach themselves to narratives that allow them to inflate their fragile ego, thereby fueling their
narcissistic attachment. They exhibited a propensity to conceive of the team as unique and
distinct from others in the respective league, possessive of an underdog spirit, constantly under
scrutiny from external parties, and prone to the identification as a “true fan” who stuck it out
with the team while others did not. The latter notion is interesting given their propensity to
CORF. Regardless, these efforts largely seemed to represent narratives manufactured in the mind
of the collective narcissist as a means of ego fulfillment. In contrast, highly identified fans, for
the most part, attached themselves solely to more secure aspects of the team and vehicles for
identification (e.g., socialization agents, players, rivalries, etc.).
Finally, in the third phase, I provided evidence of defensive behaviors distinct from mere
highly identified fans that serve as dissonance reduction mechanisms in the face of criticism.
Across two studies, collective narcissists were shown to be more prone to perceiving of criticism
as a threat, as well as outgroup derogation and aggression intention in the face of the criticism.
This was shown to be the case regardless of whether the criticism was ambiguous or legitimately
critical, or whether it came from a neutral or rival party.
Common across all three phases is evidence of a fan that goes to excessive lengths to use
their relationship with the team as a vehicle to protect and inflate their fragile and insecure selfesteem. While different results and pieces of evidence emerge throughout, this is the common
(theoretical) thread tying these three separate but related studies together. In an overarching way,
the findings are consistent with our existing understanding of collective narcissism stemming
from the work of Golec de Zavala and her colleagues (e.g., Cichocka et al., 2015; Golec de
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Zavala, 2011; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, 2013a, 2013b). That being said, the current work
advances the collective narcissism literature significantly by providing a nuanced look at how
this plays out in the unique context of sport. In addition, as noted throughout, I provide
considerable advances for our understanding of sport fan behavior and team identification.
6.2 Key Advances on Past Literature
An important advancement of the current work is the merging of the literature on
collective narcissism and self-expansion theory. This provides scholarly work on collective
narcissism with a strong theoretical underpinning in ingroup identification processes.
Specifically, collective narcissism is an ingroup identification marked by inclusion of the
team/group in self and merging of resources. The self-expansion model also provides a
framework to better understand narcissistic relationship tendencies characteristic of collectively
narcissistic sport team identification. These include the affirmation of the relationship through a
mutual exchange of resources during good times, coupled with defensive behaviors (e.g.,
CORFing) when narcissistic needs are not met during bad times (e.g., failure, team loss, etc.).
Given the characteristics and behaviors exhibited by collective narcissists both in the current
work and past literature (e.g., Golec de Zavala, 2011; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, 2013a,
2013b), the self-expansion model represents a natural accompaniment affording scholars a sound
theoretical lens through which to view ingroup identification of this nature.
Another important advancement of the current work specific to literature on team
identification is the provision of a distinct set of outcomes, drivers, and behavioral responses,
when compared to mere positive team identification. This illustrates the importance of parsing
out the narcissistic aspect of team identification, which likely exists to varying degrees in sport
fans worldwide. For some this may be dormant or insignificant in their fandom, while for others,

129

this may be quite pronounced and evident in their relationship with the sport team and resultant
behaviors. Regardless, there is considerable insight to be gained for both academicians and
practitioners alike to warrant continued exploration of this construct moving forward. A number
of ideas for future study have been put forth across this series of essays. These and other avenues
would represent a sound starting point for the continued advancement of this research line and
ultimately a better understanding of sport fan identification and behavior.
Team identification is among the most widely studied constructs in the sport management
literature and with good reason. Highly identified fans have long exhibited a distinct set of
behavioral responses from those low or moderate on team identification, making them a segment
coveted by marketers. Because of this, we have a firm understanding of many of the outcomes
and drivers of this important construct. However, findings from the current series of studies
provide evidence to suggest our current understanding is incomplete. In order to truly understand
team identification, we must also consider the potential for other forms and/or variations of the
construct—one such variations being collective narcissism. Indeed, the potential exists for a
robust segment of individuals who identify in this fashion, and as such, it is critical we make an
effort to understand the psychology and behaviors exhibited by this segment. The current work
represents an important first step in this venture, providing a foundation for the advancement of
literature on team identification and collective narcissism moving forward.

.

130

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aron, A., & Aron, E. N. (1986). Love as the expansion of self: Understanding attraction and
satisfaction. New York: Hemisphere.
Aron, A., & Aron, E. N. (2006). Romantic relationships from the perspectives of the selfexpansion model and attachment: Partially overlapping circles. In M. Mikulincer & G. S.
Goodman (eds.), Dynamics of Romantic Love: Attachment, Caregiving, and Sex (pp. 359382). New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
Aron, A., Mashek, D., McLaughlin-Volpe, T., Wright, S., Lewandowski, G., & Aron, E. N.
(2005). Including close others in cognitive structures of the self. In M. W. Baldwin (Ed.),
Interpersonal Cognition (pp. 206-232). New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
Associated Press. (2015, August 2). Maine man hires plane to fly banner over Roger Goodell’s
vacation home. Boston Globe. Retrieved from
https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2015/08/02/patriots-fan-hires-plane-fly-bannerover-goodell-vacation-home/HXrb2HBj1w9E0ECSMI84RK/story.html
Basu, T. (2015, September 6). Patriots fan mocks NFL commissioner using sky banner. Time.
Retrieved from http://time.com/4023948/sky-banner-roger-goodell-tom-brady/
Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Narcissism as addiction to esteem. Psychological
Inquiry, 12, 206-209.
Bender, K. J., Gomez, M., & Melvin, J. (2013). San Francisco: Dodgers fan fatally stabbed in
fight with Giants fans; two suspects still at large. The Mercury News. Retrieved from
http://www.mercurynews.com/2013/09/25/san-francisco-dodgers-fan-fatally-stabbed-infight-with-giants-fans-two-suspects-still-at-large/
Bizman, A., & Yinon, Y. (2002). Engaging in distancing tactics among sport fans: Effects on
self-esteem and emotional responses. The Journal of Social Psychology, 142, 381-392.
Bizumic, B., & Duckitt, J. (2008). “My group is not worthy of me”: Narcissism and
ethnocentrism. Political Psychology, 29, 437-453.
Bleiberg, E. (1994). Normal and pathological narcissism in adolescence. American Journal of
Psychotherapy, 48, 30-51.
Bosson, J. K., Brown, R. P., Zeigler-Hill, V., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2003). Self-enhancement
tendencies among people with high explicit self-esteem: The moderating role of implicit
self-esteem. Self and Identity, 2, 169-187.
Branscombe, N. R. & Wann, D. (1992). Role of identification with a group, arousal,
categorization processes, and self-esteem in sport spectator aggression. Human Relations,
45,1013-1033.

131

Brewer, M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitivemotivational analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 307-324.
Bristow, D. N., & Sebastian, R. J. (2001). Holy cow! Wait ‘til next year! A closer look at the
brand loyalty of Chicago Cubs baseball fans. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 18, 256275.
Brown, A. (1997). Narcissism, identity, and legitimacy. Academy of Management Review, 22,
643-686.
Brown, J. D. (1993). Self-esteem and self-evaluation: Feeling is believing. In J. Suls (Ed.),
Psychological perspectives on the self (Vol. 4, pp. 27-58). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Brown, N., & Deegan, C. (1998). The public disclosure of environmental performance
information—a dual test of media agenda setting theory and legitimacy theory.
Accounting and Business Research, 29, 21-41.
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A new source
of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 3-5.
Burke, M. (2014, July 27). Burke: New England Patriots fans the most sensitive group in sports.
Metro. Retrieved from http://www.metro.us/sports/new-england-patriots-fans-the-mostsensitive-group-in-sports/tmWngA---6dO5x7rxRnLyY/
Bushman, B. J., Baumeister, R. F., Thomaes, S., Ryu, E., Begeer, S., & West, S. G. (2009).
Looking again, and harder, for a link between low self-esteem and aggression. Journal of
Personality, 77, 427–446.
Castano, E., Yzerbyt, V. Y., Bourguignon, D., Seron, E. (2002). Who may enter? The impact of
in-group identification on in-group/out-group categorization. Journal of Experimental
Social Pscyhology, 38, 315-322.
Cialdini, R. B., Borden, R. J., Thorne, A., Walker, M. R., Freeman, S., & Sloan, L. R. (1976).
Basking in reflected failure: Three (football) field studies. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 39, 406-415.
Cichocka, A., de Zavala, A. G., Marchlewska, M., & Olechowski, M. (2015). Grandiose
delusions: Collective narcissism, secure in-group identification, and belief in
conspiracies. In M. Bilewicz, A. Cichocka, & W. Soral (Eds.), The Psychology of
Conspiracy (pp. 42-61). Oxford: Taylor & Francis.
Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods
approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Creswell, J. W., & Miller, D. L. (2000). Determining validity in qualitative inquiry. Theory into
Practice, 39, 124-130.

132

Delia, E. B. (2015). The exclusiveness of group identity in celebrations of team success. Sport
Management Review, 18, 396-406.
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2011). Handbook of qualitative research. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Dolloff, M. (2015, October 20). It’s time for Patriots nation to retire the “deflategate revenge
tours.” CBS Boston. Retrieved from http://boston.cbslocal.com/2015/10/20/patriots-coltsdeflategate-revenge-myth/
Donahue, T., & Wann, D. L. (2009). Perceptions of the appropriateness of sport fan physical and
verbal aggression: Potential influences of team identification and fan dysfunction. North
American Journal of Psychology, 11, 419-428.
Duchon, D., & Drake, B. (2009). Organizational narcissism and virtuous behavior. Journal of
Business Ethics, 85, 301-308.
Elliot, A. J., & Thrash, T. M. (2002). Approach–avoidance motivation in personality: Approach
and avoidance temperaments and goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
82, 804–818.
Fink, J. S., Parker, H. P., Brett, M., Higgins, J. (2009). Off field behavior of athletes and team
identification. Using social identity theory and balance theory to explain fan reactions.
Journal of Sport Management, 22, 142-155.

Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Beliefs, attitudes, intention, and behavior: An introduction to
theory and research. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.
Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. (1981). Evaluating structural equation models with unobservable
variables and measurement error. Journal of Marketing Research, 18, 39-50.
Fortunato, J. A. (2004). The rival concept: An analysis of the 2002 Monday Night Football
season. Journal of Sport Management, 18, 383-397.
Foster, J. D., & Trimm, R. F. (2008). On being eager and uninhibited: Narcissism and approachavoidance motivation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1004–1017.
Funk, D. C., Haugtvedt, C. P., & Howard, D. R. (2000). Contemporary attitude theory in sport:
Theoretical considerations and implications. Sport Management Review, 3, 125-144.
Funk, D. C. & James, J. D. (2001). The psychological continuum model: A conceptual
framework for understanding an individual’s psychological connection to sport. Sport
Management Review, 4, 119-150.
Funk, D. C., & James, J. D. (2004). The fan attitude network (FAN) model: Exploring attitude
formation and change among sport consumers. Sport Management Review, 7, 1- 26.

133

Fylan, F. (2005). Semi-structured interviewing. In J. Miles, & P. Gilbert (Eds.), A handbook of
research methods for clinical and health psychology (pp. 65-77). United Kingdom:
Oxford University Press.
Gibbs, G. R. (2007). Analysing qualitative data. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Giles, M. (2015, May 21). Four deflategate conspiracy theories so looney they might just be real.
GQ. Retrieved from http://www.gq.com/story/these-ballghazi-conspiracy-theories-willnever-die
Gioia, D. A., Corley, K. G., & Hamilton, A. L. (2012). Seeking qualitative rigor in inductive
research: Notes on the Gioia methodology. Organizational Research Methods, 00, 1-17.
Glaser, B. G. (1978). Theoretical sensitivity: Advances in methodology of grounded theory (Vol.
2). Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press.
Golec de Zavala, A. G. (2011). Collective narcissism and intergroup hostility: The dark side of
‘in-group love’. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 5, 309-320.
Golec de Zavala, A. G., & Cichocka, A. (2012). Collective narcissism and anti-semitism in
Poland. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 15, 213-229.
Golec de Zavala, A. G., Cichocka, A., & Bilewicz, M. (2013a). The paradox of in-group love:
Differentiating collective narcissism advances understanding of the relationship between
in-group and out-group attitudes. Journal of Personality, 81, 16-28.
Golec de Zavala, A. G., Cichocka, A., Eidelson, R., & Jayawickreme, N. (2009). Collective
narcissism and its social consequences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
97, 1074-1096.
Golec de Zavala, A. G., Cichocka, A., & Iskra-Golec, I. (2013b). Collective narcissism
moderates the effect of in-group image threat on intergroup hostility. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 104, 1019-1039.
Grove, S. J., Pickett, G. M., Jones, S. A., & Dorsch, M. J. (2012). Spectator rage as the dark side
of engaging sport fans: Implications for services marketers. Journal of Service Research,
15, 3-20.
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., & Anderson, R. E. (2009). Multivariate data
analysis (7th Ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Harter, S. (2006). The self. In W. Damon & R. M. Lerner (Series Eds.) & N. Eisenberg (Vol.
Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 3. Social, emotional, and personality
development (pp. 505–570). New York: Wiley.

134

Harvard, C. T. (2014). Glory out of reflected failure: The examination of how rivalry affects
sport fans. Sport Management Review, 17, 243-253.
Hastorf, A. H., Cantril, H. (1954). They saw a game: A case study. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 49, 129-134.
Heere, B., & James, J. D. (2007). Sports teams and their communities: Examining the influence
of external group identities on team identity. Journal of Sport Management, 21, 319-337.
Heere, B., James, J. D., Yoshida, M., & Scremin, G. (2011). The effect of associated group
identities on team identity. Journal of Sport Management, 25, 606-621.
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Hill, R. (2015, November 24). Deflategate and Spygate: Another reason for Patriots fans to hate
ESPN. Pats Pulpit. Retrieved from
http://www.patspulpit.com/2015/11/24/9790058/deflategate-and-spygate-another-reasonfor-patriots-fans-to-hate-espn
Hirt, E. R., Zillman, D., Erickson, G. A., & Kennedy, C. (1992). Costs and benefits of allegiance.
Changes in fans’ self-ascribed competencies after team victory versus defeat. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 724-738.
Hogg, M. A., Terry, D. J., & White, K. M. (1995). A tale of two theories. A critical comparison
of identity theory with social identity theory. Social Psychology Quarterly, 58, 255-269.
Howe, J. (2017, January 29). Tom Brady vs. Roger Goodell tops list of 5 big Super Bowl story
lines. The Boston Herald. Retrieved from
http://www.bostonherald.com/sports/patriots/2017/01/tom_brady_vs_roger_goodell_tops
_list_of_5_big_super_bowl_story_lines
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. (1999). Fit indices in covariance structure modeling: Sensitivity
under parameterized model misspecification. Psychological Methods, 3, 424-453.
Jacks, J. Z., & Devine, P. G. (2000). Attitude importance, forewarning of message content, and
resistance to persuasion. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 22, 19-29.
James, J. D. (2001). The role of cognitive development and socialization in the initial
development of team loyalty. Leisure Sciences, 23, 233-262.
Johnson, D. J., & Rusbult, C. E. (1989). Resisting temptation: Devaluation of alternative partners
as a means of maintaining commitment in close relationships. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 57, 967-980.
Jordan, C. H., Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., Hoshino-Browne, E., & Correll, J. (2003). Secure and
defensive high self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 969-978.
135

Kernis, M. H. (2003). Toward a conceptualization of optimal self-esteem. Psychological Inquiry,
14, 1-26.
Kohut, H. (1977). The restoration of the self. Madison, WI: International Universities Press.
Kolbe, R. H., & James, J. D. (2000). An identification and examination of the influences that
shape a professional team fan. International Journal of Sport Marketing and
Sponsorship, 2, 21-37.
Kramer, R. M. (1998). Paranoid cognition in social systems: Thinking and acting in the shadow
of doubt. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2, 251-275.
Kramer, R. M. (2004). Collective paranoia: Distrust between social groups. In R. Hardin (Ed.),
Distrust. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Kramer, R. M., & Jost, J. T. (2003). Close encounters of the suspicious kind: Outgoing paranoia
in hierarchical trust dilemmas. In D. M. Mackie & E. R. Smith (Eds.), From prejudice to
intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups (pp. 173-190). New York:
Taylor & Francis.
Kramer, R. M., & Messick, D. M. (1998). Getting by with a little help from our enemies:
Collective paranoia and its role in intergroup relations. In C. Sedikides, J. Schopler, & C.
A. Insko (Eds.), Intergroup cognition and intergroup behavior (pp. 233-255). Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Kurkjian, A. (2015, November 23). Patriots fans vent deflategate anger with ESPN in Foxboro.
Boston Herald. Retrieved from
http://www.bostonherald.com/sports/patriots/the_blitz/2015/11/patriots_fans_vent_deflat
egate_anger_with_espn_in_foxboro
Kwon, H., Trail, G. T., & Anderson, D. F. (2005). Are multiple points of attachment necessary to
predict cognitive, affective, conative, or behavioral loyalty? Sport Management Review,
8, 255-270.
Kwon, H. H., Trail, G. T., & Lee, D. (2008). The effects of vicarious achievement and team
identification on BIRGing and CORFing. Sport Marketing Quarterly, 17, 209-217.
Larkin, B. (2015). An examination of fantasy sport participation motives and substitution versus
attendance attention. Sport Marketing Quarterly, 24, 120-133.
Larkin, B. A., & Fink, J. S. (2016). Fantasy, FoMO, and traditional fandom: How second-screen
use of social media allows fans to accommodate multiple identities. Journal of Sport
Management, 30, 643-655.
Larkin, B., Fink, J. S., & Trail, G. T. (2015). An examination of constraints and motivators of
sport media consumption substitution intention. Sport Marketing Quarterly, 24, 183-197.

136

Lock, D., Darcy, S., & Taylor, T. (2009). Starting with a clean slate. Analysis of member
identification with a new sport team. Sport Management Review, 12, 15-25.
Lock, D. J., & Funk, D. C. (2016). The multiple in-group identity framework. Sport Management
Review, 19, 85-96.
Lock, D., Taylor, T., Funk, D., & Darcy, S. (2012). Exploring the development of team
identification. Journal of Sport Management, 26, 283-294.
Lowe, M. (2015, October 15). Patriots beat: Extra incentive vs. the Colts? The Patriots aren’t
biting. Portland Press Herald. Retrieved from
http://www.pressherald.com/2015/10/15/patriots-beat-extra-incentive-vs-the-colts-thepatriots-arent-biting/
Madrigal, R. (1995). Cognitive and affective determinants of fan satisfaction with sporting event
attendance. Journal of Leisure Research, 3, 205-227.
Malinowski, E. (2015, September 10). The persecution of Patriots nation. Rolling Stone.
Retrieved from http://www.rollingstone.com/sports/features/the-persecution-of-patriotsnation-20150910
Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review, 50, 370-396.
McClintock, B. (2011, April 5). MLB fan fights: Why rivalry belongs on the field, has no place
in the stands. Bleacher Report. Retrieved from http://bleacherreport.com/articles/654975rivalries-belong-on-the-field-and-have-no-place-crossing-over-into-the-stands
McCracken, G. (1988). The long interview. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Metcalf, S. (2015, May 18). Patriots derangement syndrome. Slate.com. Retrieved from
http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2015/05/tom_brady_appeal_new_england
_patriots_fans_have_gone_over_the_deep_end_over.html
Morf, C. C., & Rhodewalt, F. (2001). Unraveling the paradoxes of narcissism: A dynamic selfregulatory processing model. Psychological Inquiry, 12, 177-196.
Mravic, M. (2013, October 8). Why I gave up my NFL season tickets. Monday Morning
Quarterback. Retrieved from http://mmqb.si.com/2013/10/08/why-i-gave-up-my-nflseason-tickets
Noel, J. G., Wann, D. L., & Branscombe, N. R. (1995). Peripheral ingroup membership status
and public negativity toward outgroups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
68, 127-137.
Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P. G. (2010). Running experiments on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Judgment and Decision Making, 5, 411.

137

Park, C. W., MacInnis, D. J., Priester, J., Eisingerich, A. B., & Iacobucci, D. (2010). Brand
attachment and brand attitude strength: Conceptual and empirical differentiation of two
critical brand equity drivers. Journal of Marketing, 74, 1-17.
Park, S., Mahony, D., Kim, Y. K. (2011). The role of sport fan curiosity: A new conceptual
approach to the understanding of sport fan behavior. Journal of Sport Management, 25,
46-56.
Partridge, J. A., Wann, D. L., & Elison, J. (2010). Understanding college sport fans’ experiences
of an attempts to cope with shame. Journal of Sport Behavior, 33, 160-175.
Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The dark triad of personality: Narcissism,
Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 36, 556-563.
Pehrson, S., Brown, R., & Zagefka, H. (2009). When does national identification lead to the
rejection of immigrants? Cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence for the role of
essentialist ingroup definitions. British Journal of Social Psychology, 48, 61-76.
Pelham, B. W., & Hetts, J. J. (1999). Implicit and explicit personal and social identity: Toward a
more complete understanding of the social self. In T. Tyler & R. Kramer (Eds.), The
psychology of the social self (pp. 115-143). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1981). Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and contemporary
approaches. Dubuque, IA: Wm. C. Brown.
Pistole, M. C. (1995). Adult attachment style and narcissistic vulnerability. Psychoanalytic
Psychology, 12, 115-126.
Poladian, C. (2015, September 9). NFL fans are incredibly biased, have unrealistic expectations
for their favorite teams. International Business Times. Retrieved from
http://www.ibtimes.com/pulse/nfl-fans-are-incredibly-biased-have-unrealisticexpectations-their-favorite-teams-2089760
Pritchard, M. P., & Funk, D. C. (2006). Symbiosis and substitution in spectator sport.
Journal of Sport Management, 20(3), 299-321.
Quevedo, K. M., Benning, S. D., Gunnar, M. R., & Dahl, R. E. (2009). The onset of puberty:
Effects on the psychophysiology of defensive and appetitive motivation. Development
and Psychopathology, 21, 27–45.
Robinson, M. J., Trail, G. T., & Kwon, H. (2004). Motives and points of attachment of
professional golf spectators. Sport Management Review, 7, 167–192.
Rosenthal, S. A., & Pittinsky, T. L. (2006). Narcissistic leadership. The Leadership Quarterly,
17, 617-633.

138

Rossman, G. B., & Rallis, S. F. (2012). Learning in the field (3rd Ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Rothbart, M. K., Ahadi, S. A., & Evans, D. E. (2000). Temperament and personality: Origins and
outcomes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 122–135.
Rothbart, M. K., & Bates, J. E. (2006). Temperament. In W. Damon & R. M. Lerner (Series
Eds.) & N. Eisenberg (Vol. Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 3. Social,
emotional, and personality development (pp. 99–166). New York: Wiley.
Ruiz, J. M., Smith, T. W., & Rhodewalt, F. (2001). Distinguishing narcissism and hostility:
Similarities and differences in interpersonal circumplex and five-factor correlates.
Journal of Personality Assessment, 76, 537-555.
Schein, E. H. (1992). Organizational culture and leadership (2nd Ed.). San Francisco, CA:
Jossey-Bass.
Shabad, P. (2010). The suffering of passion: Metamorphoses and the embrace of the stranger.
Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 20, 710-729.
Shaughnessy, D. (2015, September 23). The curse of Deflategate makes its mark. Boston Globe.
Retrieved from https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2015/09/22/patriots-enemiesmysteriously-meet-with-misfortune/p2NJbnZjdsRmWTdaMXEUZN/story.html
Sierra, J. J., Taute, H. A., & Heiser, R. S. (2010). Personal opinions and beliefs as determinants
of collegiate football consumption for revered and hated teams. Sport Marketing
Quarterly, 19, 143-153.
Silverblatt, A. (2004). Media as social institution. American Behavioral Scientist, 48, 35-41.
Smith, R. A., & Schwarz, N. (2003). Language, social comparison, and college football: Is your
school less similar to the rival school than the rival is to your school? Communication
Monographs, 70, 351-360.
Stein, M. (2003). Unbounded irrationality: Risk and organizational narcissism at long term
capital management. Human Relations, 56, 523-528.
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2001). Using Multivariate Statistics (5th Ed.). New York, NY:
Pearson Education.
Tajfel, H. (1969). Cognitive aspects of prejudice. Journal of Social Issues, 25, 79-97.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin
& S. Worche (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33-47).
Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Tesch, R. (1990). Qualitative research. New York: Falmer.

139

Thomaes, S., Bushman, B. J., De Castro, B. O., & Stegge, H. (2009). What makes narcissists
bloom? A framework for research on the etiology and development of narcissism.
Development and Psychopathology, 21, 1233-1247.
Thompson, C. J., Locander, W. B., & Pollio, H. R. (1989). Putting consumer experience back
into consumer research: The philosophy and method of existential-phenomenology.
Journal of Consumer Research, 16, 133-146.
Trail, G. T., Fink, J. S., & Anderson, D. F. (2003). Sport spectator consumption behavior. Sport
Marketing Quarterly, 12, 8-17.
Tropp, L. R., & Wright, S. C. (2001). Ingroup identification as inclusion of ingroup in the self.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 585-600.
Tsiotsou, R. H. (2013). Sport team loyalty. Integrating relationship marketing and a hierarchy of
effects. The Journal of Services Marketing, 27, 458-471.
Turner, J. C. (1975). Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup
behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 5, 5-34.
Twenge, J. M. (2006). Generation me: Why today’s young Americans are more confident,
assertive, entitled—and more miserable than ever before. New York: Free Press.
Van Natta, D., & Wickersham, S. (2015, September 8). Spygate to deflategate: Inside what split
the NFL and Patriots apart. ESPN.Com. Retrieved from
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/13533995/split-nfl-new-england-patriots-apart
Wakefield, K. & Wann, D. L. (2006). An examination of dysfunctional sport fans. Methods of
classification and relationships with problem behaviors. Journal of Leisure Research, 38,
168-186.
Wann, D. L. (2006). The causes and consequences of sport team identification. In A. A. Raney &
J. Bryant (Eds.), Handbook of sports and media (pp. 331-352). United Kingdom:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Wann, D. & Branscombe, N. R. (1990). Die hard and fair weather fans. Effects of identification
on BIRGing and CORFing tendencies. Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 14, 103-117.
Wann, D. L., Carlson, J. D., & Schrader, M. P. (1999). The impact of team identification on the
hostile and instrumental verbal aggression of sport spectators. Journal of Social Behavior
and Personality, 14, 279-286.
Wann, D. L., & Dolan, T. J. (1994). Spectators’ evaluations of rival and fellow fans.
Psychological Record, 44, 351-.

140

Wann, D. L., Melnick, M. J., Russell, G. W., & Pease, D. G. (2001). Sport fans: The
psychology and social impact of spectators. New York: Routledge.
Wann, D. L., Schrader, M. P., & Carlson, J. D. (2000). The verbal aggression of sport spectator:
A comparison of hostile and instrumental motives. International Sports Journal, 4, 5663.
Ware, A., & Kowalski, G. S. (2012). Sex identification and the love of sports: BIRGing and
CORFing among sports fans. Journal of Sport Behavior, 35, 223-237.
Wenzel, M., Mummendey, A., & Waldzus, S. (2007). Superordinate identities and intergroup
conflict. European Review of Social Psychology, 18, 331-372.
Wilbur, E. (2015, February 19). ESPN proves yet again why Patriots fans have lost trust in the
network. Boston.com. Retrieved from
http://www.boston.com/sports/columnists/wilbur/2015/02/in_lieu_of_espn_mess_nfl_sho
uldnt_be_allowed_to_bu.html
Wright, S., Aron, A., McLaughlin-Volpe, T., & Ropp, S. A. (1997). The extended contact effect:
Knowledge of cross-group friendships and prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 73, 73-90.
Wu, S., Tsai, C. D., & Hung, C. (2012). Toward team or player? How trust, vicarious
achievement motive, and identification affect fan loyalty. Journal of Sport Management,
26, 177-191.
Zeigler-Hill, V. (2006). Discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem: Implications for
narcissism and self-esteem instability. Journal of Personality, 74, 119-143.
Zeithaml, V. A., Berry, L. L., & Parasuraman, A. (1996). The behavioral consequences of
service quality. Journal of Marketing, 60, 31-46.

141

